Shayna Hubers v. Vanessa Kennedy, Warden Kciw

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: 2025-CA-1116
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: MAY 15, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-1116-MR

SHAYNA HUBERS APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE MELANIE BRUMMER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-00101

VANESSA KENNEDY, WARDEN KCIW; COOKIE CREWS, COMMISSIONER KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; JEREMY LUCAS, COR CAPT I; JOSEPH WELLS, ADJUSTMENT OFFICER; MARC BLANFORD, COR CAPT I; AND SARA KING, INVESTIGATING OFFICER APPELLEES

OPINION AFFIRMING

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BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: Shayna Hubers, an inmate in the custody of the Kentucky

Department of Corrections (the DOC), appeals from an order of the Shelby Circuit Court dismissing her petition for a declaration of rights. After our review, we

affirm.

Hubers is housed at the Kentucky Correctional Institution for Women

in Pewee Valley. She is serving a life sentence for the 2012 murder of Ryan

Poston, a young attorney.

On February 26, 2024, following an investigation into allegations

made by a former inmate, Hubers was charged by the institution with a major

violation of the DOC’s policies and procedures; i.e., engaging in extortion or

blackmail. After an administrative hearing conducted in March, she was found

guilty of the violation. The penalty imposed was thirty-days’ disciplinary

segregation (with thirty-days’ credit for time served) and ninety-days’ loss of

good-time credit. Hubers filed a timely appeal to the warden. Upon her review,

the warden affirmed the decision and the segregation penalty but ordered the good-

time credit restored.

On February 20, 2025, Hubers filed a declaratory judgment action in

Shelby Circuit Court. Hubers contended that she had been denied procedural due

process throughout the disciplinary proceedings. The DOC moved to dismiss the

petition arguing that the penalty of 30-days’ segregation with credit for time served

was insufficient in severity and impact to warrant either state or federal due

-2- process protection as a matter of law. The circuit court agreed and granted the

motion. This appeal followed.

In her brief on appeal, Hubers argues that the circuit court erred by

dismissing her declaratory judgment action because the penalties imposed

adversely impacted her parole eligibility; increased the duration of her sentence;

increased her security level; and delayed her eligibility for honors housing. She

contends that these consequences constitute an atypical and significant hardship

sufficient to implicate her right to due process.

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by

provisions of the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(f). A trial court

will grant a motion to dismiss only where “it appears the pleading party would not

be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his

claim.” James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883 (Ky. App. 2002) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Whether a trial court erred by dismissing a civil action presents a

question of law subject to our de novo review. Campbell v. Ballard, 559 S.W.3d

869, 870 (Ky. App. 2018). However, we must bear in mind that “‘[p]rison

disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply

of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.’” Webb v. Sharp,

223 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Ky. 2007) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556

-3- (1974)). Courts are highly deferential to prison administrators where prison

disciplinary proceedings are questioned. Smith v. O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357

(Ky. App. 1997).

In order to establish a procedural due process claim, a party must

show: (1) that she enjoyed a protected “liberty” or “property” interest within the

meaning of our due process jurisprudence, and (2) that she was denied the process

due under the circumstances. Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Ky.

App. 2003) (citations omitted). A liberty interest sufficient to invoke due process

protections will generally be limited to freedom from restraint, which, while not

exceeding the sentence, nevertheless “imposes atypical and significant hardship on

the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner,

515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).

It is agreed that the loss of statutory good-time credit generally

implicates a protected liberty interest. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. However, in

this case, it is uncontroverted that the warden ordered that Hubers’s good-time

credit be restored in its entirety following her review of the administrative

proceedings. Thus, she suffered no loss of good-time credit.

Moreover, Hubers’s declaratory judgment action specifically

referenced restoration of “meritorious good time credit.” Unlike statutory good-

time credit, which is typically awarded automatically, meritorious good-time credit

-4- is awarded at the discretion of the DOC’s commissioner. See Marksberry, 126

S.W.3d at 752. There is no liberty interest justifying due process because

protection where a privilege, such as meritorious good-time credit, is withheld. Id.

Consequently, Hubers did not assert a viable due process claim on this basis.

Similarly, disciplinary segregation does not generally implicate a

liberty interest protected by principles of due process because segregation is

consistent with the nature of confinement that an inmate can reasonably anticipate

serving upon imprisonment. Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d at 749-50. Furthermore, the

collateral consequences that Hubers contends she suffered (including a delay in

transferring to preferred housing, etc.) affect privileges accorded to inmates that

also fail to implicate a protected liberty interest. See Marksberry, 126 S.W.3d at

751.

The record does not support Hubers’s assertion that she was deprived

of a protected liberty interest as a result of the disciplinary action. Dismissal of the

petition was warranted and required because she failed to show that she suffered an

atypical and significant hardship as a result of the disciplinary hearing. Her

procedural due process claims fail as a matter of law.

The order of the Shelby Circuit Court dismissing the petition is

affirmed.

-5- ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Louis W. Rom Robert Chaney Lexington, Kentucky Frankfort, Kentucky

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