Shavon Conyers v. Department of Commerce

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 21, 2022·No. DC-315H-17-0307-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SHAVON CONYERS, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DC-315H-17-0307-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, DATE: July 21, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Pamela F. Mucklow, Esquire, Englewood, Colorado, for the appellant.

Tyree P. Ayers, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal as untimely filed. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been id entified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error af fected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we c onclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The agency appointed the appellant to a GG-11 Program Analyst position with the Census Bureau Field Division. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 12 at 13-15. On January 4, 2017, the agency terminated the appellant from her excepted-service position because she incorrectly listed on her résumé a degree that she had not obtained. IAF, Tab 1, Attachment. The notice informed the appellant that she had a right to appeal her ter mination to the Board within 30 days of the date that she received the termination notice, a period that ended on February 3, 2017. Id. She filed a Board appeal on February 7, 2017, four days after the filing deadline. IAF, Tab 1. ¶3 The administrative judge issued an order informing the appellant of her burden to show that her appeal was timely filed or that good caus e existed for the delay in filing. IAF, Tab 8. Based on the parties’ responses to that order, IAF, Tabs 13, 16, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the appellant’s discussions with the agency regarding her possible reinstatement ended on the afternoon of February 3, 2017, IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID) at 7. The administrative judge determined that, because February 3, 2017, was 3

the filing deadline, the appellant, who is an electronic filer, could have filed her appeal before midnight of the due date, but instead , she waited an additional 4 days to file. Id. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to show that she exercised ordinary prudence or due diligence under the circumstances, and therefore, she dismissed the appeal as untimely filed. ID at 7-8. ¶4 In her petition for review, the appellant asserts, among other things, that she filed late because she reasonably relied on agency misstatements that she would be reinstated, and the administrative judge erred in disregarding case law concerning the effect of such misstatements. Petition for Review (PFR) Fil e, Tab 1 at 10-21. She also contends that the filing delay was minimal , that her termination was actually a suitability action, and that the administrative judge erred in disregarding evidence that the agency’s failure to comply with 5 C.F.R. § 731.402 caused her delay in filing. Id. at 10, 21-22. The agency responded in opposition to the petition. PFR File, Tab 5.

ANALYSIS ¶5 If an appellant fails to timely file her appeal, it will be dismissed as untimely absent a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.22(c). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of an appeal, an appellant must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Marcantel v. Department of Energy, 121 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 10 (2014). To determine if an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of the excuse and her showing of diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unfavora ble casualty or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file her claim. Little v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶ 10 4

(2017). Beyond the appellant’s assertion that the appeal was filed late because she relied on agency misstatements, she has not offered any evidence or argument regarding any additional circumstances that affected her ability to timely file her appeal. ¶6 In support of her assertion that the agency caused her delay in filing, the appellant provided a declaration made under penalty of perjury recounting various conversations related to her termination and possible reinstatement. IAF, Tab 13 at 10-14. In her declaration, however, the appellant does not identify an instance after January 4, 2017—the date of the termination notice—in which an agency manager directly led her to believe that her termination would be rescinded. Id. Any suggestion that the appellant might have been reinstated came through the appellant’s union representative, and there is no evidence that he was authorized to make a decision on the appellant’s reinstatement. Under the circumstances, we find that the appellant failed to show that any agency official made misstatements that caused her to lose time in filing her appeal. Likewise, we find that the cases cited by the appellant in her petition for review do not support a finding that agency misrepresentation caused the appellant’s filing delay. See Shubinsky v. United States, 488 F.2d 1003 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Gordy v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 736 F.2d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Gometz v. Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 284 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Sturdy v. Department of the Army, 88 M.S.P.R. 502 (2001). Both Shubinsky and Gometz are distinguishable because, unlike here, there was a finding in those cases that the employees actually received inaccurate information from agency officials.

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Shavon Conyers v. Department of Commerce, (Miss. 2022).

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