UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Shawn Murphy
v. Case No. 19-cv-1162-PB Opinion No. 2022 DNH 007 Strafford County et al.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Shawn Murphy filed this action against Strafford County and
certain “John Doe” defendants on November 16, 2019. His claims
arise out of an incident that occurred three years earlier, on
November 16, 2016, when he was allegedly beaten, tased, and
forced to walk on a broken leg while incarcerated at the
Strafford County Department of Corrections. In January 2020,
Murphy amended his complaint to name five Strafford County
correctional officers as defendants. Strafford County and the
correctional officers have moved for summary judgment on all
claims against them. 1 Murphy does not challenge defendants’
motion as to his claims against Strafford County and the
correctional officers in their official capacities. Thus, the
only issue I must resolve is whether his individual capacity
claims against the correctional officers can proceed to trial.
1 Murphy has also asserted claims against two defendants employed by the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. Those defendants have not yet moved for summary judgment. The individual defendants’ principal argument is that the
statute of limitations bars Murphy’s claims against them. The
claims are for excessive force and inadequate medical care
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. New
Hampshire law determines the applicable statute of limitations
for both sets of claims. See Conjugal P’ship Acevedo–Príncipe
v. United States, 768 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is
well-established that § 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s
statute of limitations.”). The parties agree that state law
prescribes a three-year limitations period for all claims and
that Murphy filed his original complaint on the last day of that
period. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. Because the
individual defendants replaced “John Doe” defendants after the
statute of limitations had run, Murphy concedes that his claims
against them are time-barred unless the amended complaint
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
“Under the doctrine of relation back, an amended complaint
can be treated, for purposes of the statute of limitations, as
having been filed on the date of the original complaint.”
Pessotti v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 946 F.2d 974, 975 (1st Cir. 1991).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) sets out three ways in
which an amendment to a complaint can relate back to the
original. Rule 15(c)(1)(A) allows for relation back when “the
2 law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows
relation back.” Rule 15(c)(1)(B) permits relation back of an
amendment asserting “a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be
set out – in the original pleading.” Lastly, under Rule
15(c)(1)(C), an amendment that “changes the party or the naming
of the party against whom a claim is asserted” relates back to
the original pleading when three elements are met: (1) the
amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence
as the original pleading, (2) the newly added party received
timely notice of the action, and (3) that party “knew or should
have known that the action would have been brought against it,
but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Once
the defendant establishes that a claim was filed after the
statute of limitations had expired, the plaintiff has the burden
to show that Rule 15(c) saves his claims. Coons v. Indus. Knife
Co., 620 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2010); Graham v. Church, 2015 DNH
013, 2015 WL 247910, at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 20, 2015).
In their motion, the individual defendants made the showing
that Murphy asserted claims against them for the first time in
his amended complaint, filed more than three years after his
cause of action accrued. Expecting that Murphy would rely on
the relation back doctrine to render his claims timely,
defendants argued that neither Rule 15(c)(1)(A) nor Rule
3 15(c)(1)(C) permits relating the amendment back to the original
complaint. Murphy ignored those provisions in his opposition to
the motion and instead argued that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows for
the relation back. Defendants responded in their reply brief
that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is inapplicable. I agree with defendants
that Murphy’s reliance on Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is misplaced, and
that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) cannot save his claims either. But the
applicability of Rule 15(c)(1)(A) presents a closer question
that has not been adequately briefed.
Murphy’s position that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) permits him to
replace a “John Doe” defendant with a named party after the
statute of limitations has expired is untenable. This provision
“allows relation back of an amendment asserting a ‘claim or
defense,’ but it does not authorize the relation back of an
amendment adding a new party.” Asher v. Unarco Material
Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2010). Murphy did
not merely add claims that arose out of the same occurrence set
out in the original complaint. Rather, the amended complaint
named, for the first time, the five correctional officers as
individual defendants allegedly liable for Murphy’s injuries.
The amendment is, therefore, outside the scope of Rule
15(c)(1)(B).
The fact that the original complaint used “John Doe”
placeholders for these defendants does not bring Murphy’s claims
4 within the purview of Rule 15(c)(1)(B). “It is familiar law
that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes
of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party
in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Tapia-Ortiz
v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see
Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that plaintiff’s “substitution of named defendants for the
original unknown ‘John Doe’ defendants amounted to adding a new
party” for purposes of Rule 15(c)). Thus, when, as here, a
claim is asserted against a new party after the limitations
period expired, the plaintiff must comply with either Rule
15(c)(1)(A) or Rule 15(c)(1)(C). See Coons 620 F.3d at 42.
Murphy cannot meet his burden of showing that Rule
15(c)(1)(C) applies to his amendment. This rule serves to allow
a plaintiff to correct a “misnomer or misidentification.” Roman
v. Townsend, 224 F.3d 24
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Shawn Murphy
v. Case No. 19-cv-1162-PB Opinion No. 2022 DNH 007 Strafford County et al.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Shawn Murphy filed this action against Strafford County and
certain “John Doe” defendants on November 16, 2019. His claims
arise out of an incident that occurred three years earlier, on
November 16, 2016, when he was allegedly beaten, tased, and
forced to walk on a broken leg while incarcerated at the
Strafford County Department of Corrections. In January 2020,
Murphy amended his complaint to name five Strafford County
correctional officers as defendants. Strafford County and the
correctional officers have moved for summary judgment on all
claims against them. 1 Murphy does not challenge defendants’
motion as to his claims against Strafford County and the
correctional officers in their official capacities. Thus, the
only issue I must resolve is whether his individual capacity
claims against the correctional officers can proceed to trial.
1 Murphy has also asserted claims against two defendants employed by the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. Those defendants have not yet moved for summary judgment. The individual defendants’ principal argument is that the
statute of limitations bars Murphy’s claims against them. The
claims are for excessive force and inadequate medical care
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. New
Hampshire law determines the applicable statute of limitations
for both sets of claims. See Conjugal P’ship Acevedo–Príncipe
v. United States, 768 F.3d 51, 56 (1st Cir. 2014) (“[I]t is
well-established that § 1983 claims borrow the forum state’s
statute of limitations.”). The parties agree that state law
prescribes a three-year limitations period for all claims and
that Murphy filed his original complaint on the last day of that
period. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4. Because the
individual defendants replaced “John Doe” defendants after the
statute of limitations had run, Murphy concedes that his claims
against them are time-barred unless the amended complaint
relates back to the date of the original pleading.
“Under the doctrine of relation back, an amended complaint
can be treated, for purposes of the statute of limitations, as
having been filed on the date of the original complaint.”
Pessotti v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 946 F.2d 974, 975 (1st Cir. 1991).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) sets out three ways in
which an amendment to a complaint can relate back to the
original. Rule 15(c)(1)(A) allows for relation back when “the
2 law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows
relation back.” Rule 15(c)(1)(B) permits relation back of an
amendment asserting “a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out – or attempted to be
set out – in the original pleading.” Lastly, under Rule
15(c)(1)(C), an amendment that “changes the party or the naming
of the party against whom a claim is asserted” relates back to
the original pleading when three elements are met: (1) the
amended pleading grew out of the same transaction or occurrence
as the original pleading, (2) the newly added party received
timely notice of the action, and (3) that party “knew or should
have known that the action would have been brought against it,
but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Once
the defendant establishes that a claim was filed after the
statute of limitations had expired, the plaintiff has the burden
to show that Rule 15(c) saves his claims. Coons v. Indus. Knife
Co., 620 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2010); Graham v. Church, 2015 DNH
013, 2015 WL 247910, at *4 (D.N.H. Jan. 20, 2015).
In their motion, the individual defendants made the showing
that Murphy asserted claims against them for the first time in
his amended complaint, filed more than three years after his
cause of action accrued. Expecting that Murphy would rely on
the relation back doctrine to render his claims timely,
defendants argued that neither Rule 15(c)(1)(A) nor Rule
3 15(c)(1)(C) permits relating the amendment back to the original
complaint. Murphy ignored those provisions in his opposition to
the motion and instead argued that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) allows for
the relation back. Defendants responded in their reply brief
that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is inapplicable. I agree with defendants
that Murphy’s reliance on Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is misplaced, and
that Rule 15(c)(1)(C) cannot save his claims either. But the
applicability of Rule 15(c)(1)(A) presents a closer question
that has not been adequately briefed.
Murphy’s position that Rule 15(c)(1)(B) permits him to
replace a “John Doe” defendant with a named party after the
statute of limitations has expired is untenable. This provision
“allows relation back of an amendment asserting a ‘claim or
defense,’ but it does not authorize the relation back of an
amendment adding a new party.” Asher v. Unarco Material
Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2010). Murphy did
not merely add claims that arose out of the same occurrence set
out in the original complaint. Rather, the amended complaint
named, for the first time, the five correctional officers as
individual defendants allegedly liable for Murphy’s injuries.
The amendment is, therefore, outside the scope of Rule
15(c)(1)(B).
The fact that the original complaint used “John Doe”
placeholders for these defendants does not bring Murphy’s claims
4 within the purview of Rule 15(c)(1)(B). “It is familiar law
that ‘John Doe’ pleadings cannot be used to circumvent statutes
of limitations because replacing a ‘John Doe’ with a named party
in effect constitutes a change in the party sued.” Tapia-Ortiz
v. Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999) (cleaned up); see
Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding
that plaintiff’s “substitution of named defendants for the
original unknown ‘John Doe’ defendants amounted to adding a new
party” for purposes of Rule 15(c)). Thus, when, as here, a
claim is asserted against a new party after the limitations
period expired, the plaintiff must comply with either Rule
15(c)(1)(A) or Rule 15(c)(1)(C). See Coons 620 F.3d at 42.
Murphy cannot meet his burden of showing that Rule
15(c)(1)(C) applies to his amendment. This rule serves to allow
a plaintiff to correct a “misnomer or misidentification.” Roman
v. Townsend, 224 F.3d 24, 28 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000). To that end,
Rule 15(c)(1)(C) requires the plaintiff to show that he made “a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” The
plaintiff’s lack of knowledge of the intended defendant’s
identity is not a mistake in identity under Rule 15(c). Wilson
v. U.S. Gov’t, 23 F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994); Joseph v. Elan
Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 555, 558 (7th Cir.
2011); Moore v. Tenn., 267 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008).
In essence, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) does not cover the substitution of
5 real names for “John Does” because the onus is on the plaintiff
“to determine the proper party to sue and to do so before the
statute of limitations expires.” Graham, 2015 WL 247910, at *7
(quoting Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry., 469 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir.
2006)). Because Murphy has merely alleged that he was ignorant
about the identities of the correctional officers who caused his
injuries, he cannot show that he made a mistake concerning their
identities. Accordingly, Murphy cannot satisfy the requirements
of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
That leaves Rule 15(c)(1)(A). Under this rule, an
amendment will relate back when “the law that provides the
applicable statute of limitations” – in this case, New Hampshire
law – “allows relation back.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A).
This provision “cements in place a one-way ratchet; less
restrictive state relation-back rules will displace federal
relation-back rules, but more restrictive state relation-back
rules will not.” Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 26
(1st Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Advisory Comm.
Notes (1991 Amendment) (Rule 15(c)(1)(A) seeks to “make it clear
that the rule does not apply to preclude any relation back that
may be permitted under the applicable limitations law.”). In
other words, “under Rule 15(c)(1)(A), [the court] must determine
if . . . state law provides a ‘more forgiving principle of
relation back’ in the John Doe context, compared to the federal
6 relation back doctrine under Rule 15(c)(1)(C).” Hogan v.
Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).
The relevant New Hampshire statute does not expressly
address relation back, but it generally authorizes amendment of
pleadings when “necessary for the prevention of injustice” so
long as “the rights of third persons shall not be affected
thereby.” N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 514:9. When an amendment
seeks to substitute a defendant after the statute of limitations
has expired, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has observed that
both potential injustice to the plaintiff and potential
prejudice to the intended defendant exist. See Sharifova v.
Riley, No. 2011-0755, 2012 WL 12830668, at *2 (N.H. Nov. 2,
2012); Dupuis v. Smith Props., Inc., 114 N.H. 625, 628 (1974).
In cases of this nature, the prejudice inquiry typically focuses
on “whether the intended defendant received notice before the
statute of limitations expired.” Sharifova, 2012 WL 12830668,
at *2 (citing Dupuis, 114 N.H. at 629); see also Sharifova v.
Riley, No. 2014-0122, 2014 WL 11485774, at *1 (N.H. Nov. 12,
2014); Bonnvie v. Beaulieu-Lindquist Real Est., Inc., No. 2006-
0047, 2007 WL 9619440, at *3 (N.H. Mar. 13, 2007). “Informality
will not nullify the notice so long as defendant receives actual
knowledge.” Dupuis, 114 N.H. at 630.
The record before me contains no evidence that the
individual defendants had actual notice of Murphy’s claims
7 before the statute of limitations expired. The parties,
however, have not adequately focused on this issue so far.
Defendants have presented only a skeletal argument with respect
to Rule 15(c)(1)(A), and Murphy has failed to address it
altogether. Accordingly, on or before January 27, 2022, Murphy
must show cause why his individual capacity claims against the
five correctional officers relate back to the date of his
original complaint. Defendants must file a response within
fourteen days of Murphy’s show-cause filing.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge
January 13, 2022
cc: Counsel of Record