Shaw v. Rosenthal

42 N.E.2d 383, 112 Ind. App. 468, 1942 Ind. App. LEXIS 67
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 17, 1942
DocketNo. 16,967.
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 42 N.E.2d 383 (Shaw v. Rosenthal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaw v. Rosenthal, 42 N.E.2d 383, 112 Ind. App. 468, 1942 Ind. App. LEXIS 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942).

Opinion

Flanagan, C. J. —

This is an appeal from an award of the Industrial Board granting appellee compensation *469 for forty-five weeks based upon a 30 per cent permanent partial impairment to his left eye.

Appellant contends that the evidence .shows that appellee’s impairment is 30 per cent without glasses, but only 10 per cent with glasses; and that compensation should be computed on the impairment with glasses under § 31 (f) of the Indiana Workmen’s Compensation Act, § 40-1303, subsection F, Burns’ 1933, §16407, Baldwin’s 1934, which reads as follows:

“For the permanent loss of the sight of an eye or its reduction to one-tenth of normal vision with glasses, one hundred and fifty [150] weeks, and for any other permanent reduction of the sight of an eye, compensation shall be paid for a period proportionate to the degree of such permanent reduction.”

We cannot agree with appellant’s interpretation of the above section. It seems clear to us that it provides for two classes of impairment: (1) Industrial blindness; that is, permanent loss of sight or reduction to one-tenth of normal vision with glasses; and (2) any permanent reduction in sight but not to the point of industrial blindness. See Eureka Coal Co. v. Melcho (1927), 85 Ind. App. 552, 154 N. E. 774. In the latter class of cases the statute does- not refer to vision- with glasses.

While it is true as appellant urges, that the general purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is to compensate for functional loss, nevertheless those parts of the act which fix a definite amount of compensation for a specific injury are arbitrary in nature and are based not on loss of earning capacity but on actual physical loss.

*470 We think the Industrial Board used the correct basis for its award.

Award affirmed with statutory 5 per cent increase.

Note. — Reported in 42 N. E. (2d) 383.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
42 N.E.2d 383, 112 Ind. App. 468, 1942 Ind. App. LEXIS 67, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaw-v-rosenthal-indctapp-1942.