Shawn Patterson and Amanda Patterson, individually and as the marital community thereof v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, a New Hampshire corporation.
Opinion
May 18, 2026 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
SHAWN PATTERSON and AMANDA PATTERSON, individually and as the NO. 2:25-CV-0296-TOR marital community thereof, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT Plaintiffs, PREJUDICE
v.
OF AMERICA, a New Hampshire corporation.,
Defendant. BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss (ECF No. 11). This matter was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. This case arises out of an insurance dispute related to a water loss to Plaintiffs’ residence located in Deer Park, Washington. The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ complaint (ECF No. 1-1). Plaintiffs had an insurance policy through Defendant that provided coverage for the dwelling at issue, personal
property, loss of use, and other additional coverages. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 2.2, 2.3. On May 9, 2023, Plaintiffs opened a claim with Defendant after Plaintiffs’ dwelling suffered a water loss. Id. at ¶ 2.2. Plaintiffs retained Property Claim
Advocates (“PCA”) to represent them in their claims with Defendant. Id. at ¶ 2.5.
Plaintiffs, through the PCA, submitted to Defendant an estimate of repair in the amount of $113,828.85 and a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss in the amount of $181,265.27. Id. at ¶¶ 2.8, 2.10. Plaintiffs’ allege that to date, they have not received all the benefits they are entitled to under the policy. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 2.33. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Spokane County Superior Court on April
11, 2025 bringing six claims: (1) Defendant violated the Washington Insurance Fair Conduct Act (“IFCA”), RCW 48.30 et seq.; (2) Defendant breached its duty of good faith by giving greater consideration to its own interests rather than Plaintiffs’ and forcing Plaintiffs to seek counsel to pursue their claims; (3) Defendant
breached its insurance contract with Plaintiffs; (4) Defendant violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”), RCW 19.86 et seq.; (5) Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment that they are entitled to coverage under their policy with
Defendant; and (6) Defendant negligently handled Plaintiffs’ insurance claim. ECF No. 1-1 at ¶¶ 3.1-3.51. Defendant removed the action to this Court on August 7, 2025. ECF No. 1.
Plaintiffs now move to voluntarily dismiss their complaint without prejudice. ECF No. 11. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ motion or alternatively requests attorney fees and costs that it incurred in removing the action to federal court. ECF No. 14
at 2. Plaintiff moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 41(a)(2) requesting a Court order voluntarily dismissing their action without prejudice. Plaintiffs seek to
join additional parties that upon investigation are considered necessary parties to Plaintiffs’ action. ECF No. 11 at 2. Plaintiffs contend that joining the parties will deprive the Court of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore seek dismissal to
refile in state court. Id. A. Legal Standard “A dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) normally is without prejudice” and should be granted “unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal
prejudice as a result.” Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla Intern. B.V., 889 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The purpose of the rule is to permit a plaintiff to dismiss an action without
prejudice so long as the defendant will not be prejudiced, or unfairly affected by dismissal.” (internal citation omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has defined “legal prejudice” to mean “prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, some legal
argument.” Id. (quoting Westlands Water Dist. V. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996). B. Analysis
Defendant puts forward several arguments it contends weigh in favor of finding that dismissal will prejudice Defendant. First, Defendant argues that it will suffer prejudice if the dismissal is granted without prejudice because it has incurred significant effort and expense in preparing for trial. ECF No. 14 at 7.
However, the Ninth Circuit has “explicitly stated that the expense incurred in defending against a lawsuit does not amount to legal prejudice.” Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97. Moreover, Defendant does not elaborate on what significant effort or
expense it has incurred other than noting that it served one set of discovery requests and incurred costs and fees in drafting the notice of removal. ECF No. 14 at 7-8. Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs’ explanation is an obvious pretext for
forum shopping and cites to Kern Oil & Refining Co. v. Tenneco Oil Co., 792 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (9th Cir. 1986). But the facts of Kern Oil are distinguishable as the defendant in that case did not seek voluntary dismissal of a particular claim until
after summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff as to that claim, and the defendant tried to delay filing a motion for reconsideration until the case was reassigned to a different judge. Kern Oil, 792 F.2d at 1390. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that “Tenneco’s filings emphasize Tenneco’s desire to litigant Count IV” before a particular judge and therefore upheld the district court’s conclusion that the defendant was forum shopping. Id. Here, no summary judgment motion
has been filed and nothing in the record indicates to the Court that Plaintiffs are forum shopping. Defendant next argues that the timing of Plaintiffs’ motion suggests it was done to avoid an adverse ruling on the merits because Defendant gave notice to
Plaintiffs that a motion for summary judgment was forthcoming. ECF No. 14 at 9- 10. This argument is unpersuasive as it requires two assumptions: first, that this Court would have granted Defendant’s future summary judgment motion on some
or all claims; and second, that the court where the action is ultimately refiled would not. The Court declines to make such inferences. In conclusion, the Court does not find that voluntarily dismissing this action without prejudice will cause Defendant any legal prejudice. It is still relatively
early in the litigation and no summary judgment motions are pending. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion. C. Attorney Fees and Costs
Defendant argues that if dismissal is granted, it be awarded the costs and fees it incurred in removing the case to federal court because the work cannot be used in any future litigation of Plaintiffs’ claims. ECF No. 14 at 7. Reasonable
costs and fees “are often imposed upon a plaintiff who is granted voluntary dismissal under [Rule] 41(a)(2).” Stevedoring Servs., 889 F.2d at 921 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97 (“[T]he defendants should only be
awarded fees for work which cannot be used in any future litigation of these claims.”). The Court concludes the interests of justice are served by awarding Defendant reasonable fees and costs associated with removing this action to federal
court. // //
// // // ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss (ECF No. 11) is GRANTED. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF No. 1-1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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Shawn Patterson and Amanda Patterson, individually and as the marital community thereof v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, a New Hampshire corporation. (Shawn Patterson and Amanda Patterson, individually and as the marital community thereof v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, a New Hampshire corporation.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.