Shaw's Case

140 A. 370, 126 Me. 572, 1928 Me. LEXIS 19
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedFebruary 9, 1928
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 140 A. 370 (Shaw's Case) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaw's Case, 140 A. 370, 126 Me. 572, 1928 Me. LEXIS 19 (Me. 1928).

Opinion

Wilson, C. J.

One Wallace W. Shaw, on January 28,1927, while in the course of his employment as a carpenter and engaged in cutting with a cold chisel and hammer small nuts from quarter inch bolts holding the hinges of a vestibule door of a street car, was struck near the eye by one of the nuts as it flew off, breaking his glasses and causing some of the pieces of the glass to enter the eye.

The only injury apparent to the physician who saw him within an hour of the accident was what he termed a sub-conjunctival hemmorrhage due to a slight injury to the tissues and blood vessels of the eyeball beneath the outer covering or membrane. Owing to the nature of the injury, he was sent on the following morning to a specialist in diseases and treatment of the eye who saw no other external signs of injury. Nor was his attention called to any during all the time of his treatment from January 29th to February 23rd, although the wife of the patient testified that there was a black place on the nose, meaning, we presume, what is ordinarily termed black and blue, a condition usually following a blow causing an injury to the blood vessels beneath the skin. Both she and her husband also testified that on the day following the accident there was some bloody mucous discharged from the nose.

The patient returned to work on January 31st and worked two or three days and then complained to the eye specialist that he was subject to headaches, dizziness, and double vision. As he also displayed symptoms of drowsiness, immobility of expression and lack of memory, the physician having had considerable experience with cases of encephalitis of the lethargic type, or sleeping sickness, advised him to have a physical examination to determine the cause of these symptoms. No infection developed in the eye and in due time, and long [574]*574before the hearing on the petition in this case, it went through the usual process of a complete recovery.

On February 10th, he consulted a general practitioner recommended by the eye specialist and on February 23rd his condition not improving, the physician made a thorough physical examination in the presence of four other specialists in certain branches of 'medicine. The diagnosis arrived at was “encephalitis and probably encephalitis lethargica.”

So far as any inference could be drawn by a layman from the evidence in the record that is not pure conjecture, the injured employee is or was suffering from some form of this somewhat obscure disease caused by the entering into the blood stream and finally the brain cells, in some manner, of a germ about which little is known to medical science and which has not yet been isolated.

Following the injury to the eye and the consequent incapacity, an agreement between the employee and employer was entered into for compensation during disability. On May 11th, 1927, the employer filed a petition to determine his present»capacity, alleging that “the incapacity for which the employee is being compensated is ended.”

After a hearing at which the employee and his wife and the several physicians who attended or who had examined him testified, the deputy commissioner, without finding as a fact that the pathological conditions described by the physicians as existing was due to the disease known as encephalitis lethargica, and apparently conscious of the lack of evidence sufficient to warrant a positive finding as to any connection between the condition of the employee as diagnosed by the physicians and the slight injury he received, expressed his conclusions as follows: “We think all will agree that the man is suffering from some nerve disorder affecting the brain whatever the name of the disorder may be.” This was folllowed by a discussion not based on any testimony in the record, of the olfactory nerves, the boney construction of the nose and its relation to the brain cavity and a theory which is purely speculative as to how the germs may have entered the blood stream and brain in this case. His final conclusion rises no higher than a belief, and has no support on any competent testimony in the case: “We believe the accident caused some sort of an injury to these nerves that the brain became affected. It [575]*575seems to us directly connected, even if there be argument as to the name of the disease. We oftimes hear of blows to the 'base of the brain’ causing incapacity. This cribriform plate forms a part of the base of the cranium. The trauma was close up to it.” There is no testimony in the record of any blow at the “base of the cranium” or any testimony, as to the nature or location of any cribriform plate. The only evidence of a blow, other than to the glasses is testimony of the wife of a place on the nose indicating a blow, but not of sufficient force even to break the outer skin.

And then by a process of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning: “Employee was a well man to' the moment of injury. Now he suffers.” Therefore he concludes the present incapacity is due to the injury. While this Court must accept his findings of fact, if based on any competent evidence, it is not bound by his reasoning. Mailman’s case, 118 Me., 177; Kelley’s case, 123 Me., 261.

From the decree of the Court affirming the decree of the deputy commissioner the petitioner employer appealed. We think the appeal must be sustained.

It is true the present case is based on a petition by the employer, and if the petition had been dismissed upon the ground that an agreement having been entered into, and the status of incapacity being already found to have been caused by the accident, it being presumed to continue until the employer sustains the burden of showing that it has ended or diminished, Orff’s case, 122 Me., 114, and that it was not sustained, no erroneous ruling of law would have been apparent, as the question of the weight of evidence and whether the burden of proof is sustained is solely for the commissioner. The rule on appeal, however, that slight evidence, if competent, is sufficient to sustain a decree is not the rule for determining whether the burden of proof is sustained before the Commission.

But the deputy commissioner in the case at bar assigned as grounds for his decree conclusions that are unsupported by any competent testimony, or beliefs that are the result of pure speculation and conjecture, which assigned as grounds for dismissing a petition constitute an error in law where they go to essential facts on which the petition is based.

It is undisputed that, at the date of the hearing on the petition, any incapacity due to the injury to the eye had long since terminated. [576]*576The issue upon the petition, therefore, was whether the pathological conditions, to which the present incapacity of the employee is. due, in any degree resulted from the injuries received from the nut. So far as there is any competent evidence in the case on which to base a positive finding as to the cause of his present incapacity, it is due to the presence of the germ of encephalitis lethargica or the results of infection therefrom. To assign any other cause, so far as the record discloses, is pure speculation, as is apparent from the language of the deputy commissioner, who evidently appreciating the force of the petitioner’s contention that from the evidence a conclusion that the disease of encephalitis lethargica could have resulted from the accident was unwarranted, expressed the belief that, while it might be doubtful as to what the nature of the disease was, the accident caused “some sort” of an injury to the perves that affected the brain.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Soucy v. Fraser Paper, Limited
267 A.2d 919 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1970)
Matthews v. R. T. Allen & Sons, Inc.
266 A.2d 240 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1970)
Goldthwaite v. Sheraton Restaurant
145 A.2d 362 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1958)
Boyce v. Maine Public Service Co.
81 A.2d 670 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1951)
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Ziegenfuss
49 A.2d 793 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1946)
Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co.
26 P.2d 973 (Montana Supreme Court, 1933)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
140 A. 370, 126 Me. 572, 1928 Me. LEXIS 19, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaws-case-me-1928.