Shaunesi DeBerry v. Nordstrom Inc., et al.

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT AT SEATTLE 7 SHAUNESI DeBERRY, CASE NO. C26-0639-KKE 8

Plaintiff(s), ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE 9 v. SUMMONS, DISMISSING COMPLAINT, AND PROVIDING LEAVE TO AMEND 10 NORDSTROM INC., et al., THE COMPLAINT

11 Defendant(s).

12 This matter comes before the Court on the complaint filed by Plaintiff Shaunesi DeBerry, 13 representing herself. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 4. In granting DeBerry’s application to proceed in forma 14 pauperis, U.S. Magistrate Judge S. Kate Vaughan recommended that the Court screen DeBerry’s 15 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) before issuing summons. Dkt. No. 3. Based on its 16 review, the Court declines to issue summons at this time and will provide DeBerry leave to file an 17 amended complaint no later than April 27, 2026, to cure the deficiencies identified herein. 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 This action stems from an incident involving DeBerry’s minor daughter, who was shopping 20 with a friend at a Nordstrom department store on November 12, 2023. Dkt. No. 4 ¶ 23. DeBerry’s 21 daughter and her friend were accused of shoplifting a hat and DeBerry’s daughter was detained by 22 Nordstrom loss prevention employee Collins Kenlak. Id. at 13–15. DeBerry alleges that Kenlak 23 “seized, grabbed, pulled, and pushed” her daughter in the course of detaining her, in contravention 24 1 of Nordstrom’s Bill of Rights prohibiting excessive force and unreasonable detention. Id. ¶¶ 23– 2 24. DeBerry further alleges that Officer Odom of the Howard County Police Department told her 3 police were not charging her daughter, although Howard County Police Department Officer Phelps

4 told her that Nordstrom insisted on pursuing charges. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. 5 DeBerry further alleges that Nordstrom covered up the incident on November 15, 2023, 6 issuing a statement claiming that her daughter “walked willingly,” “no force was used,” and that 7 “police decided to charge her,” relying on video evidence that Nordstrom refused to release. Dkt. 8 No. 4 ¶¶ 30–31. DeBerry states that “a Maryland judge ordered release of police body cam, 911, 9 dispatch logs[,]” and although Howard County complied, Nordstrom produced nothing. Id. ¶¶ 32– 10 34. DeBerry contends that Nordstrom filed a Notice of Appearance “on appeal” before an appeal 11 existed, which was “impossible unless Nordstrom received inside information from court 12 personnel.” Id. ¶¶ 35–36. She states that such actions show “improper coordination between

13 private actors and state officials.” Id. ¶ 37. Further, she alleges that Judge E. Gregory Wells 14 “strategically dismissed” her filings for “false ‘hard copy’ reasons,” while court clerks had already 15 accepted them. Id. ¶¶ 38–39. She states that Judge Wells’ actions “prevented appellate review,” 16 and “shielded Nordstrom,” “satisf[ying] § 1985(2) obstruction and § 1983 denial of access to 17 courts.” Id. ¶¶ 40–42. 18 DeBerry filed this suit in February 2026 against Nordstrom Inc., Howard County, the 19 county police officers and judge, as well as other individuals, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 20 1983 and 1985, and claims of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, negligent training and 21 supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, corporate negligence, and spoliation of 22 evidence. Dkt. No. 4. The Court will screen DeBerry’s complaint to determine whether her claims

23 as stated are valid. 24 2 The Court will first discuss the sufficiency of DeBerry’s claims against Judge Wells. The 3 Court then addresses her claims against Stephen Yaeger, Officer Odom, Officer Phelps,1 and 4 Howard County, before turning to her claims against Nordstrom, Collins Kenlak, Jamie 5 Nordstrom, Erik Nordstrom, and Cherie Williams.2 6 A. Standard of Review 7 The Court will dismiss a complaint at any time if the action fails to state a claim, raises 8 frivolous or malicious claims, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 9 relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because DeBerry is representing herself, the Court shall 10 construe her pleadings liberally. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). 11 Regardless, her complaint must still include factual allegations “enough to raise a right to relief 12 above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When 13 dismissing a complaint under § 1915, courts give pro se plaintiffs leave to amend unless “it is 14 absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Cato v. 15 United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 16 B. DeBerry’s Claims Against Judge Wells Fail. 17 DeBerry’s complaint lists Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims against Judge Wells in an 18 “administrative capacity only (non-judicial acts).” Dkt. No. 4 at 4. She alleges that by dismissing 19 her filings for false procedural reasons, and because “court personnel” must have given inside 20 information to Nordstrom to allow it to appear in an appeal before any appeal existed, Judge Wells 21 is liable for denying DeBerry access to the courts and conspiracy to obstruct justice. Id. at 5. 22

23 1 This order refers to Yaeger, Officer Odom, and Officer Phelps collectively as the “Maryland Defendants.”

2 This order refers to Kenlak, Jamie Nordstrom, Erik Nordstrom, and Williams collectively as the “Nordstrom 24 Defendants.” 1 “[J]udges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages 2 liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities.” Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980) 3 (quoting Supreme Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734–35 (1980)). Indeed, “judicial

4 immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice[.]” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 5 11 (1991). Such immunity applies regardless how “erroneous the [judge’s] act may have been, 6 and however injurious in its consequences [the act] may have proved to the plaintiff.” Ashelman 7 v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (quoting Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 8 193, 199 (1985)). 9 Here, DeBerry sues Judge Wells in his “administrative” capacity for money damages under 10 Section 1983. See Dkt. No. 4 at 6–7. Nonetheless, a review of DeBerry’s complaint describes 11 only judicial acts of Judge Wells and his connection to the facts alleged arises only from judicial 12 acts. Accordingly, DeBerry’s claims against Judge Wells fail because they are barred by judicial

13 immunity. The Court will therefore dismiss DeBerry’s claims against Judge Wells, without leave 14 to amend because no amendment could cure this deficiency. 15 C. DeBerry’s Section 1983 Claims Against the Remaining Defendants Are Dismissed, With Leave to Amend. 16 DeBerry brings Section 1983 claims against all other Defendants, in addition to Judge 17 Wells. See Dkt. No. 4 at 6. A claim may be brought under Section 1983 against a person who, 18 acting under color of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution. See 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim for relief under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) they 20 suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, and (2) the 21 violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. 22 Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). As to the second prong, a plaintiff must allege facts 23 demonstrating how individually named defendants caused, or personally participated in causing, 24 1 the harm alleged in the complaint. See Arnold v. I.B.M. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 2 1981). A person subjects another to a deprivation of a constitutional right when committing an 3 affirmative act, participating in another’s affirmative act, or omitting to perform an act which is

4 legally required. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory 5 allegations of participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to support a claim under 6 Section 1983. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 7 DeBerry’s Section 1983 claims fail as to the Maryland Defendants, Howard County, 8 Nordstrom, and Nordstrom Defendants, for the following reasons. 9 1. Maryland Defendants 10 The Court begins with DeBerry’s Section 1983 claim of “Conspiracy to Violate Civil 11 Rights” against the Maryland Defendants. Dkt. No. 4 at 6. First, DeBerry’s complaint does not 12 state which constitutional right(s), if any, that have been violated specifically by Officer Odom,

13 Officer Phelps, and Stephen Yaeger, nor does the complaint link the conduct of any Maryland 14 Defendant to the violation of a constitutional right. In fact, the complaint does not describe any 15 conduct of Stephen Yaeger, and his connection to this lawsuit is unclear. 16 Thus, the Court will dismiss DeBerry’s Section 1983 claim against Maryland Defendants 17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), with leave to amend. To state a valid Section 1983 claim 18 against the Maryland Defendants, DeBerry’s amended complaint must (1) identify the right 19 protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute that was violated, and (2) allege facts 20 explaining how the violation was proximately caused by a Defendant that was acting under color 21 of state law. 22 2. Howard County

23 Local government entities may be sued under Section 1983 for monetary or equitable relief 24 where “action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature cause[s] a constitutional 1 tort.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–94 (1978). “To 2 impose Monell liability on a municipality under Section 1983, a plaintiff must prove: (1) [he] had 3 a constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy

4 amounts to deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy is the moving force 5 behind the constitutional violation.” Gordon v. County of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021) 6 (quoting Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011)). 7 DeBerry brings two claims of “Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights” and “Denial of Access 8 to Courts” under Section 1983 against Howard County. But DeBerry has not alleged which 9 constitutional right of hers Howard County violated, has not identified a Howard County policy or 10 custom, and has not drawn any connection between the two. See Dkt. No. 4. 11 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss DeBerry’s Section 1983 claims against Howard 12 County, with leave to amend. To state a Section 1983 claim against Howard County, DeBerry’s

13 amended complaint must identify her constitutional right that was violated, and a policy, custom, 14 or practice of Howard County that was the “moving force” behind the constitutional violations 15 allegedly committed by actors employed by Howard County. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–94. 16 3. Nordstrom and Nordstrom Defendants 17 “It is generally presumed that private individuals and entities do not act ‘under color of 18 state law’ within the meaning of Section 1983.” See James v. FPI Mgmt., Inc., No. C22-0336JLR, 19 2022 WL 1499590, at *5 (W.D. Wash. May 11, 2022) (citing Florer v. Congregation Pidyon 20 Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011)). However, private parties can be liable under 21 Section 1983 if a plaintiff demonstrates that their “conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a 22 federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,

23 937 (1982). Here, the relevant inquiry is the “joint action test,” asking “whether state officials and 24 private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights.” 1 Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Franklin v. Fox, 312 2 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002)). Joint action exists when the state has “so far insinuated itself into 3 a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be recognized as a joint

4 participant in the challenged activity.” Id (quoting Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. 5 Improvement & Power Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 507 (9th Cir. 1989)). 6 DeBerry’s allegations against Nordstrom and Nordstrom Defendants are not sufficient to 7 suggest they are liable for conspiring to deprive her of a federal right. Nordstrom is a private entity 8 and Nordstrom Defendants are private individuals; DeBerry’s complaint lacks allegations that 9 demonstrate Nordstrom’s conduct was attributable to the state of Maryland, and she has not alleged 10 any facts about the conduct of the Nordstrom Defendants. DeBerry alleges that Nordstrom filed a 11 Notice of Appearance “on appeal” before the existence of an appeal, concluding that this fact was 12 “impossible” unless Nordstrom received insider information from the court. See Dkt. No. 4 ¶ 35.

13 But even with insider information, it is unclear how Nordstrom could file a notice of appearance 14 in a non-existent appeal. Vague and conclusory statements of impossibility and “improper 15 coordination” are not sufficient. 16 Accordingly, the Court will dismiss DeBerry’s Section 1983 claims against Nordstrom and 17 Nordstrom Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), with leave to amend. To state a Section 18 1983 claim against Nordstrom or the Nordstrom Defendants, DeBerry’s amended complaint must 19 describe the conduct of Nordstrom or the Nordstrom Defendants that deprived her of a 20 constitutional right, and allege facts showing that Nordstrom’s and/or the Nordstrom Defendants’ 21 actions amounted to state action under the joint action test. 22

23 24 1 D. DeBerry’s Section 1985 Claims Against Nordstrom, Nordstrom Defendants, and Maryland Defendants Are Dismissed, With Leave to Amend. 2 DeBerry brings a Section 1985(2) claim against “Nordstrom corporate defendants” and 3 “Maryland officials.” Dkt. No. 4 at 6. She also brings a Section 1985(3) claim but does not 4 disclose which Defendant(s) she brings this claim against. Id. 5 The relevant clause of Section 1985(2) gives rise to a cause of action concerning access to 6 state courts where “two or more persons conspire for the purposes of impeding, hindering, 7 obstructing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice in any State or Territory, with 8 intent to deny to any citizen the equal protection of the laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2). “It is well- 9 settled that the equal protection language of the second clause of section 1985(2) requires an 10 allegation of class-based animus for the statement of a claim under that clause.” Portman v. County 11 of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation modified). 12 Section 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or 13 indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 14 1985(3). A violation of Section 1985(3) requires the existence of a conspiracy and an act in 15 furtherance of the conspiracy, and mere allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a 16 claim. Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2005). 17 For the following reasons, DeBerry’s complaint fails to state valid Section 1985 claims. 18 DeBerry has not alleged that Nordstrom, Nordstrom Defendants, or Maryland Defendants denied 19 her access to state court because she was a member of a protected class, and it is not clear that she 20 was denied access to state court at all. Thus, DeBerry’s Section 1985(2) claim fails. 21 As noted earlier in this order, DeBerry’s complaint fails to identify which Defendants the 22 Section 1985(3) claim is brought against. Without this information, or any allegations as to what 23 conduct supports this claim, DeBerry has failed to show that she is entitled to relief on this claim. 24 1 Because DeBerry fails to state valid Section 1985 claims, the Court will dismiss these 2 claims with leave to amend. To state a Section 1985(2) claim, DeBerry’s amended complaint must 3 allege that she was denied access to state courts based on her membership in a protected class. To

4 state a Section 1985(3) claim, DeBerry’s amended complaint must identify which Defendants 5 conspired together, what facts support the existence of a conspiracy, and what act(s) were taken in 6 furtherance of the conspiracy. 7 E. The Malicious Prosecution Claim Is Dismissed, With Leave to Amend. 8 DeBerry’s complaint brings a malicious prosecution claim against Nordstrom, Kenlak, and 9 Yaeger. Dkt. No. 4 at 6. The complaint does not identify whether this is a state law claim or a 10 federal claim, nor does it allege that DeBerry herself was prosecuted (nor does it allege that her 11 daughter was prosecuted, for that matter). 12 In the absence of such factual allegations, DeBerry has failed to state a valid claim for

13 malicious prosecution. To state such a claim, DeBerry’s amended complaint must identify a 14 defendant that instigated a criminal proceeding against her (that has since been resolved in 15 DeBerry’s favor) with an improper purpose and without probable cause. See McDonough v. Smith, 16 588 U.S. 109, 116–17 (2019). Thus, the Court dismisses this claim with leave to amend. 17 F. The Court Declines to Further Address the State Law Claims. 18 DeBerry alleges claims of false imprisonment, negligent training and supervision, 19 intentional infliction of emotional distress, corporate negligence, and spoliation of evidence. See 20 Dkt. No. 4 at 6. 21 As explained above, DeBerry has not stated a federal claim for relief. A district court has 22 discretion on whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims arising from the same

23 case or controversy supporting the federal claims. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 24 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a federal court has 1 subject-matter jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it may (or may not) choose to 2 exercise.”). “When district courts dismiss all claims independently qualifying for the exercise of 3 federal jurisdiction, they ordinarily dismiss as well all related state claims.” Artis v. District of

4 Columbia, 583 U.S. 71, 74 (2018). 5 Thus, because DeBerry’s federal claims are dismissed for the above reasons, the Court 6 need not address whether her complaint adequately pleads state claims. If DeBerry amends her 7 complaint to sufficiently allege federal claims, the Court will then address her state claims. 9 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to 28 10 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). No later than April 30, 2026, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to 11 correct these deficiencies. An amended complaint operates as a complete substitute for the original 12 complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). If no amended complaint

13 is timely filed, the Court will close this case. 14 The clerk is directed to send Plaintiff (1) the appropriate forms for filing a civil rights 15 complaint, (2) a copy of this order, and (3) the Pro Se Guide to Filing Your Lawsuit in Federal 16 Court. 17 Dated this 30th day of March, 2026. 18 A 19 Kymberly K. Evanson 20 United States District Judge

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