Shaughnessy v. State of NH

2005 DNH 147

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: October 24, 2005
• Docket: 05-CV-149-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Shaughnessy v . State of NH 05-CV-149-SM 10/24/05 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

John J. Shaughnessy,

v. Civil N o . 05-cv-149-SM Opinion N o . 2005 DNH 147 Donald P. Bliss and The State of New Hampshire,

O R D E R

John Shaughnessy has sued Donald Bliss and the State of New

Hampshire for alleged violation of his federal rights. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Of the causes of action suggested in his complaint,1 all

but one – a due process claim – are facially without merit.

Plaintiff asserts that his due process rights were violated by

the manner in which he was discharged from his public employment

and, in particular, by defendants’ failure to utilize the full

multi-step disciplinary process described in the State of New

Hampshire’s personnel rules.

1 Rather than setting out individual claims, count by count, the complaint weaves together various bits and pieces of federal and state statutory and common law. The facts alleged in the complaint do not support a claim

for violation of plaintiff’s right to due process. Under the

circumstances alleged by plaintiff, he “was entitled to the

constitutional minimum of ‘some kind of hearing’ and ‘some

pretermination opportunity to respond.’” O’Neill v . Baker, 210

F.3d 4 1 , 47 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v .

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 5 3 2 , 542 (1985)) (footnote omitted). More

specifically, “[t]he pre-termination process ‘need only include

oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the

employer’s evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to tell

his side of the story.” O’Neill, 210 F.3d at 48 (quoting Gilbert

v . Homar, 520 U.S. 9 2 4 , 929 (1997)).

Defendant Bliss’s April 2 9 , 2002, memorandum to plaintiff

(attached to the complaint) and the April 3 0 , 2002, meeting

between Bliss and plaintiff (as described in paragraphs 27 and 28

of the complaint) meet the requirement described in O’Neill. The

April 29 memorandum informed plaintiff that the charges against

him were based upon an e-mail he sent to Kevin Merli on April 2 6 ,

2002. At the meeting, plaintiff was informed that he was being

charged with insubordination, and he presented his side of the

2 story. Because the complaint and the documents annexed thereto

demonstrate that plaintiff was afforded all the pretermination

process to which he was entitled, it does not state a claim for

deprivation of his federal constitutional right to due process.

For the reasons given, and those argued in defendants’

motion to dismiss, the motion (document no. 3) is granted. The

clerk of the court shall enter judgment in accordance with this

order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

S __feven J./McAuliffe Chief Judge

October 24, 2005

cc: John J. Shaughnessy, pro se Nancy J. Smith, Esq.