Shavasia Faggins v. Ernest Vandemark, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. New York
• Decided: February 12, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00699
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHAVASIA FAGGINS, Plaintiff, 1:25-CV-699 v. (GTS/DJS) ERNEST VANDEMARK, et al., Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL: SHAVASIA FAGGINS Plaintiff, Pro Se Yonkers, New York 10701 “| COOK, KURTZ, & MURPHY, P.C. MICHAEL T. COOK, ESQ. Attorneys for Defendants 85 Main Street Kingston, New York 12401 DANIEL J. STEWART United States Magistrate Judge DECISION and ORDER Presently pending with this Court are two Motions filed by Plaintiff. One motion

seeks to seal the case record and the other seeks the appointment of counsel. Dkt. Nos. 23 & 35. Upon due consideration, each Motion is denied. I. Motion to Seal Plaintiff first seeks to seal the case, in whole or in part, “based on legitimate and ongoing safety concerns.” Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiff alleges that “public access to the case record -|-

has created a credible risk to personal safety for myself and other connected to this case.” Jd. The Motion does not provide details of the nature of that risk. “T]he public has a First Amendment right to observe the proceedings and filings of the federal courts.” Sparman v. Edwards, 325 F. Supp. 3d 317, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (citing Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006)). This right has been further explained in this District by Judge Mae D’ Agostino: The common law right of public access to judicial documents, i.e., documents filed with a court that are relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process is well-established. It is also well established that the public and the press have a qualified First Amendment right to attend judicial proceedings and to access certain judicial documents. The burden of demonstrating that case records should be sealed rests on the party seeking such action. “| Caswell v. Miller, 2018 WL 2170294, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 2018) (internal citations and quotation omitted). A party’s “cursory and conclusory statements” are insufficient to carry the burden necessary to overcome the First Amendment presumption of access. Herman v. City of New York, 334 F.R.D. 377, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2020). Here, Plaintiff's generalized assertion of harm is a conclusory statement and not a basis to seal the entire case file. Insofar as Plaintiff suggests sealing “specific identifying portions of the record” that request is also

denied since Plaintiff fails to identify what those documents should be. Accordingly, the Motion is denied.

-2-

II. Motion Regarding Counsel Plaintiff has also filed a letter seeking the Court’s assistance in obtaining counsel, which the Court construes as a motion for the appointment of counsel. Dkt. No. 35. That request is denied at this time. “A party has no constitutionally guaranteed right to the assistance of counsel in a civil case.” Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 68 (2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). Courts cannot utilize a bright-line test in determining whether counsel should be appointed on behalf of an indigent party. Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1997). Instead, a number of factors must be carefully considered by the court in ruling upon such a motion. As a threshold matter, the court should ascertain whether “| the indigent’s claims seem likely to be of substance. A motion for appointment of counsel may be properly denied if the court concludes that the plaintiff's “chances of success are highly dubious.” Leftridge v. Connecticut State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d at 69. If the court finds that the claims have substance, the court should then consider: [T]he indigent’s ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent’s ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in thle] case why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination. Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1986)). This is not to say that all, or indeed any, of these factors are controlling in a particular case. Rather, each case must be decided on its

-3-

own facts. Velasquez v. O’Keefe, 899 F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d at 61). In the present matter, the case is at a very early stage. Indeed, only allegations have been made at this point; no evidence has yet been submitted relating to Plaintiff's claims. At “| this early stage, Plaintiff has not met the threshold requirement of demonstrating that her claims seem likely to be of substance. See Brown v. Utica Police Dep’t, 2017 WL 5514518, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2017) (“Where there are merely unsupported allegations, the moving party does not meet the first requirement imposed by the Second Circuit for appointment of pro bono counsel.”) (citation omitted)). III. Conclusion “ For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby ORDERED, Plaintiff's Motions to Seal (Dkt. No. 23) and for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 35) are DENIED; and it is further ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order upon the parties to this action. Dated: February 12, 2026 Albany, New York

eg ff US-Magistrate Judge

-4-