Shawvan v. Shawvan

86 N.W. 165, 110 Wis. 590, 1901 Wisc. LEXIS 233
Wisconsin Supreme Court·Decided May 21, 1901·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Cassoday, C. J.

It appears from the record that Mary Shawvan, a widow, seventy-seven years of age, died intestate at her home in Milwaukee, February 7, 1900, leaving, her surviving, sis children, three of whom are plaintiffs in this action, and two of whom are defendants in this action, and the other, Kerillo, was a witness on the trial.

This action was commenced February 12,1900, for the purpose of setting aside and having declared void a deed, executed by the deceased January 29, 1900, of the house and lot where she resided to the defendant Douglas Shaw-vcm, and recorded on the same day, on the ground that the same was procured by the defendants by fraud and undue influence, and without any consideration. The defendants, Douglas and Oscar, each separately answered by way of admissions, denials, and counter allegations. The cause being tried, the court, at the close thereof, found as matters of fact, in effect: (1) That the mother died February 7,1900, at the age stated, leaving, her surviving, the six children named, as her sole heirs at law; (2) that February 12,1900, the son Kerillo, for value received, assigned, transferred, and set over all his right, title, and interest in and to all of the real estate owned by his mother to his brother Sobieshi by proper conveyance; (3) that in 1884 the mother purchased the real estate in question for $1,800; that the property at the time of her death was of the value of $2,500, and was all the property she possessed, except a small amount of personal property; (4) that in the fall of 1899 the deceased was taken sick, and gradually grew worse up to the time of her death; (5) that January 29,1900, the defendants, Douglas and Oscar, while present together at the home of the deceased, conspired together to procure a deed of the ■real estate from the deceased to the defendant Douglas, with the understanding between them that Oscar was to receive $500 from Douglas, and by means of fraud and undue influence, and in pursuance of such conspiracy, the defendants [592] on that day caused a deed of the real estate to be signed, wherein Douglas was the grantee and the deceased was the grantor; that at the time of signing the deed by the mother she was physically weak from long-continued sickness, which somewhat weakened her will power, and her situation and condition at the time were such as to render her unable to resist the importunities and influences brought to bear upon her by the defendants, and that the deed was not the free and voluntary act of the deceased, but was procured from her by fraud and undue influence practiced upon her by the defendants; that the procuring of the deed was so accomplished by the defendants without the knowledge of the other heirs, and was kept a secret from them by Douglas and Oscar, and that all of them, with the possible exception of the plaintiff Mrs. Metz were on friendly terms with the deceased; that Kerillo and Solieshi — two of such heirs— were in the city, and near at hand, at the time the deed was procured, and could have been easily called in; that the deceased, just pi’ior to the signing of the deed, asked for Kerillo, but the inquiry was ignored by Douglas; (6) that at the time the deceased signed the deed she was not indebted to, or under any obligation whatever to, Douglas, the grantee therein named; that the allegations in the answer of Douglas that he had advanced large sums of money to assist the deceased to purchase the real estate were untrue; that, if he had advanced money, it was a very small amount, and was by the deceased repaid to him many years ago; that the $500 mentioned in the deed as consideration was not paid to the deceased, and that at the time of obtaining the deed the defendants well knew that the deceased could live but a few days or weeks at the furthest; (J) that the defendants caused the deed so obtained to be recorded in the office of the register of deeds January 29, 1900; (8) that in the summer of 1899 the deceased made her will distributing her property among all her children [593] except Mrs. Metz; that her direction as to how she desired her will drawn, was written by herself, and clearly shows how she desired to dispose of her property; that Douglas caused such will to be destroyed a few hours before the deed was drawn, January 29,1900; that notice of the pend-ency of this action was filed; that all the other material allegations of the complaint were fully proven and true.

And as conclusions of law the court found, in effect, that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment against the defendants vacating and setting aside the deed from the mother, Mary Shawvan, to the defendant Douglas Shawvcm, dated January 29, 1900, and recorded on that day, and ordered judgment to be entered accordingly, together with the costs and disbursements of this action, to be taxed against the defendants. Erom the judgment entered thereon accordingly the defendant Douglas Shawvam, brings this appeal.

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Shawvan v. Shawvan, 86 N.W. 165, 110 Wis. 590, 1901 Wisc. LEXIS 233 (Wis. 1901).

86 N.W. 165 (Shawvan v. Shawvan) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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