Shawnee Ridge Hunting, L.L.C. v. LaRose

2026 Ohio 995

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 25CA1215
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Shawnee Ridge Hunting, L.L.C. v. LaRose, 2026-Ohio-995.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ADAMS COUNTY

: SHAWNEE RIDGE HUNTING, LLC, : Case No. 25CA1215 ET AL., : : Plaintiffs-Appellees : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY FRANK LAROSE, OHIO SECRETARY : OF STATE, ET AL., : RELEASED 3/19/2026 : Defendants-Appellants. : : APPEARANCES:

Morgan Staric, Hallie Zarbakhsh, and Greta Raser, Assistant Attorneys General, Columbus, Ohio for Defendants-Appellants State of Ohio and Director of Ohio Department of Natural Resources Mary Mertz.

Brodi J. Conover and Jessica E. Bainbridge, Bricker Graydon LLP, Columbus, Ohio for Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants Ohio Pork Council, Heimerly Farms, Ltd., And Eagle Creek Farms LLC.1

Zachary C. Schaengold, Jarrod M. Mohler, and Charles E. Rust, Robbins, Kelly, Patterson & Tucker LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Hess, J.

{¶1} State of Ohio and Ohio Department of Natural Resources Director

Mary Mertz appeal the judgment of the Adams County Court of Common Pleas

following a hearing for a preliminary and permanent injunction. The judgment

granted Shawnee Ridge Hunting and Paul Richter a permanent injunction and

found that amendments and new sections to R.C. 1531.01, 1533.01, 1533.731,

1533.75, and 1533.99 made by H.B. 503 were unconstitutional.

1 Intervenors filed a notice of appeal, but did not file a brief or otherwise participate in the appeal. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 2

{¶2} The State and Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR)

(collectively the “State”) raise four assignments of error. They contend that (1) the

plaintiffs-appellees lacked standing; (2) the trial court applied the wrong standards

in granting the injunction; (3) the trial court erred as a matter of law on the merits

because H.B. 503 is neither vague nor does it authorize a taking; and (4) the trial

court should not have converted the preliminary injunction hearing into a

permanent injunction hearing.

{¶3} We find: (1) the plaintiffs-appellees have standing to bring this

action; (2) the trial court applied the correct standards but made an error in the

written order that is properly corrected with a nunc pro tunc entry; (3) the trial court

did not err when it found H.B. 503 unconstitutional under the vagueness doctrine

and the takings clause; and (4) the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it

converted the preliminary injunction hearing to a permanent injunction hearing. We

overrule the State’s assignments of error and sustain the trial court’s judgment.

We remand the cause for the appropriate nunc pro tunc entry.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶4} Shawnee Ridge and Paul Richter sought a declaratory judgment

and injunctive relief against the State, ODNR, and others to have provisions of

H.B. 503 enjoined and declared unconstitutional. Richter owns Shawnee Ridge, a

several-hundred-acre wildlife hunting preserve in Adams County that hosts a

collection of wild animals, including boars. Shawnee Ridge has been a family-

owned business for over 50 years. The preserve grounds are surrounded by 9-

gauge triple-galvanized wire fencing, topped with barbed wire, and ranging up to Adams App. No. 25CA1215 3

12 feet high in certain areas. Shawnee Ridge provides 30,000 pounds of corn to

the boars to supplement their foraging diet, which includes acorns. According to

Richter, approximately 70 to 80 boars are hunted annually, the meat is processed,

and it is considered “free-range” pork by the United States Department of

Agriculture, meaning the boars have continuous, free access to the outdoors for

more than 50% of their lives. More than 60% of Shawnee Ridge’s business comes

from hunting and processing the boars in the preserve.

{¶5} In December 2024, the Ohio General Assembly enacted H.B. 503 to

take effect March 20, 2025. H.B. 503 was enacted “to prohibit certain activities

regarding garbage-fed swine, feral swine, and wild boar and to revise a definition

in the Agricultural Commodity Handlers Law.” R.C. 1531.01 was amended to add

a definition of “wild boar” or “feral swine” as meaning members of the suidae and

tayassuidae family:

(HHH) “Wild boar” or “feral swine” means either of the following:

(1) Members of the family suidae, including both of the following:

(a) Wild pig, wild hog, feral hog, and feral pig;

(b) Old world swine, razorbacks, European wild boar, and Russian wild boar, and any hybrids or crossbreeds thereof;

(2) Members of the family tayassuidae, including collared peccary and javelina, and any hybrids or crossbreeds of members of the family tayassuidae.

R.C. 1533.731 was amended to add subpart (B)(4) to ban the release of or hunting

of wild boar or feral swine in a wild animal hunting preserve:

(B)(4) No person shall knowingly release for hunting or hunt wild boar or feral swine in any wild animal hunting preserve in this state. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 4

R.C. 1533.75 was added to prohibit the following:

(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:

(1) Import, transport, or possess live wild boar or feral swine;

(2) Release wild boar or feral swine into the wild or expand the range of a wild boar or feral swine by introducing the wild boar or feral swine to a new location;

(3) Allow a swine that is under the ownership or possession of the person to live in a feral state;

(4) Except as otherwise provided in section 1533.751 of the Revised Code, hunt, trap, or kill a wild boar or feral swine or assist in the hunting, trapping, or killing of a wild boar or feral swine;

(5) Profit from the releasing, hunting, trapping, or killing of wild boar or feral swine;

(6) Fail to notify the division of wildlife in accordance with division (B) of section 1533.751 of the Revised Code.

(B) No person shall purposely feed a wild boar or feral swine.

R.C. 1533.751 was added to require a person with knowledge of the presence of

a wild boar or feral swine to notify the division of wildlife and, if it is on the person’s

property, permits the person to kill it if the person notifies the division of wildlife

within 24 hours and properly handles and disposes of the carcass:

(A) Except as provided in division rules, a person, including a property owner, tenant, or person responsible for a property's management, who knows or has reason to believe a wild boar or feral swine is present on private or public property shall notify the division of wildlife within twenty-four hours of the person so knowing or having reason to believe of the wild boar's or feral swine's presence.

(B) Except as provided in division rules, a person or a person's agent who encounters wild boar or feral swine on property owned or leased by that person may immediately eradicate the wild boar or feral swine without a hunting license required under section 1533.10 of the Revised Code if the person or agent does both of the following: Adams App. No. 25CA1215 5

(1) Notifies the division as soon as practicable, but not later than twenty-four hours after the eradication or attempted eradication of the wild boar or feral swine;

(2) Follows the instructions provided by the division including the handling, preservation for testing, and disposal of any wild boar or feral swine carcass.

{¶6} While there is no penalty imposed against persons who fail to report

the presence of wild boar or feral swine to the department of wildlife as required in

R.C. 1533.751(A), criminal penalties and costs of varying degrees are imposed for

violations of the remaining provisions. R.C. 1533.99(C) was amended to make a

violation of R.C. 1533.731(B)(4) (hunting in a wildlife preserve) a first-degree

misdemeanor. R.C. 1533.99(H) was added to make a violation of R.C.

1533.75(A)(3)-(6) and (B) a first-degree misdemeanor and a violation of R.C.

1533.75(A)(1) and (2) a fifth-degree felony. The applicable revisions in R.C.

1533.99 are:

(C) Whoever violates . . . division (B) . . . (4) of section 1533.731 . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree.

(F) Whoever violates any section of this chapter for which no penalty is otherwise provided is guilty of a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. This division does not apply to division (A) of section 1533.751 of the Revised Code.

(H) Except as otherwise provided in this division, whoever violates section 1533.75 of the Revised Code is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree. Whoever violates that section when the violation involves the importing or releasing of a wild boar or feral swine is guilty of a felony of the fifth degree. In addition to any other penalty, the court shall require any person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of that section to pay the costs incurred by any state or federal agency for the investigation, control, and eradication of wild boar or feral swine that resulted from the violation. Money paid to the division of wildlife shall be credited to the wildlife fund established under section 1531.17 of the Revised Code. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 6

{¶7} Shawnee Ridge and Richter alleged that H.B. 503 was

unconstitutional and sought a temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction.

They alleged that all pigs fall under the definition of wild boar or feral swine as set

forth in R.C. 1531.01(HHH) because pigs from Europe and Asia are members of

the suidae family and pigs from the Americas are members of the tayassuidae

family. They alleged that H.B. 503 failed the rational-basis test because there is no

rational relationship between the concern over feral pigs spreading disease against

the outright ban on owning and/or killing pigs. Under the law as written, they

contended that any individual with a pig (pet teacup pig or a zoo with a pig in a

petting zoo), in addition to themselves and Ohio pig farmers are criminals by their

mere ownership of pigs. In addition, H.B. 503 would permit a landlord to shoot and

kill a tenant’s pet teacup pig if the landlord notified the department of wildlife and

disposed of the carcass properly. They alleged there is no rational relationship

between H.B. 503 and the government’s interest in solving Ohio’s growing feral

swine infestation problem.

{¶8} They also alleged that H.B. 503 fails to meet the strict-scrutiny test.

Pigs are chattel and private property protected by the Ohio Constitution. The Ohio

Constitution recognizes a fundamental right to property. They contend that when

a law restricts the exercise of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is applied to

determine if the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

They alleged that H.B. 503 is not narrowly tailored to serve the government interest

in reducing the spread of feral swine and the diseases they spread. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 7

{¶9} They alleged that H.B. 503 is unconstitutionally vague because a

person of reasonable intelligence cannot ascertain with certainty what behavior is

prohibited or permitted by the new law. They contend that their possession of pigs

is criminal, their hunting of pigs is criminal, Shawnee Ridge’s profiting from the

hunting of pigs is criminal, their feeding of pigs is criminal, and although the killing

of pigs on personal property is generally permitted, their land is a wildlife hunting

preserve and the killing of pigs on that land is more specifically prohibited under

R.C. 1533.731(B)(4). In sum, they argued that there is nothing Shawnee Ridge or

Richter can do to not commit crimes under H.B. 503.

{¶10} Following a temporary restraining order hearing at which all parties

were present, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order. The trial court

found that the definition of wild boar or feral swine was so broad as to include all

pigs:

The Court finds the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits because the definition of “Wild boar” or “feral swine” contained in R.C. 1533.01(HHH) is defined to include the families suidae and tayassuidae which arguably encompasses all pigs. The Statute does not define what makes a pig wild or feral and does not except a certain genus or species of pig from its purview. Accordingly, this Court finds the Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their arguments that [H.B. 503] creates a law that fails the rational basis test, is constitutionally vague, takes property without due process, and imposes criminal penalties without due process.

The trial court also found that under H.B. 503, the plaintiffs could incur up to

$80,000 in criminal fines and 40 years incarceration for the possession of the 80

pigs currently on their preserve.

{¶11} The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to add the Adams County

Sheriff. The Ohio Pork Council, Heimerly Farms, Ltd., and Eagle Creek Farms LLC Adams App. No. 25CA1215 8

moved for and were granted permission to intervene as defendants. The

preliminary injunction hearing was continued by joint agreement of the parties to

allow the intervenors adequate time to prepare for the preliminary injunction

hearing. The preliminary injunction hearing was held over a two-day period and

the temporary restraining order was continued in place during that time.

{¶12} On the first day of the preliminary injunction hearing plaintiffs called

Pavan Parikh, who served as chief legal counsel for the minority caucus and a

policy advisor concerning the constitutionality and legality of different bills that

process through the Ohio legislature. Parikh also served as legislative counsel for

the Federal Home Loan Bank of Cincinnati where he worked on legislative matters

in Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the federal government. Parikh testified that

H.B. 503 was passed during a lame duck session, in which bills move “very, very

quickly.” Parikh testified that the definitional subsection (HHH), defining wild boar

and feral swine does not follow “naming conventions and definitional structures”

and adds “more ambiguity as to what the definition actually is.” Parikh testified that

the way the definition is written, it includes all members of the family Suidae and

the family Tayassuidae, which essentially bans all pigs in Ohio. This would lead to

non-uniform enforcement of the law because people could read the definition very

differently.

{¶13} Paul Richter testified that he and his family have resided in Adams

County for over 50 years and his father, Paul Richter, Sr., opened the Shawnee

Ridge Hunting preserve in 1973. Richter took over the business and now has two

sons who assist him. Richter testified that the preserve is 237 acres of fenced land Adams App. No. 25CA1215 9

with hogs, rams, goats, deer, and occasionally bison. There are 2 sections, one

with twelve-foot fencing for deer and larger animals, and the other a five-and one-

half-foot fenced section for boar and ram. The preserve has had boar since its

inception in 1973. Richter testified that no animal has ever escaped over or under

the fencing. However, in approximately 2020 a landslide occurred, and eight deer

escaped. Richter fixed the fencing and notified ODNR of the escape. Richter

regularly monitors the entire perimeter on a four-wheeler.

{¶14} Richter testified that he forgot to renew his ODNR license and sent

in his application and renewal fees on March 20, 2025, which was received by

ODNR on March 24, 2025.

{¶15} Richter testified that he has hybrid hogs, some which are born in the

preserve and others that he obtains through exotic stock sales in Ohio. He has

never purchased hogs from out of state or out of the country. After he purchases

them, they are quarantined in a barn for two days before they are released. He

feeds the animals in the preserve 200 lbs. of corn every 2 days at a cost of

approximately $15,000 to $20,000 a year. Wild boar hunting is approximately 50%

of the preserve’s revenue. People engage in hunting wild boar because the meat

is very good to eat and they like the challenge and camaraderie of hunting with

friends and family. Approximately 75 to 80 percent of the preserve’s new clients

come to hunt pigs because of the superior taste of the meat.

{¶16} Richter testified that he became aware of H.B. 503 during June 2024

and contacted his Ohio senators to express his opposition and to offer to testify

against the bill. However, nobody followed up with him. Richter had concerns about Adams App. No. 25CA1215 10

the bill as enacted because it was so broad it affected every pig and every pork

producer in the State of Ohio. He was concerned that because he owned a hunting

preserve, he would be subject to criminal prosecution and jail for owning hogs that

he has had for decades.

{¶17} Richter testified that he had witnessed a feral pig approximately three

years ago when a representative from the U.S. Department of Agriculture

approached him to warn him that they had trapped and tagged a feral sow and

released it with a tracker in the hopes of locating two other feral pigs. The tracker

broke and they lost track of the tagged feral sow. Richter was told to shoot it if he

discovered it. Richter testified that he located the feral sow on trail camera footage

from an adjacent property that is not fenced, and there were six or eight piglets

with her. Richter saw the sow several months later without any piglets and was

able to shoot the sow.

{¶18} Richter testified that several years ago at the request of the ODNR,

he installed two one-way doors, which allows animals that have escaped to get

back into the enclosure. Richter testified that he is aware of one occasion on which

a pig escaped, and he was able to locate and shoot it. He repaired the area which

had developed a sinkhole under the fencing and monitored the area and did not

locate any other escaped pigs. He is not aware of how many pigs in total may have

escaped from the preserve over the years, but it is a very rare occurrence.

{¶19} Dr. Andy Bowman, a professor in the Department of Veterinary

Preventative Medicine at The Ohio State University, testified as a qualified expert Adams App. No. 25CA1215 11

on pigs2 and infections on behalf of the intervenors. Dr. Bowman testified that the

Suidae family of pigs is a family that encompasses 18 different genus and species,

“I think, in general, we would think those are all the different pigs of what we think

of as normal pigs in the world.” A domestic pig is in the family Suidae and the

products in the grocery store, such as a pork chop, come from domestic pigs from

the family Suidae. Dr. Bowman discussed the type of diseases that feral swine

might carry that pose a risk to domesticated pigs. Dr. Bowman testified that he

believed that H.B. 503 would reduce the risk of the spread of disease amongst the

domestic pig population.

{¶20} Dr. Bowman testified that, to him, a feral pig is “any non-

domesticated pig . . . pigs roaming the countryside.” Ohio has had an ongoing

problem with “uncontained pigs,” particularly in the southern half of the state. The

two main diseases (pseudorabies and brucellosis) feral pigs might transmit to

domestic pigs are transmitted through direct contact. There is also an H5N1

influenza virus that is transmitted by wild birds to poultry, cattle, and pigs.

{¶21} On cross-examination, Dr. Bowman agreed that all pigs that Richter

purchases for Shawnee Ridge must test negative for both pseudorabies and

brucellosis prior to entering Ohio, under OAC 901-117.12. However, these same

tests are not required for pigs that come into “every Smithfield factory.” Dr.

Bowman agreed that, on an individual basis, Richter’s pigs undergo stricter testing

and verifications for pseudorabies and brucellosis disease than the pigs that come

into “the Smithfield factories.” Dr. Bowman testified that a domestic pig will become

2 Witnesses, attorneys, and the trial court used the terms “pig,” “hog,” and “swine” interchangeably

throughout the proceedings. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 12

feral if given the right circumstances. Dr. Bowman testified that male pigs will grow

tusks and that every pig in the United States today is of the family Suidae:

Q: And you talked about the members of the family Suidae and that is, to be clear, every pig that’s in the United States, correct?

A: It is in the Family Suidae, yes. Yes.

Q: Every pig that [Richter] owns, every pig that the Ohio Pork Council has some sort of governance or relationship over, they are in the Family Suidae, correct?

A: Correct.

***

A: I think all pigs are a part of the Family Suidae, yes.

{¶22} Dr. Bowman testified that he performs research on the transmission

of disease among pigs. Dr. Bowman’s research includes the study of the

transmission of respiratory illnesses among pigs at state agricultural fairs and

shows, in which pigs from different geographic areas come together in close

enclosures. Dr. Bowman established an influenza A virus (“IAV”) monitoring

program to monitor these pigs at agricultural fairs and found that 25% of fairs have

pigs shedding IAV and at fairs where there were IAV positive pigs, 66% of all pigs

tested positive by the end of the fairs, which include the 88 Ohio county fairs, plus

4-H events. Dr. Bowman testified that there is a risk of pigs transmitting IAV at

county fairs and the pigs who travelled to these fairs can return to their farms and

infect other pigs. Additionally, these IAV infected pigs could be sold at these fairs

and put into different farms and infect that farm’s pig breeding population. Despite

these infection risks, Dr. Bowman would not advocate banning county fair and 4-

H events. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 13

{¶23} Dr. Bowman also researched the risks of feral pigs captured in Ohio

from 2009 through 2015. His research concluded, “Results indicated an overall low

prevalence of pathogens in feral swine in Ohio; however, the importation of live

feral swine from other states remained an important concern for pathogen

introduction and spread.” Dr. Bowman also conceded that even though he wrote

that Ohio’s feral swine population “likely originated from hunting preserve

escapees or from illegal interstate transportation,” he had no citation for that

information, and he agreed it was “word of mouth” and he had no evidence that

Shawnee Ridge was the source of any feral swine in the study. Dr. Bowman’s

study also concluded, “From a public health standpoint, our results indicate feral

swine pose a risk, albeit overall low, for zoonotic pathogen transmission in Ohio.

The risk to the public is perhaps greatest for hunters, biologists[,] and other

professionals who have close contact with these animals or those who consume

their meat.” Dr. Bowman testified that he continues to hold that opinion concerning

feral swine in Ohio. Dr. Bowman’s feral swine study concluded, “This study serves

as an important step in recognizing feral swine risks in Ohio and assisting in

prioritizing future surveillance, pathogen testing, and control strategies. Illegal

introductions of animals carrying pathogens remain a critical threat to Ohio’s swine

industry.” Dr. Bowman agreed that he had no evidence that Shawnee Ridge or

Richter introduces animals illegally into Ohio.

{¶24} Dr. Bowman agreed that about 25% of his research is focused on

disease transmission at fairs and there were only three of his studies related to Adams App. No. 25CA1215 14

feral swine. Dr. Bowman agreed that he focuses his research on true risks to the

pig population.

{¶25} On redirect, Dr. Bowman reiterated his belief that feral swine do pose

a risk to the domestic pig population and that H.B. 503 is directed at limiting the

feral swine and wild boar population. Although the reduction of disease is one

aspect of the bill, Dr. Bowman believes the bill is also meant to reduce the crop

damage feral swine can cause.

{¶26} On re-cross Dr. Bowman testified that he made a distinction between

feral swine and the wild boar on an enclosed hunting preserve like Shawnee Ridge:

Q: Dr. Bowman when you talked about feral pigs, you are talking about the unowned and just wild out there, not enclosed in a hunting preserve type of pig, right?

Q: You’re not talking about my client’s [Richter’s] pigs specifically, are you?

A: I’m not.

{¶27} Dr. Bowman testified that if H.B. 503 outlawed the existence of all

pigs, that would be an unreasonable approach to eliminate concerns about the

spread of disease. In a question from the trial court, Dr. Bowman testified that there

is no current law that requires all domestic hogs to be vaccinated for pseudorabies

and/or brucellosis. There is no requirement for a pseudorabies vaccine because

all 50 states have been recognized as free from pseudorabies in the domestic pig

population.

{¶28} Cheryl Day, executive vice president of the Ohio Pork Council,

testified that the Ohio Pork Council is a trade association that represents pig Adams App. No. 25CA1215 15

farmers in Ohio. The Ohio Pork Council has 2,500 members representing 3,400

farms, with an economic value to the state of $3.8 billion, $115 million in state and

local taxes, and 28,000 jobs.

{¶29} Day became involved in H.B. 503 because of concerns the United

States and South American countries have with African swine fever, which has

become a problem in Europe. South and North America do not have African swine

fever in its pig population. Currently, 44 states ban the importation of feral swine

and 16 states ban the hunting and importation of feral swine.

{¶30} Day testified that, in a hypothetical scenario where African swine

fever was detected in the United States, there would be a 72-hour stop of all pig

movement, hog prices would drop (Day speculates by 50 to 60%), and herds that

were infected would have to be culled. U.S. trading partners would shut down the

export market. To avoid the economic consequences of an African swine fever

outbreak, the Ohio Pork Council works to keep foreign animal disease out of the

United States by working on the U.S. Swine Health Improvement Plan which

started a pilot project to have certain farms test for African swine fever.

{¶31} According to Day, H.B. 503 “gives us another tool in the strategy to

control and eliminate feral swine in Ohio.”

{¶32} On cross-examination, Day stated that she was not sure whether

African swine fever was a respiratory illness, but that it is transmitted “nose-to-

nose” or by the spread of manure from one farmer’s boot to another farmer’s boot

and onto their farms. Day testified that African swine fever is not in Canada or any

U.S. State such that the borders of Ohio are intact, and the transmission of African Adams App. No. 25CA1215 16

swine fever is not coming to Ohio. However, Day testified that African swine fever

can be transmitted in meat, and it is currently in the Dominican Republic. If

someone from the Dominican Republic evades customs officials, brings raw

infected pig meat in through the airport, and feeds that raw meat to an Ohio pig,

the Ohio pig population could be infected with African swine fever. H.B. 503

addresses that through the garbage feeding restrictions in the bill. Day testified

that any pig in Ohio is equally at risk for infection by African swine fever.

{¶33} Day testified that “food security is national security” and she agreed

that a hostile government could sneak into a commercial farming operation in Ohio

and feed African swine fever meat to the pigs, which are crammed tightly inside,

and create an epidemic. However, Day testified that “farms have strict biosecurity

reasons for that, and they limit the guests that come on, and they have to sign and

do cameras, just as anybody would protect their property.”

{¶34} Day testified that H.B. 503 was a law the Ohio Pork Council

advocated for and “it was a group effort.” “We all reviewed the language to our [sic]

best of our knowledge, so we thought we had the language and definitions tight

and correct.” Day testified that she does not believe the entire Ohio pork industry

could be wiped out by H.B. 503, “because I see the bill as a legislative attempt to

only do feral swine.”

{¶35} Following Day’s testimony, the trial court continued the hearing in

progress because they ran out of time for the State’s witness. The temporary

restraining order was continued in place through the next hearing date. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 17

{¶36} The second day of the hearing, the State called Leighland Arehart, a

law enforcement program administrator with the wildlife division of ODNR.

Arehart’s responsibilities include oversight of the records management system,

development of policy and procedures, and drafting administrative rules. Arehart

is familiar with wild animal hunting preserves and with H.B. 503. Arehart prepared

a document summarizing the changes in H.B. 503. Arehart testified that the

purpose of H.B. 503 was to eliminate feral swine and wild boar from Ohio because

they pose a risk to native habitat, crops, agricultural commodities, and can transmit

disease.

{¶37} Arehart testified that the Ohio Administrative Code Rule 1501:31-1-

02 (FFFFFF) contains a definition of “wild boar” or “feral swine” that is similar to

the one in H.B. 503 but is structurally different and has been in place since 2014.

Arehart testified that he would determine whether a pig in the wild were a feral pig

or a domestic pig by evaluating “the totality of the circumstances where it’s found,

its proximity to a known livestock operation, what it looks like, if it is acting wild,

how far away it is, if we can determine when it escaped, those kind of things would

all be for consideration.” Arehart testified that there are four wild animal hunting

preserves in Ohio licensed to have wild boar for hunting. These preserves obtain

wild boar through a licensed breeder, an exotic animal sale, breed them

themselves, or through natural breeding on the preserve. Wild animal hunting

preserves are required to be licensed, fenced, and animals on the preserve must

be tagged if they are released into the preserve (tagging existing animals in the

preserve is not required). Arehart testified that he is aware of only one escape of Adams App. No. 25CA1215 18

wild boar from Richter’s Shawnee Ridge preserve and that was “years ago, a large

tree fell and knocked down the fence. [Richter] knew three hogs got out, and he

was able to shoot them down the road.”

{¶38} On cross-examination, Arehart testified that the Department of

Agriculture is responsible for livestock in the state and the Division of Wildlife would

work with the Department of Agriculture to help delineate whether a pig would be

called feral or domestic.

{¶39} Arehart testified that he prepared a letter to be sent March 20, 2025,

the expected date of the effectiveness of H.B. 503, to inform hunting preserves

with wild boar that what they were doing was illegal but that the Division of Wildlife

would refrain from enforcing H.B. 503 until June 1, 2025. The Division of Wildlife

was aware of the impact of H.B. 503 on wild boar hunting preserves since

December 2024, but was not going to contact any of them until the law took effect

and they were already acting illegally.

{¶40} Arehart agreed that if a pig escaped a local farm and got into

Shawnee Ridge, it would be included in the definition of wild boar and regulated

as an animal on a wild animal preserve. Arehart testified that prior to H.B. 503, the

determination of what a feral pig is was left to the discretion of the Chief of the

Division of Wildlife. Arehart testified that under R.C. 1533.75:

If Mr. Richter had pens where he had livestock pigs, he was raising for the fair, whatever he does with them, they were contained in those pens and were not available for hunting in the preserve, they would be livestock. But if he’s releasing them for hunting within the preserve, they would fall under the prohibition under 1533.731. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 19

{¶41} To clarify the distinction between wild boar and feral pig, Arehart

testified to the following:

Q: Mr. [Areh]art can we agree that wild boar, however you define them and domestic pigs, however you define them, can both become feral pigs or swine?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. But they are not inherently feral pigs or swine until the circumstances arise that makes them feral pigs or swine, correct?

Q: Okay. Now, you’ve talked about the totality of the circumstances, the color, are they owned, that kind of thing. And so, I was just trying to create that understanding, if we move the question along, we’re just talking about feral swine. Mr. Richter’s pigs, who for the record, have all had to be tested for Brucellosis and pseudorabies when he purchased them at stock sales in Ohio. They are more along the lines of wild boar than feral pigs, according to your totality of the circumstances test, correct?

A: So, his boar, wild boar, within his preserve, I would think would be wild boar. Correct.

{¶42} Arehart was then asked about the pigs that are advertised by the

Wooly Pig Farm Brewery near Coshocton, Ohio. According to the advertisement

by Wooly Pig Farm Brewery, they claim “Our wooly pigs are an old-world breed

called ‘Mangalitsas’ originating in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late 1800s.”

It says the wooly pigs “are pasture pigs; they are excellent foragers and need very

little feeding when free ranging in a pasture.” Arehart testified that he would not

consider the pigs at Wooly Pig Farm Brewery to be under ODNR’s supervision

even though, according to the advertisement, the brewery has hairy heritage-

looking crossbreed pigs that are free-ranging in a pasture and foraging, because

the advertisement said “that it is a domestic pig.” However, Arehart clarified, “if this Adams App. No. 25CA1215 20

exact pig were in the middle of Wayne National Forest, outside of captivity or

confinement, or any livestock operation, then yes, it would be a feral pig.” Arehart

further clarified that if the Wooly Farm pigs “were within a hunting preserve

release[d] for hunting, then they would fall under our regulations.”

{¶43} However, upon further cross-examination, Arehart conceded that

under the definition of wild boar and the totality of the circumstances test, the pigs

on Wooly Farm could be wild boar:

A: If I take this article to be accurate, it does appear to be a crossbreed of European wild boar and Serbian Sumadija breed, I’m not sure how to pronounce it, but they could potentially fall, yes, as a wild boar, or a crossbreed of a wild boar.

{¶44} Arehart testified that ODNR has not determined how they are going

to regulate wild boar and feral swine going forward with the new definition.

However, he testified that they had decided that they were going to send

enforcement letters to everyone who listed wild boar on a wild animal hunting

preserve within the last several years. He acknowledged that everyone

understands that feral pigs are a potential problem and that feral pigs and wild boar

are not necessarily the same thing. His approach to enforcing H.B. 503 was to

begin with people who had wild boar, but not necessarily feral pigs. ODNR had not

developed what the next enforcement step would be. Thus their first step was to

start with wild animal hunting preserves. They had no plans to approach breweries

with Hungarian boar crossbreeds. Arehart has not developed any guidance for his

wildlife officers to tell the difference between a wild boar and a feral swine, even

though there is a difference. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 21

{¶45} Arehart testified that he believes Richter is the owner of the pigs on

his land. However, the State of Ohio is the owner in trust of all wild animals not

legally confined or held by private ownership. Arehart agreed that H.B. 503 makes

the ownership and possession of wild boar unlawful, but it has no system set up to

compensate people who owned wild boar before H.B. 503 went into effect.

{¶46} On re-direct Arehart testified that wild boar pose threats to

landscape, habitat, agricultural commodities, and crops. But on re-cross, he

conceded that those are threats that wild boar pose if they are living as feral pigs,

wild on the landscape. And he agreed that this is the same threat, to a certain

extent, that a domestic pig who becomes feral would pose to the landscape.

Arehart testified that ODNR has a general understanding of the difference between

domestic and wild animals and uses the Department of Agriculture definitions to

aid them in interpretation and enforcement of their regulations and to ensure that

they “are not overstepping into their lane.”

{¶47} Arehart testified that H.B. 503 does not give the ODNR any specific

waiting period within which to enforce the law. The agency’s decision to wait until

June 1, 2025 to begin enforcement was entirely discretionary.

{¶48} In response to questions from the trial court, Arehart testified that if

a pig from the Wooly Pig Farm Brewery escaped to a neighbor’s property, the

neighbor could lawfully shoot it as feral swine. Similarly, if a Hampshire hog (black

and white hog) escaped from a farm, it could likewise be shot as a feral swine.

{¶49} Paul Richter was called on rebuttal and testified that it was his father,

Paul Richter, Sr., who spoke to the ODNR agents in 2021 about the escaped hogs. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 22

Richter testified that he no longer purchases hogs from Canada, rather they are

either propagated on the premises or purchased through exotic sales in Ohio.

Richter also testified that he was seven or eight years old when the three hogs

escaped as noted in the ODNR report, so it would have been in 1975 or 1976.

Other than the three hogs, in the late 1970’s a Sika deer escaped, a Spanish goat

jumped out and was quickly shot, and in the mid-1980s a goat disappeared and

may have jumped out or may have “met an untimely demise.”

{¶50} Richter testified that he checks his fences often because the animals

are his livelihood. It would be a bad business model if his profits were escaping,

and Richter also does not want his animals impacting the environment. Richter

testified that after 2021, there was a sinkhole that developed near a fence and a

hog managed to get through, but Richter shot it. Richter testified that there are

approximately 50 hogs on the preserve currently and he purchases approximately

30 to 40 hogs each year. The remaining 10 to 20 are naturally bred.

{¶51} At the conclusion of preliminary injunction hearing, Richter and

Shawnee Ridge renewed their motion to have the court convert the preliminary

injunction hearing to a permanent injunction and the State renewed its objection.

The trial court granted the motion and converted it to a permanent injunction

hearing. The parties gave closing arguments, and the trial court granted a

permanent injunction to Richter and Shawnee Ridge on the grounds that H.B. 503

has ambiguous definitions and is void for vagueness and thus fails due process.

If you apply this law, if this law goes into effect, you don’t enjoin it, what does Mr. Richter do? There’s nothing he can do based upon this law. What about the unambiguous parts? He can’t sell, transport, Adams App. No. 25CA1215 23

can’t kill, can’t feed, can’t starve. What is he supposed to do with these animals?

The trial court found that Richter and Shawnee Ridge had proven both beyond a

reasonable doubt and by clear and convincing evidence that the factors for a

permanent injunction had been met. The trial court also found there is no remedy

at law because, based on the approximately 40 hogs Richter owns, he could be

charged with 40 misdemeanors, sentenced to 20 years of local incarceration, and

issued a $40,000 fine. The trial court clarified that the injunction did not affect the

provisions of the bill that allow landowners to kill a feral pig or wild boar on their

property, or the garbage-feeding provisions.

{¶52} In the order granting the permanent injunction the court found that

Richter and Shawnee Ridge established their entitlement to a permanent injunction

by clear and convincing evidence. First, it found that the definition of “wild boar” or

“feral swine” includes the family of Suidae, which encompasses all pigs, hogs, and

swine in Ohio. Thus, H.B. 503 authorizes the taking of all pigs, hogs, and swine in

Ohio. As such it is “ill-conceived terminology that is overly broad/vague, and is

unconstitutional.” The amendments in R.C. 1531.01, 1533.01, 1533.731, 1533.75,

and 1533.99 are void for vagueness and violate Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s due

process rights:

Under these amendments and additions, Plaintiffs are unable to act without engaging in criminal activity: they cannot own, kill, transport, feed, or fail to feed the members of the family Suidae that they own, without committing misdemeanor or felony criminal acts. The Court also finds that the specific amendments and additions to Chapter 15 in H.B. 503 described above violate Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution as they would constitute an unjust and uncompensated taking. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 24

In addition, the Court finds that the specific amendments and additions to Chapter 15 in H.B. 503 do not meet rational basis review. Feral pigs provide no benefit, but the Court cannot find that there is a rational basis connecting the prohibition on owning, killing, feeding, transporting or failing to feed any member of the family Suidae with the eliminating of feral pigs. The Court finds well beyond clear and convincing evidence that the specific amendments and additions to Chapter 15 in H.B. 503 are unconstitutional for the three reasons listed above.

{¶53} The order, entered April 11, 2025 stated, “This is a Final appealable

Order and there is not Just Reason for Delay.” The State and the intervenors filed

timely notices of appeal. Richter and Shawnee Ridge had a separate statutory

claim for attorney’s fees under R.C. 2335.39 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §1988 in their

complaint but requested that the deadline to file for attorney’s fees be held in

abeyance pending the appeal and the trial court granted that request.3

{¶54} After the trial court determined that the definition of “wild boar” or

“feral swine” was so unartfully drafted as to include all pigs in the state, the Ohio

General Assembly immediately acted to amend that definition. That amended

definition was signed by the governor on June 30, 2025 – 11 weeks after the trial

court’s order. The revised definition of “wild board” or “feral swine” in R.C.

1531.01(HHH) is:

(HHH) “Wild boar” or “feral swine” means a hog, boar, or pig that appears to be untamed, undomesticated, or in a wild state. “Wild boar” or “feral swine” includes both of the following:

3 Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s unresolved statutory claim for attorney’s fees under R.C. 2335.39

does not prevent a final judgment; the order here is a final, appealable one. See State ex rel. Staple v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 2025-Ohio-4698, ¶ 31. However, when attorney’s fees are sought as part of damages and they are left unresolved, the order is not a final, appealable one because damages are part of a claim for relief, rather than a separate claim in and of themselves. See Chilli Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Denti Restaurants Inc., 2022-Ohio-848, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.). Adams App. No. 25CA1215 25

(1) Except for Sus scrofa domesticus that is legally confined or held in captivity, members of the family suidae, including all of the following:

(b) Old world swine, razorbacks, European wild boar, and Russian wild boar, and any hybrids or crossbreeds thereof;

(c) Wild pig, wild hog, feral hog, or feral pig that appear contained in a wild animal hunting preserve licensed under section 1533.721 of the Revised Code or a wholly enclosed preserve for hunting or trapping.

(2) Members of the family tayassuidae, including collared peccary and javelina, and any hybrids or crossbreeds of members of the family tayassuidae.

{¶55} The State argues that this change in the definition in R.C.

1531.01(HHH) moots a portion of their appeal, but not all of it. To the extent the

trial court’s analysis relied exclusively upon the former definition of wild boar or

feral swine, the State argues that analysis is now moot. However, the State argues

that certain portions of the trial court’s decision did not rely exclusively on the

former definition to reach its conclusions, and those portions are not moot.

Specifically, the State argues that the takings and void-for-vagueness holdings are

not moot, but the rational basis holding is moot. Richter and Shawnee Ridge argue

that even the rational basis holding is not moot because captive, free-range wild

boar pose no greater threat to property and livestock than domestic pigs.

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶56} The State raises the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it granted a permanent injunction despite Plaintiffs’ lack of standing. Order at 1. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 26

2. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it applied the incorrect standards. Order at 2, 3.

3. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it found for Plaintiffs on the merits. Order at 1.

4. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. Order at 1.

We address the State’s first, second, and fourth assignments of error first and then

turn to the third assignment of error – the merits of the trial court’s decision.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standing

{¶57} The State contends that Richter and Shawnee Ridge did not have

standing to challenge certain provisions in H.B. 503 because, even though they

operate a wild animal hunting preserve that identified wild boar on their permit

application, their license lapsed in April 2024 and they did not renew it until March

2025. Richter testified that his family had operated Shawnee Ridge as a wild

animal hunting preserve since the early 1970’s, when he was a young child. The

family business is now operated by Richter and his two sons. However, he forgot

to renew the license and sent in his renewal application and fees on March 20,

2025 and it was received by ODNR on March 24, 2025.

{¶58} Richter argues that there is no dispute that Richter and Shawnee

Ridge own the pigs within the preserve and this alone gives them standing.

Additionally, the relevant hunting preserve licensure statutes have two

requirements: R.C. 1533.721(A) and (G)(1). R.C. 1533.721(A)(1) governs the

initial license and requires the payment of a $1,000 fee. Subpart (G)(1) contains

the annual renewal requirement and payment of $200. The renewal is to be made Adams App. No. 25CA1215 27

on the thirteenth day of April each year. The statute imposes no fees or penalties

for late renewal. Thus, Richter argues he was a license holder under R.C.

1533.721(A) and renewed it late under subpart (G). Therefore, he had standing to

challenge the law.

1. Standard of Review

{¶59} “Standing determines whether a litigant is entitled to have a court

determine the merits of the issues presented.” (Citations omitted.) Moore v.

Middletown, 2012-Ohio-3897, ¶ 20. Standing is a question of law, which we review

de novo. Id.

{¶60} Before a court can consider the merits of a legal claim, “the person

or entity seeking relief must establish standing to sue.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio

Dept. of Commerce, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 27. Under common-law standing, a

plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) an injury; (2) that is fairly traceable to the

defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct; and (3) is likely to be redressed by the

requested relief. Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus, 2020-Ohio-6724,

¶ 12. “[T]he question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such

a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,’ as to ensure that ‘the dispute

sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form

historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Sierra

Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972). “[J]udges are cautioned to remember,

standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court. ‘

“Rather, it is a practical concept designed to insure that courts and parties are not

vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial Adams App. No. 25CA1215 28

decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with

each view fairly and vigorously represented.” ’ ” Moore at ¶ 47; Hoover v. Pfeifer,

2025-Ohio-4909, ¶ 86-87 (3d Dist.).

2. Legal Analysis

{¶61} The State raised the issue of standing in its memorandum opposing

the temporary restraining order and argued that the plaintiffs could not show any

harm because they are currently operating an unlicensed wild animal hunting

preserve because they did not submit their annual renewal application in a timely

manner. The State argued that the plaintiffs had no separate right to own wild boar,

however they cited nothing to support that contention and the exhibits they

submitted acknowledged that because of H.B. 503, “Wild boar and feral swine can

no longer be possessed in Ohio” – not that possession of them had been outlawed

prior to H.B 503.

{¶62} Richter and Shawnee Ridge addressed the renewal application at

the temporary restraining order hearing, explaining that “there has been a

ministerial mix up in terms of the renewal of the license.”

{¶63} The trial court does not directly address the State’s standing

argument in its order granting the temporary restraining order. Rather, it implicitly

rejected the State’s standing argument by finding that Richter and Shawnee Ridge

were likely to prevail on the merits and that there was a substantial risk of

irreparable harm because they run the risk of incurring up to $80,000 in fines and

40 years in jail for possession of 80 pigs, if the sentences were to be imposed

consecutively. Remarks made from the bench during the temporary restraining Adams App. No. 25CA1215 29

order reveal that the trial court found no merit to the State’s standing argument

such that it did not warrant more than a terse analysis. The trial court characterized

Richter as “inadvertently overlooking maybe a renewal of a license application”

rather than intending a purposeful surrender of the business or permanent

cessation of operations. Additionally, the trial court found, “But when we talk about

the broad sweeping [sic] that Mr. Richter doesn’t have standing. This is his life.”

“[H]e’s [Richter’s] part of the pork industry. In that respect, that he does have

apparently about 80 hogs that are harvested in a year’s time.” “And it’s also been

the livelihood of Mr. Richter and his family for over 50 years.”

{¶64} We find that Richter and Shawnee Ridge have standing to challenge

H.B. 503, both as the operator of a wild animal hunting preserve and as owners of

pigs. The temporary lapse of the license does not affect their standing. There is no

evidence that Richter intended to cease business operations. To the contrary,

Richter had a family-operated business for 50 years and planned to continue it for

his two sons. Moreover, there is no evidence that the temporary lapse of his license

had any legal ramifications to the business. When he did renew the license in

March 2025, he did not have to pay late fees, penalties, or reapply anew and pay

the initial $1,000 license fee. The State has presented no evidence that they

required Richter to suspend the ongoing operations of the hunting preserve during

the time his license was lapsed. In fact, the only action the State ever took against

Richter for his inadvertent failure to renew the license was to give him a reminder

to renew it. The State explained that Richter had forgotten to renew the license on Adams App. No. 25CA1215 30

another occasion in the past and the State simply gave him a reminder: “He has in

the past also failed to renew his license and the agency informed him of this.”

{¶65} The State has cited no case law or statutory authority that the license

lapse removed Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s standing to sue. Nowhere do we find

the State claiming that H.B. 503 does not apply to Richter and Shawnee Ridge,

nor does the State refute the trial court’s finding the Richter and Shawnee Ridge

could be fined up to $80,000 and jailed for 40 years (assuming 80 hogs) based on

the criminal penalty provisions added by the bill. Richter and Shawnee Ridge have

demonstrated an injury fairly traceable to H.B. 503 that is redressed by an

injunction. They have standing. To interpret standing as the State argues it is to

use standing as a technical rule to keep Richter and Shawnee Ridge out of court.

{¶66} We overrule the State’s first assignment of error.

B. The Standards Applied by the Trial Court in Granting the Permanent Injunction

{¶68} The State contends that the trial court made two errors in applying

legal standards. First, the State argues that Richter and Shawnee Ridge were

required to prove that H.B. 503 was unconstitutional “beyond a reasonable doubt”

but that the standard the trial court applied was “clear and convincing evidence.”

However, the State did not make this argument below. To the contrary, the State

argued in their memorandum contra, “Plaintiffs have the burden to prove each of

these factors by clear and convincing evidence.” In addressing the constitutionality

factor, the State did not argue a different standard of proof or argue that “proof

beyond a reasonable doubt” was the evidentiary standard that applied to that

factor. Thus, to the extent the trial court erred, it was an error the State invited and Adams App. No. 25CA1215 31

about which it cannot now complain. Krista v. Thompson, 2025-Ohio-5566, ¶ 33

(4th Dist.) (“Under the invited-error doctrine, a party may not take advantage of an

error that he himself invited or induced the trial court to make.”).

{¶69} Furthermore, Richter and Shawnee Ridge argued, and it was

conceded at oral argument, that the trial court used the correct legal standard

verbally from the bench at the hearing, but did not use the correct legal standard

in the subsequent written order.

{¶70} The degree of proof required for a facial constitutional challenge like

the one here is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. “To prevail on a facial

constitutional challenge, the challenger must prove the constitutional defect, using

the highest standard of proof, which is also used in criminal cases, proof beyond

a reasonable doubt.” State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State

Bd. of Edn., 2006-Ohio-5512, ¶ 21. “To prevail on a constitutional challenge to the

statute as applied, the challenger must present clear and convincing evidence of

the statute's constitutional defect.” Id.

{¶71} Our review of the hearing transcript confirms that the trial court found

that Richter and Shawnee Ridge had proven both beyond a reasonable doubt and

by clear and convincing evidence that the factors for a permanent injunction had

been met: “The court, in returning to the factors, by clear and convincing evidence,

I would go as far as to say, because I am, that it’s beyond a reasonable doubt to

this court.” Because the trial court actually applied the “beyond a reasonable doubt”

standard and found it had been met, any error in the trial court’s subsequent written

order can be corrected on remand with a nunc pro tunc entry. Stepp v. Starett, Adams App. No. 25CA1215 32

2019-Ohio-4707, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.) (nunc pro tunc entries are used to reflect what the

court actually decided and to correct clerical or mechanical errors).

{¶72} Second, the State argues that to grant a permanent injunction, the

trial court should consider four factors (likelihood of prevailing on the merits;

irreparable injury to plaintiff; no unjustifiable harm to third parties; and it is in service

of the public interest). However, here the trial court added two more requirements:

whether plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law and whether injunctive relief is

for the purpose of maintaining the status quo pending a trial on the merits.

{¶73} We find that the State has made no argument or showing that it was

prejudiced by this purported error. Smith v. Flesher, 12 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 (1967)

(“It is an elementary proposition of law that an appellant, in order to secure reversal

of a judgment against him, must not only show some error but must also show that

that error was prejudicial to him.”). Moreover, the State has no standing to assert

a purported error that placed additional legal burdens upon its opponent.

“Generally, an appellant does not have standing to argue issues affecting another

person.” Tunnacliffe v. Carr, 2025-Ohio-5590, ¶ 76 (4th Dist.).

{¶74} Because any error in the burden of proof can be corrected by a nunc

pro tunc entry and the additional standards imposed upon plaintiffs were not

prejudicial to the State, we overrule the State’s second assignment of error.

C. Conversion from a Preliminary to a Permanent Injunction Hearing

{¶75} The State argues that the trial court erred when in converted the

preliminary injunction hearing to a permanent injunction hearing. The State argues

that this was highly prejudicial to it because it wanted to determine if it could call a Adams App. No. 25CA1215 33

witness to talk about “studies out there that the State recently become aware of”

that discuss “the correlation between the number of feral swine surrounding areas

that have wild animal hunting preserves.” “There are studies out there focusing on

these issues.” Because the State could not present a witness to discuss these

studies, it claims it was prejudiced by the conversion.

{¶76} Under Civ.R. 65(B), “the court may order the trial of the action on the

merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application” before

or after the commencement of the preliminary injunction hearing. We review its

decision to do so for an abuse of discretion. West v. Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-1951,

¶ 15 (1st Dist.). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's attitude was

unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Cochran v. Cochran, 2025-Ohio-2565,

¶ 27 (4th Dist.).

{¶77} There are three types of injunctions:

In Ohio, injunctions are separated into three categories: (1) the temporary restraining order, which is issued ex parte without notice in an emergency situation to last only until a hearing can be set; (2) the preliminary injunction issued with notice and after a hearing to maintain the status quo until there can be a full trial on the merits; and, (3) the permanent injunction issued after a trial on the merits. 2 McCormac, Anderson's Ohio Civil Practice (1991) 842, Section 75.01.

Bd. of Educ. Ironton City Schools v. Ohio Dept. of Educ., 1993 WL 256320, *2 (4th

Dist. June 29, 1993) (trial court erred when it consolidated a temporary restraining

order hearing with a trial on the merits). Civ.R. 65(B) governs preliminary

injunctions and provides, in relevant part: Adams App. No. 25CA1215 34

(B) Preliminary Injunction (1) Notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without reasonable notice to the adverse party. The application for preliminary injunction may be included in the complaint or may be made by motion.

(2) Consolidation of Hearing With Trial on Merits. Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application.

{¶78} Thus, under Civ.R. 65, a trial court has the discretion to consolidate

a hearing on a preliminary injunction with a trial on the merits to prevent

two hearings and save time and expense for the court and parties. See Staff Note,

Civ.R. 65. The consolidation can occur after the preliminary hearing begins.

Generally, it is improper for a trial court to consolidate a preliminary injunction

hearing with the permanent injunction hearing (or a trial on the merits) without first

giving notice to the parties. Ohioans for Concealed Carry v. City of Columbus,

2019-Ohio-3105, ¶ 49 (10th Dist.) (trial court erred when it did not give notice that

it was consolidating the hearings until it issued its written injunction order).

{¶79} However, to be entitled to reversal, a party must not merely

demonstrate it was denied proper notice, but also that the denial of notice was

prejudicial. Id. at ¶ 52; West v. Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio 1951, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.) (“court

does not abuse its discretion by consolidating the trial into the preliminary hearing

without notice if the parties did not suffer prejudice from this maneuver”). A party

who claims to be aggrieved by lack of notice of consolidation “should at least make

a proffer to the trial court to highlight what evidence it would have introduced with

adequate notice. Otherwise, we are left with little more than speculation on Adams App. No. 25CA1215 35

appeal.” West at ¶ 18 (city failed to show prejudice when it failed to proffer evidence

to trial court that it claims it would have introduced with adequate notice).

{¶80} Here the trial court held a temporary restraining order hearing with

notice to the parties. The State defendants had four attorneys representing them

at the temporary restraining order hearing. Therefore, the trial court could have

treated the motion for a temporary restraining order as one for a preliminary

injunction but did not. Bd. of Educ. Ironton City Schools v. Ohio Dept. of Educ.,

1993 WL 256320, *2 (4th Dist. June 29, 1993) (where all parties have notice, are

present, and participate, the temporary restraining order hearing can be treated as

a preliminary injunction hearing).

{¶81} The trial court held a preliminary injunction hearing two weeks later

on April 1, 2025, which extended to a second day on April 8, 2025. By the time

the preliminary injunction hearing commenced the intervening defendants had

joined and were represented by counsel at the hearing and had brought their own

expert witness and a representative of the Ohio Pork Council to testify. Richter

testified and had an expert witness also testify. The State defendants brought one

witness to testify. Prior to the beginning of the first day of the hearing, Richter and

Shawnee Ridge’s counsel requested that the preliminary injunction hearing be

converted to a permanent injunction hearing. Counsel explained:

I was talking with [intervenor’s counsel] and [State’s counsel], and we have a lot of witnesses here. I don’t know that we can call any other witnesses. If Your Honor is willing to consider the option to notify us, which I think all is required under Rule 65, and you’re considering it, we’d like you to consider this for both Preliminary and Permanent Injunction. We are going to have I think everybody’s due process rights will be taken care of with the number of witnesses we Adams App. No. 25CA1215 36

have. . . . I think [opposing counsels] are at least hesitantly comfortable with that.

However, State’s counsel disagreed:

Given the time frame that we do have, I believe the State may be seeking to have additional testimony in front of the court in terms of a Permanent Injunction. Additionally, . . . there is a right to appeal, . . . a Preliminary Injunction ruling for matters that stays laws. So we don’t believe that there’s a need to convert this into a Permanent Injunction hearing today.

The trial court denied the request to convert it, “we will not be converting this to

permanent today, on permanent injunction.” Due to time constraints, the State was

unable to present its witness during the first day of the hearing, so the trial court

continued the hearing until a week later.

{¶82} Prior to the start of the second day of the preliminary hearing,

Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s counsel renewed their motion to have the hearing

converted to a permanent injunction. Relevant arguments concerning the

conversion were:

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: We would like to renew our motion to have this converted to a permanent injunction. All of the witnesses, all the evidence we’re going to need here will have been heard by the end of today. My understanding is that [intervenor’s counsel], on behalf of the interveners, does not oppose that. I’ll let him speak for himself, But [State’s counsel] does. I do not know [her] position as to why. But we believe, at this point, it makes sense for Your Honor to be able to make a ruling that establishes the parties’ relationship, because I don’t think we need more evidentiary hearings on this particular matter[.] * * * [State’s Counsel]: Yes, my colleague is correct. We do oppose the conversion to a permanent injunction hearing. The State would like to reserve the right to call additional witnesses as time progresses. As we’re all aware, this has been a fairly tight time frame just given the procedural nature that we’re in. So, we would request that this remain a preliminary injunction hearing so that the State has the ability and reserves the right to call additional witnesses should a Adams App. No. 25CA1215 37

permanent injunction or when a permanent injunction hearing occurs. * * * [Intervenors’ Counsel]: I don’t really have a super strong opinion about it. I think there’s wisdom in converting it. I think there’s wisdom in leaving it as a preliminary. I don’t have a super strong opinion . . . . * * * [Sheriff’s Counsel]: We’ll leave it to the court’s discretion, Your Honor. * * * [Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Your Honor, I appreciate the opportunity to quickly respond. You know, more witnesses was the reason that the State said, well, we don’t want to do now. The State’s had opportunity. We don’t even understand what the State thinks might be an unresolved issue or might need to be developed as far as House Bill 503 goes. And I think that’s telling. The State had the opportunity to bring more witnesses today. My understanding is they’re not. And that was after last week when the State said, well, we don’t want to convert this to a permanent hearing because we think there may be more witnesses. They’ve had their opportunity over the last week to figure that out. Our case is pretty much done. I’m not sure what else. And I don’t think the State has enunciated what other evidence might be adduced from any mystery speculative witnesses. And I think that’s telling. So, unless the State can particularly point to an area that they believe is lacking, that they believe truly needs to be developed, that they could have developed, that they could not have developed, I apologize. But I think it makes sense to convert this to a permanent injunction, Your Honor.

Plaintiffs’ Counsel summarized the factors for an injunction and how each

of the witnesses and evidence addressed those factors and concluded:

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: I just don’t know what evidence there is left to figure out. And I think the fact that we have no new witnesses from last week to this week.

Court: I think there is an additional witness that has not been presented yet. At least one, correct?

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Yeah, but the State literally said last week, we don’t think it’s appropriate because we might need more witnesses.

Court: I agree. That was my hesitation. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 38

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Yes. They’ve had the opportunity. They have no more witnesses. If they wanted to have more witnesses, I would have said, that’s fine. Let’s get the evidence in there so that Your Honor can decide what the law is and how it should be applied.

Court: Do you see any prejudicial effect to the plaintiff or plaintiffs if the court hears testimony before it determines whether this will be converted prior to closing arguments to a permanent injunction relief hearing?

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Your Honor, I do think having to continue to do this and continue to fight this over the long time period would be prejudicial to the plaintiffs. But if the court hears testimony before it decides.

Court: Today.

[Plaintiffs’ Counsel]: Today. I don’t that that’s prejudicial. My big concern is I don’t want the State to then say, well, you didn’t give us sufficient notice. So, as long as everybody’s on notice that the court may convert this, I’m comfortable with that.

Court: So, I’ll reserve ruling on that, and I’ll defer to [State’s counsel]. She’s not had an opportunity to present her client’s testimony or persons that she wishes to testify. So, I’m gonna reserve it, but there’ll be a ruling on it prior to oral arguments, okay?

Nobody objected to the court’s notice that it would wait until the conclusion of the

evidence to decide whether to convert the hearing to a permanent injunction

hearing.

{¶83} After the State’s witness concluded his testimony, the trial court

asked the State if it had any additional witnesses that it would like to call and the

State replied, “No additional witnesses from the State, Your Honor.” The

intervenors and the sheriff also stated that they had no more witnesses. Richter

testified in rebuttal and at the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court addressed

the conversion motion. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 39

{¶84} The State continued to object to a conversion to a permanent

injunction hearing on the ground that an additional witness might be found to

discuss “the correlation between the number of feral swine surrounding areas that

have wild animal hunting preserves.” The State also addressed the issue of

whether the order, if it were preliminary rather than permanent, would be a final

appealable order. The trial court and other counsel also joined in to speculate

about whether a preliminary injunction order would be a final, appealable order

and whether the conversion to a permanent injunction would facilitate the parties’

ability to appeal it.4 The intervenors’ counsel stated that he would favor converting

it to a permanent injunction hearing. The trial court granted the motion and

converted the hearing to a permanent injunction hearing and then allowed the

parties to proceed with closing arguments.

{¶85} The trial court did not act unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable

when it converted the preliminary hearing to a permanent hearing. We further find

that the State has failed to show prejudice from the consolidation. Here, the State

was put on advance notice that the plaintiffs sought to have the matter

consolidated at the beginning of the first day of the preliminary injunction hearing.

The trial court further notified the parties on the second day of the hearing, which

occurred a week later, that it would consider consolidation after it heard from the

4 There is no legal landscape more littered with landmines than that of finality under R.C. 2505.02.

Compare Preterm-Cleveland v. Yost, 2022-Ohio-4540, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.) (a preliminary injunction order enjoining a statute was not a final, appealable order) with Cincinnati v. State, 2024-Ohio- 2425, ¶ 16-17 (1st Dist.) (a preliminary injunction order enjoining a statute was a final, appealable order). R.C. 2505.02 was amended October 24, 2024 to add (B)(8): An order restraining or restricting enforcement, whether on a temporary, preliminary, or permanent basis, in whole or in part, facially or as applied, of any state statute or regulation, including, but not limited to, orders in the form of injunctions, declaratory judgments, or writs; . . . Adams App. No. 25CA1215 40

State’s witness. The State’s only objection to consolidation was that it might bring

in a witness to discuss studies that correlate feral swine’s presence with the

presence of wild animal hunting preserves. But it never proffered copies of those

studies as evidence before the trial court. A party in the State’s position “aggrieved

by consolidation like this should at least make a proffer to the trial court to highlight

what evidence it would have introduced with adequate notice. Otherwise, we are

left with little more than speculation on appeal.” West v. Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-

1951, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.).

{¶86} The State also argues that the trial court should not have

consolidated the hearing because it had not yet filed an answer, citing Hershhorn

v. Viereck, 27 Ohio App.3d 242 (10th Dist. 1985). We find Hershhorn

distinguishable. In Hershhorn, the trial court consolidated a preliminary injunction

hearing with a trial on the merits where the complaint asserted multiple claims,

including breach of contract and specific performance. The appellate court found

that it was prejudicial to the defendants to have to defend against all the claims

raised in the complaint, particularly where the defendants had not filed an answer

that might have raised additional issues. Id. at 243.

{¶87} Here, Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s complaint made three claims: a

declaratory judgment that H.B. 503 is unconstitutional; an injunction against H.B.

503; and attorney’s fees under R.C. 2335.39 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §1988. The

declaratory judgment and injunction claims were intertwined, involving the same

issues. Unlike in Hershhorn, the trial court here did not consolidate the preliminary

injunction hearing with a trial on the merits of all claims raised in the complaint; it Adams App. No. 25CA1215 41

consolidated it with a permanent injunction hearing. The State was not forced to

defend the attorney’s fee claim. And, the State does not identify any prejudice, nor

does it contend that there were additional issues raised in its answer that should

have been considered outside the scope of the hearing. To the contrary, the

State’s answer responded to the allegations in the complaint and raised a standard

list of affirmative defenses. In sum, the State has failed to identify any manner of

prejudice caused it by the consolidation of the preliminary and permanent hearings

prior to filing its answer.

{¶88} We overrule the State’s fourth assignment of error.

D. The Trial Court’s Findings on the Merits

{¶89} The State challenges two aspects of the trial court’s decision to grant

injunctive relief. First, it argues that H.B. 503 is not void for vagueness because it

is clear what wild animal hunting preserves can and cannot do under the law and

“opportunities for compliance are plentiful.” Second, the State contends that the

trial court erred in finding H.B. 503 authorizes a taking because Ohio citizens have

no entitlement to own certain breeds of pigs. Alternatively, the State argues that

even if it were a taking, an injunction is not the solution. Instead, a mandamus

action is the correct legal procedure.

{¶90} Richter and Shawnee Ridge contend that the trial court correctly

enjoined the statute because it failed the rational-basis test, is unconstitutionally

vague and deprives them of due process, and is an unconstitutional taking of

property. They argue that there is no rational basis for targeting hunting preserves

and owners and propagators of wild boars because the evidence showed that this Adams App. No. 25CA1215 42

breed of pig is less likely to spread disease than factory-farmed pigs. They argue

that H.B. 503 is unconstitutionally vague because it is unclear what they can do

without incurring criminal sanctions. Finally, they argue that H.B. 503 is an

unconstitutional taking because all of their pigs would become property of the

ODNR without compensating them for the value of the pigs.

{¶91} “The grant or denial of an injunction is solely within the trial court's

discretion and, therefore, a reviewing court should not disturb the judgment of the

trial court absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” Garono v. State, 37

Ohio St.3d 171, 173 (1988), citing Perkins v. Village of Quaker City, 165 Ohio St.

120, 125 (1956) (“unless there is a plain abuse of discretion on the part of trial

courts, in granting or refusing injunctions, reviewing courts will not disturb such

judgments”). To review the trial court's grant of the permanent injunction, we must

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Richter

and Shawnee Ridge proved beyond a reasonable doubt that H.B. 503 is

unconstitutional.

{¶92} “[B]ecause the determination of a statute's constitutionality presents

a question of law, we review the merits of that question on a de novo

basis.” Hayslip v. Hanshaw, 2016-Ohio-3339, ¶ 27 (4th Dist.). Moreover, “[w]hen

a claim challenges a statute's constitutionality, we begin with the presumption that

the statute is constitutional.” State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State,

2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 13.

2. Legal Analysis Adams App. No. 25CA1215 43

{¶93} The trial court found that the definition of “wild boar “or “feral swine”

in R.C. 1531.01(HHH) was unconstitutionally broad and vague because it included

all pigs, hogs, and swine. The General Assembly made substantive amendments

to that definition in June 2025, immediately after the trial court’s decision issued.

Thus, the June 2025 version of R.C. 1531.01(HHH) was not part of the record

below, nor was there testimony or analysis of it. We will not review the newly

amended definition for the first time on appeal. However, we do find that the

amendments were substantive and would require a new constitutional analysis of

R.C. 1531.01(HHH) at the trial court level. Therefore, for purposes of our review,

we will not consider the trial court’s analysis of R.C. 1531.01(HHH).

{¶94} The trial court also found H.B. 503 “void for vagueness, and therefore

violates Plaintiffs’ rights to due process.” “Plaintiffs are unable to act without

engaging in criminal activity: they cannot own, kill, transport, feed, or fail to feed

the members of the family Suidae that they own, without committing misdemeanor

or felony criminal acts.”

{¶95} The trial court found that the provisions of H.B. 503 violate the Ohio

Constitution because “they would constitute an unjust and uncompensated taking.”

{¶96} Finally, the trial court found that H.B. 503 failed to meet rational basis

review. The trial court agreed that feral pigs provide no benefit, but there was no

“rational basis connecting the owning, killing, feeding, transporting, or failing to

feed any member of the family Suidae with the elimination of feral pigs.”

a. Vagueness and Due Process Adams App. No. 25CA1215 44

{¶97} “It is well established that all legislative enactments must be afforded

a strong presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Collier, 62 Ohio St.3d 267, 269

(1991). “The prohibition of vagueness in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized

requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules

of law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the first essential of due

process.’” Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015).

Under the Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, any statute which “ ‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute’ ” is void for vagueness. More recently, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “ * * * the void-for- vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Similarly, this court has stated that “ ‘ * * * [t]he crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue.’ ”

Three “values” rationales are advanced to support the “void for vagueness” doctrine. These values are first, to provide fair warning to the ordinary citizen so behavior may comport with the dictates of the statute; second, to preclude arbitrary, capricious and generally discriminatory enforcement by officials given too much authority and too few constraints; and third, to ensure that fundamental constitutionally protected freedoms are not unreasonably impinged or inhibited. (Citations omitted.)

State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3 (1984). “The void-for-vagueness doctrine

ensures that individuals can ascertain what the law requires of them.” State v.

Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 532 (2000).

{¶98} We agree with the trial court’s analysis and find that the provisions in

R.C. 1533.731 and R.C. 1533.75 fail to give persons of ordinary intelligence fair Adams App. No. 25CA1215 45

notice that their contemplated conduct is forbidden. Richter and Shawnee Ridge

cannot ascertain what the law requires of them so that they can avoid engaging in

criminal conduct. The crimes here are not expressed such that the ordinary

persons can intelligently choose, in advance of taking action, what course is lawful

for them to pursue.

{¶99} On March 19, 2025, Richter and Shawnee Ridge could lawfully

operate a wild animal hunting preserve that included wild boar among their

business inventory. They could possess and feed the animals and hunt, kill, and

profit from the hunting of the animals. On March 20, 2025, they instantly, and

without taking any action, became criminals as approximately 50 percent of their

business inventory was declared unlawful for them to both possess or dispossess.

They could not possess, feed, not feed, hunt, kill, transport, or profit from the

hunting or killing of the wild boar. Half of Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s business

operations went from lawful to criminal overnight. Because of the restrictions on all

actions involving the animals, it was impossible for them to determine how to

intelligently choose, in advance of taking any action, what course was lawful for

them to pursue.

{¶100} The State argues that the provisions are not vague because

it is clear: there is nothing that Richter and Shawnee Ridge can do to avoid criminal

activity. However, this argument brazenly disregards the values that support the

vagueness doctrine. Ordinary citizens are to be given fair warning so that their

behavior might comport with the statute. They must be able to intelligently choose

what course is lawful. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 46

{¶101} The State also argues that opportunities for compliance with

H.B. 503 “are plentiful.” First, the State argues Shawnee Ridge and Richter had

from December 2024 to March 2025 to dispossess themselves of their wild boar

inventory “by transporting them out of state or hunting them on the preserve.” First,

they presented no evidence at the hearing that either of these two “opportunities”

were viable options. Transporting them out of state and then what? Releasing them

in a neighboring state to become feral? The State gives no guidance. And, the

State submitted no evidence that it would be possible for Shawnee Ridge to cull

its entire inventory of wild boar in the three-month period from December 19, 2024

and March 20, 2025.

{¶102} H.B. 503 is void for vagueness because “it fails to give the

ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted.”

(Emphasis added.) City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60 (1999). It is vague

not in the sense that it imprecisely distinguishes between permissible and

impermissible conduct, but because no standard of permissible conduct is

specified at all. Id.

{¶103} Last, the State argues that ODNR planned to exercise

enforcement discretion and had planned to inform wild animal hunting preserves

by letter on March 20, 2025 that it would not enforce H.B. 503 until June 1, 2025,

which would have given Richter and Shawnee Ridge both notice of the law and an

arbitrarily determined two additional months to cull or transport their inventory out

of state. However, H.B. 503 contains no provision that suspends the enforcement

of the criminal penalties. ODNR has arbitrarily determined this. County sheriffs and Adams App. No. 25CA1215 47

other state law enforcement officials could enforce them as soon as they became

effective on March 20, 2025. ODNR provided no evidence or rationale supporting

a June 1, 2025 enforcement date. Its decision to arbitrarily refrain from enforcing

H.B. 503 is a tacit acknowledgment that H.B. 503 fails to provide fair notice and

prevent arbitrary enforcement.

{¶104} We find the trial court did not err when it found that Richter

and Shawnee Ridge had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that H.B. 503 violated

Due Process because it was unconstitutionally vague.

b. Unconstitutional Taking

{¶105} First, the State contends that the procedural posture of this

case is wrong. It argues that Richter and Shawnee Ridge should have brought a

mandamus action, not a declaratory judgment and injunction action. We disagree.

A mandamus action is a procedure to compel appropriation proceedings. A

declaratory judgment action under R.C. 2721.03 is the proper procedure for a

person to have determined the validity of a statute and challenge the

constitutionality of it. E.g., Ohioans for Fair Representation v. Taft, 76 Ohio St.3d

180 (1993); R.C. 2721.12. Additionally, a mandamus action to compel

appropriation proceedings and an action for declaratory and injunctive relief are

not mutually exclusive proceedings. State ex rel. Gilmour Realty, Inc. v. City of

Mayfield Heights, 2008-Ohio-318 (a developer could bring both (1) an action for

declaratory judgment and injunction alleging that a rezoning ordinance constituted

an unlawful taking and (2) a mandamus action to compel the city to commence

appropriation proceedings). Adams App. No. 25CA1215 48

{¶106} Next the State contends that Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s

hogs are dangerous wild animals over which the State has the power to regulate,

citing Wilkins v. Daniels, 913 F.Supp.2d 517 (2012) (analyzing the Ohio Dangerous

Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act). However, the State made no claims in

the proceeding below that Richter and Shawnee Ridge’s hogs were governed by

the Ohio Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snakes Act and thus have

waived any arguments related thereto.

{¶107} Moreover, in Wilkins, the plaintiffs argued that the law that

required them to microchip their animals was a “permanent physical invasion” of

their property and amounted to a taking. The district court found that the plaintiffs

had a cognizable property interest in the ownership of dangerous wild animals: a

“limited or qualified property right exists in connection with the ownership of

dangerous wild animals” Id. at 541. But the microchip requirement was “minimally

invasive to the animal” and less invasive than a spay and neutering requirement

which had previously been held not to effect a taking. Id. at 542. Therefore, the

court held that the microchip requirement did not constitute a taking. Unlike H.B.

503, which strictly outlaws without exception the possession of wild boar, the Ohio

Dangerous Wild Animals and Restricted Snake Act allowed the plaintiffs to

maintain ownership and possession of their animals if they registered and

microchipped the animals, obtained proper permits, installed certain fencing, and

followed the breeding and selling restrictions. The holding in Wilkin lends support

to the trial court’s finding that H.B. 503 effected a taking without compensation.

H.B. 503 does more than impose a layer of regulatory requirements on Richter and Adams App. No. 25CA1215 49

Shawnee Ridge’s hogs, it requires the immediate and complete dispossession of

them. See Michigan Animal Farmers Assoc. v. Dept of National Resources and

Environment, 2012 WL 676386 (Mich.App. Mar 1, 2012).

{¶108} In Michigan Animal Farmers, the court held that it was within

Michigan DNRE’s authority to amend the Invasive Species Order (ISO) to add

certain swine breeds to it and to develop a phased compliance protocol for its

implementation. The agency amended the ISO in December 2010 and then

allowed for a 15-month phase-in period through March 31, 2012 “to allow ‘owners

of shooting and breeding facilities’ an opportunity ‘to cease possession of a such

swine before determinations of noncompliance will be rendered.’ ” Id at * 7. There

was also a procedure for a compensation claim in the Michigan Court of Claims.

The court held that this did not constitute a taking because “owners of prohibited

swine will not immediately lose their property, and any property that is lost will be

subject to a potential claim for government compensation in the Court of Claims.”

Id. Here, H.B. 503 does constitute a taking because it does require the immediate

loss of property and provides no system for compensation.

{¶109} We find the trial court did not err when it found that Richter

and Shawnee Ridge had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that H.B. 503

constituted an unconstitutional taking of their property.

c. The Rational Basis Test

{¶110} The State and Richter and Shawnee Ridge disagree on how

the June 2025 amendments to R.C. 1531.01(HHH) impact the trial court’s finding

that H.B. 503 does not meet rational basis review. The State argues that the trial Adams App. No. 25CA1215 50

court’s rational basis holding was based on its finding that “wild boar” or “feral

swine” encompasses every pig in Ohio. Therefore, the amendments moot that

finding. Richter and Shawnee Ridge argue both that it refers to “everything pig-

related in Ohio” and that it also refers to their pigs.

{¶111} In discussing the rational basis test, the trial court’s decision

appears to rely on its interpretation that R.C. 1531.01(HHH) definition includes all

pigs. It states:

In addition, the Court finds that the specific amendments and additions to Chapter 15 in H.B. 503 do not meet rational basis review. Feral pigs provide no benefit, but the Court cannot find that there is a rational basis connecting the prohibition on owning, killing, feeding, transporting or failing to feed any member of the family Suidae with the elimination of feral pigs. (Emphasis added.)

The use of the phrase “any member of the family Suidae” means all pigs because

it is undisputed by the parties that Suidae means pigs. Therefore, we read the trial

court’s finding as applying the rationale basis test to H.B. 503’s ban on all pigs in

the state. The trial court’s remarks from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing

also appear to support our determination that the trial court was using the definition

of the wild boar to mean all pigs. Excerpts from that portion of the trial court’s

remarks include:

And then the rational basis test. Ask whether the method or means is rational in its rawest form. And the court cannot find, again going back to its belief, that while extremely well-intended law, no hesitation or reservation . . . . Again, well-intended law, but just ill- conceived terminology, ambiguous definitions. . . . But I don’t think, with time for a brief, that it can be the family Suidae, including . . . .You don’t have to be a wordsmith. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 51

{¶112} Because we find that the trial court applied the rational basis

test to H.B. 503 as applicable to all pigs in the state and that definition has since

been amended, we find this portion of the trial court’s findings moot. However, we

find that the trial court’s vagueness and takings findings were supported by proof

beyond a reasonable doubt. These two grounds are sufficient to affirm the trial

court’s grant of a permanent injunction. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

when it granted a permanent injunction of the contested sections of H.B. 503.

{¶113} We overrule the State’s third assignment error.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶114} We overrule the State’s assignments of error and affirm the

trial court’s judgment. We remand the cause for a nunc pro tunc entry to state the

standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt for the constitutional findings the

trial court issued.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY. Adams App. No. 25CA1215 52

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY. Costs to be paid by appellants.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. & Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

__________________________________ Michael D. Hess Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.