Shawn Eldridge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 24, 2017
Docket49A05-1610-CR-2369
StatusPublished

This text of Shawn Eldridge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Shawn Eldridge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shawn Eldridge v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be May 24 2017, 9:50 am regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK Indiana Supreme Court the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Megan Shipley Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Marion County Public Defender Agency Attorney General of Indiana Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana Christina D. Pace Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Shawn Eldridge, May 24, 2017 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 49A05-1610-CR-2369 v. Appeal from the Marion Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Linda E. Brown, Appellee-Plaintiff Judge The Honorable Steven J. Rubick, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49G10-1607-CM-27670

May, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1610-CR-2369 | May 24, 2017 Page 1 of 4 [1] Shawn Eldridge (“Eldridge”) appeals two of three convictions of Class A

misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.1 He asserts, and the State concedes,

two of the counts should be vacated as they violate the continuous crime

doctrine. We reverse and remand.

Facts and Procedural History [2] On July 19, 2016, four officers responded to a report of a disturbance at a

residence. Antwon Eldridge (“Antwon”) requested assistance in removing his

brother, Eldridge, from Antwon’s premises. Eldridge, while appearing

confused, left after thirty minutes but then came right back. Upon his return,

one of the officers attempted to handcuff him. However, Eldridge resisted.

After “thirty (30) seconds to a minute” of resisting three of the officers, they

were able to take Eldridge into custody. (Tr. at 7.)

[3] On July 20, 2016, the State charged Eldridge with one count of Class A

misdemeanor trespass2 and three counts of Class A misdemeanor resisting law

enforcement. Subsequently, the State requested and was granted dismissal of

the trespass charge. At a bench trial, Eldridge was found guilty of the three

counts of resisting law enforcement and sentenced to 67 days on each, to be

served concurrently.

1 Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1) (2016). 2 Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2 (2016).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1610-CR-2369 | May 24, 2017 Page 2 of 4 Discussion and Decision [4] Eldridge asserts two of his convictions should be vacated because although

three officers were involved in the incident, the resisting was “only one

continuous crime.” (Appellant’s Br. at 6.) The State agrees two of the

convictions should be vacated based on the fact his crime was one continuous

crime.

The continuing crime doctrine essentially provides that actions that are sufficient in themselves to constitute separate criminal offenses may be so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. [T]he continuing crime doctrine reflects a category of Indiana’s prohibition against double jeopardy. . . . The statutory elements and actual evidence tests [of double jeopardy, as described in Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999),] are designed to assist courts in determining whether two separate[ly] chargeable crimes amount to the “same offense” for double jeopardy purposes. The continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double jeopardy implications of two distinct[,] chargeable crimes; rather, it defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts only to a single[,] chargeable crime. In doing so, the continuous crime doctrine prevents the state from charging a defendant twice for the same continuous offense.

Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations

and quotations removed, emphasis in original), trans. denied.

[5] Although the counts were based on actions against three separate officers, the

actions constituted one continuous crime. Thus, we reverse and remand with

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1610-CR-2369 | May 24, 2017 Page 3 of 4 instructions for the trial court to vacate two of Eldridge’s convictions of

resisting law enforcement.

[6] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1610-CR-2369 | May 24, 2017 Page 4 of 4

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Related

Richardson v. State
717 N.E.2d 32 (Indiana Supreme Court, 1999)
Cesar Chavez v. State of Indiana
988 N.E.2d 1226 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2013)

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