Shaw v. Moss

CourtCourt of Appeals of South Carolina
DecidedJune 15, 2016
Docket2016-UP-286
StatusUnpublished

This text of Shaw v. Moss (Shaw v. Moss) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaw v. Moss, (S.C. Ct. App. 2016).

Opinion

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Phillip C. Shaw, Respondent,

v.

Jeffrey C. Moss, Ed. D., Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2015-000407

Appeal From Beaufort County Marvin H. Dukes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-286 Heard May 20, 2016 – Filed June 15, 2016

REVERSED

Allen D. Smith, Kenneth L. Childs, Vernie L. Williams, and Shirley M. Fawley, of Childs & Halligan, PA, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Clifford Bush, III, of The Law Offices of Clifford Bush III, LLC, of Beaufort, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this employment action, Dr. Jeffrey Moss, the Superintendent of the Beaufort County School District (the District), appeals the circuit court's reversal of the Beaufort County School District Board of Education's (the Board's) decision to terminate the employment of former H.E. McCracken Middle School (McCracken) principal, Phillip Shaw. On appeal, Dr. Moss argues the circuit court erred by (1) improperly applying the substantial evidence standard of review, (2) disregarding the substantial evidence in the record, (3) reversing the Board's decision regarding Shaw's termination, (4) issuing an order containing erroneous facts and conclusions, and (5) failing to grant Dr. Moss's motion for reconsideration. We reverse.

We find substantial evidence supported the Board's decision to terminate Shaw's employment under section 59-25-430 of the South Carolina Code (2004)1 on the ground that he willfully violated the District's financial policies.2 See Barrett v. Charleston Cty. Sch. Dist., 348 S.C. 426, 431, 559 S.E.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[T]he proper standard of review regarding the propriety of a teacher's termination . . . is the substantial evidence test."); id. at 432, 559 S.E.2d at 368

1 Section 59-25-430 provides,

Any teacher may be dismissed at any time who shall fail, or who may be incompetent, to give instruction in accordance with the directions of the superintendent, or who shall otherwise manifest an evident unfitness for teaching; provided, however, that notice and an opportunity shall be afforded for a hearing prior to any dismissal. Evident unfitness for teaching is manifested by conduct such as, but not limited to, the following: persistent neglect of duty, willful violation of rules and regulations of district board of trustees, drunkenness, conviction of a violation of the law of this State or the United States, gross immorality, dishonesty, illegal use, sale or possession of drugs or narcotics.

2 Dr. Moss recommended the Board terminate Shaw's employment on numerous grounds, including ten violations of the District's financial policies. The Board held Shaw manifested an evident unfitness for teaching based on his (1) willful violation of the Board's rules regarding the handling of finances; (2) violation of the confidentiality of employment-related information; and (3) questionable behavior or dishonesty related to his administrative and medical leave, confidentiality, and storage of undeposited student funds in a lockbox under his desk. ("Therefore, this [c]ourt is limited to examining the record to determine whether substantial evidence existed to support the [s]chool [b]oard's decision to terminate [the teacher] . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-1-130 (2004) ("'Teacher' means any person who is employed either full-time or part-time by any school district either to teach or to supervise teaching." (emphasis omitted)). Dr. Moss asserted Shaw committed ten violations of the District's financial policies. Although we acknowledge the Board needed only one ground to terminate Shaw's employment, we address several of Shaw's financial violations herein.

First, Dr. Moss recommended the Board terminate Shaw because cash receipts were being accepted and not receipted through the school bookkeeper in violation of District policy. Section I.B.8.3 of the District's Student Activities Policy and Procedure Manual (the Manual) provides, "A receipt should be written for all money deposited, whether collected in the school or received by mail." In addition, Section I.B.3 of the Manual provides, "Middle and High school teachers are not permitted to collect monies from students. All Middle/High school students must be receipted by the school bookkeeper." The District's chief administrative and human resources officer testified McCracken's bookkeeper reported that the student council had held many fundraisers at the school and raised large amounts of money but none of that money had been funneled through the school bookkeeper as required by District policy. There was testimony that the two teachers who sponsored the student council were not following the District's policies regarding the proceeds of fundraisers. According to the chief administrative and human resources officer, both of the sponsors reported that Shaw had instructed them to collect the money raised by the student council and take it to his secretary. One of the sponsors stated Shaw told her to give the funds to his secretary—instead of the school's bookkeeper—so the secretary could deposit the funds into the Parent-Teacher Organization's bank account. The sponsor also stated she never received receipts when she gave money to Shaw's secretary. The District's chief operational services officer testified her staff provided financial training to principals at a summer leadership retreat and at monthly leadership meetings and gave each principal a binder containing the District's policies and procedures. In addition, the bookkeeper stated she notified Shaw several times that money was being collected by the student council but was not being brought to her for depositing, as required by the District's financial policies. Based on the foregoing, we find there was substantial evidence that, upon Shaw's orders, cash was accepted and not receipted through the school bookkeeper, and that Shaw willfully violated the District's financial policies. Dr. Moss also recommended the Board terminate Shaw because reimbursements for expenses were made from undeposited cash receipts in violation of District policy. See Manual, Section I.B.6 ("Under no circumstances should purchases be made or invoices paid from undeposited cash receipts."); id. at Section I.C ("No purchases should be made or invoices paid from undeposited cash on hand."). The District's chief operational services officer testified one of the student council sponsors said she routinely took envelopes full of cash—that was student money and school money—to Shaw's secretary, who placed the cash in a filing cabinet in Shaw's office. The sponsor testified that on one occasion when she gave money to Shaw's secretary, Shaw's secretary opened the bottom drawer of the filing cabinet in Shaw's office and she saw several envelopes of cash from "weeks prior" still sitting in the drawer. The sponsor testified she asked Shaw's secretary why the money had not yet been deposited in the bank and Shaw's secretary responded, "I don't have time to go to the bank every time you give me money." The sponsor explained that when a teacher requested funds from her for a school activity, she would ask Shaw for approval and Shaw's secretary would give her an envelope containing cash to give to the teacher. We find this constitutes substantial evidence that reimbursements were made with undeposited cash receipts in violation of the District's policies.

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Related

Barrett v. Charleston County School District
559 S.E.2d 365 (Court of Appeals of South Carolina, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Shaw v. Moss, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaw-v-moss-scctapp-2016.