Shaw v. Hornblower Cruises & Events, LLC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 2, 2023
Docket1:21-cv-10408
StatusUnknown

This text of Shaw v. Hornblower Cruises & Events, LLC (Shaw v. Hornblower Cruises & Events, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shaw v. Hornblower Cruises & Events, LLC, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DOCUMENT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC #: CLYVE SHAW and KENARDRO PRESS, on DATE FILED:__ 3/2/2023 behalf of themselves and those Similarly situated, 21 Civ. 10408 (VM) Plaintiffs, DECISION AND ORDER - against - HORNBLOWER CRUISES & EVENTS, LCC, Defendant.

VICTOR MARRERO, United States District Judge. Pending before the Court are two objections (see “Objection to Discovery,” Dkt. No. 83; “Objection to Denial of Stay,” Dkt. No. 86) filed by defendant Hornblower Cruises & Events, LLC (“Hornblower” or “Defendant”) to Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang’s discovery orders dated January 30, 2023 (see “January 30 Order,” Dkt. No. 82) and February 3, 2023 (see “February 3 Order,” Dkt. No. 85). For the reasons set forth below, both objections are overruled. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Clyve Shaw and Kenardro Press (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this putative class action, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, against Hornblower. Plaintiffs allege that Hornblower violated the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification

(“WARN”) Act,1 the New York State WARN Act,2 and the Illinois WARN Act,3 by failing to provide the required timely notices to its employees prior to closing a site of employment and conducting a mass layoff.4

The Court referred this case to Magistrate Judge Wang for general pre-trial supervision, including scheduling, discovery, and non-dispositive pretrial motions. On November 28, 2022, and consistent with this Court’s Individual Practices, counsel for Hornblower sent counsel for Plaintiffs a pre-motion letter regarding its anticipated motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint (see “Third Amended Complaint” or “TAC,” Dkt. No. 61) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). (See Dkt. No. 64.) The parties engaged in a pre-motion letter exchange, and informed this Court by letter on January 26, 2023 that they

consented to deeming the pre-motion letters a fully briefed motion. (See Dkt. No. 80.) On January 30, 2023, in response to the parties’ joint letter on discovery (see Dkt. No. 81), Magistrate Judge Wang

1 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109. 2 N.Y. Lab. L. § 860. 3 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 65/1. 4 As relevant here, a “mass layoff” is defined as a “reduction in force which . . . results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for -- (i)(I) at least 33 percent of the employees (excluding any part-time employees); and (II) at least 50 employees (excluding any part-time employees); or (ii) at least 500 employees (excluding any part-time employees).” 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3). granted, in part, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery (see January 30 Order). On February 2, 2023, Hornblower filed a partial objection (see Objection to Discovery) to Magistrate

Judge Wang’s January 30 Order directing Hornblower “to produce the number of people employed at the relevant locations in California before the March 2020 layoffs.” (January 30 Order at 1.) That day, Hornblower also moved to stay discovery pending resolution of its Discovery Objection (see Dkt. No. 84), which Magistrate Judge Wang promptly denied on February 3, 2023 (see February 3 Order). Hornblower filed another objection to challenge Magistrate Judge Wang’s denial of its stay request. (See Objection to Denial of Stay.) On February 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to both objections. (See “Opposition,” Dkt. No. 88.) II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A), a district judge may “designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any [non-dispositive] pretrial matter,” that is not otherwise expressly excluded. Magistrate judges have “broad discretion in resolving non-dispositive disputes.” Marotte v. City of N.Y., No. 16 Civ. 8953, 2017 WL 11105223, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2017) (citing Am. Stock Exch., LLC v. Mopex, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 87, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)). “Matters concerning discovery generally are considered ‘nondispositive’ of the litigation.” Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990). A party must serve and file any objections to a

magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive matter within 14 days after being served with a copy of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). A non-dispositive matter decided by a magistrate judge will be “modified” or “set aside” only if the order “is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). A ruling is “‘clearly erroneous’ when, ‘although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Am. Stock Exch., LLC, 215 F.R.D. at 90 (citing Derthick v. Bassett-Walker Inc., Nos. 90 Civ. 5427, 90 Civ. 7479, 90 Civ. 3845, 1992 WL 249951, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23,

1992)). Thus, “a magistrate judge’s resolution of a discovery dispute deserves substantial deference.” Moran v. Flaherty, No. 92 Civ. 3200, 1992 WL 276913, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1992). III. DISCUSSION A. OBJECTION TO MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY The Court finds that Magistrate Judge Wang’s January 30 Order granting, in part, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel was neither an abuse of discretion nor clearly erroneous, and overrules Hornblower’s objection. In her January 30 Order, Magistrate Judge Wang directed Hornblower to produce the number of people employed at its California sites of

employment prior to the March 2020 layoffs. Hornblower argues that compelling it to produce these “denominators” with respect to the California sites while its motion to dismiss is still pending is “premature and improper” and contrary to federal caselaw and rules of civil procedure. (Objection to Discovery at 6.) Hornblower’s Objection to Discovery functions, in substance, as a request that discovery be stayed pending its motion to dismiss. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (“Rule 26”), which governs discovery, provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs

of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Under Rule 26(c), “a district court may stay discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss for ‘good cause shown.’” Chesney v. Valley Stream Union Free Sch. Dist., 236 F.R.D. 113, 115 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Spencer Trask Software & Info. Servs. LLC v. RPost Int’l Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court has discretion to stay discovery ‘for good cause shown.’”). Courts consider several factors to determine whether good cause exists, including: “(1) a strong showing, by the defendant[], that the plaintiffs’ claim(s) lack merit; (2) the breadth of the discovery demanded and the burden of

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Shaw v. Hornblower Cruises & Events, LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shaw-v-hornblower-cruises-events-llc-nysd-2023.