Sha’Teek Burton v. Judge Josh W. Thacker, et al.

• Court: District Court, N.D. Georgia
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 1:25-cv-07088
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA ATLANTA DIVISION

SHA’TEEK BURTON, Plaintiff, Civil Action No. v. 1:25-cv-07088-SDG JUDGE JOSH W. THACKER, et al., Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Sha’Teek Burton’s emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) [ECF 1-3]. Defendants have not yet been served. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65—with which Burton, though proceeding pro se, is required to abide, Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007)—a TRO may only be issued against an unserved party if both of the following conditions are met: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Burton seeks to enjoin a prosecution against him in the State Court of Spalding County, Georgia.1 There was a hearing scheduled for December 18, 2025,

in which the State of Georgia and Burton were ordered to appear and show cause why Burton’s current bond conditions should not be modified or revoked.2 Burton’s request to appear at the hearing virtually was denied.3

Having reviewed Burton’s motion and the supporting documents, the Court concludes that abstention is appropriate under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Though the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging” obligation to hear cases within their subject matter jurisdiction, the Younger doctrine “requires a

federal court to abstain where a plaintiff’s federal claims could be adjudicated in a pending state judicial proceeding.” Leonard v. Ala. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902, 907 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274 (11th

Cir. 2003) and Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988)). When a federal lawsuit overlaps with a state criminal prosecution, the federal court considers three factors in determining whether to abstain: (1) is the state proceeding ongoing

at the same time as the federal one; (2) does the state proceeding implicate an important state interest; and (3) does the state proceeding provide an adequate

1 See generally ECF 1-3. 2 Id. at 44–45. 3 Id. at 62. opportunity to raise the federal claim. Id. at 908 (citing, inter alia, Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

When the three Middlesex factors are met, “the federal court should abstain and allow the state proceeding to go forward.” Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized certain “extraordinary circumstances” in which the federal court

should not abstain under Younger: “(1) there is evidence [the] state proceedings [are] motivated by bad faith, (2) irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Id. (quoting Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004))

(alterations in original). The Eleventh Circuit has further distilled the three Younger exceptions into two broad categories: proceedings instituted in bad faith and proceedings founded on flagrantly and patently unconstitutional laws. Id. at 911.

Burton’s claim satisfies the three Middlesex factors. The state proceeding is clearly ongoing, as Burton was scheduled for a bond status review on December 18. It is almost axiomatic that the State of Georgia has an important interest in the

administration of its criminal laws. E.g., Wells v. Mulholland, 739 F. Supp. 3d 1318, 1323 (M.D. Ga. 2024) (citing Middlebrooks v. Patterson, No. 4:24-CV-00102-WMR, 2024 WL 2148741, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 30, 2024)), aff’d, No. 24-12535, 2025 WL 1860248 (11th Cir. July 7, 2025); see also Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1387 n.21

(5th Cir. 1979) (noting “the traditional reluctance of federal courts to interfere in the state criminal process and reflects the strong State interests involved in the administration of the criminal law”). As to the third factor, the bond review

hearing provides Burton an adequate opportunity to raise his federal claims. See Pompey v. Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]hat matters is whether the plaintiff is procedurally prevented from raising his constitutional

claims in the state courts, from which a certiorari petition can be filed seeking review on the merits in the United States Supreme Court.”) (emphasis in original). As to the Younger exceptions, Burton has not shown that the proceedings against him were instituted in bad faith or founded on flagrantly and patently

unconstitutional laws. Bad faith “generally means that a prosecution has been brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction.” Leonard, 61 F.4th at 911 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975)). The

documents attached to Burton’s motion show that his fiancée called police to their home after an alleged altercation, which is the basis for the state prosecution.4 Even though Burton’s fiancée, the alleged victim, has stated her desire that the

charges be dismissed,5 “it is the state, not the victim, that has an interest in criminal prosecutions,” and so a prosecutor “has broad discretion in making decisions prior to trial about [whom] to prosecute, what charges to bring, and which sentence to

4 Id. at 8–9, 49–51. 5 Id. at 8–13, 54–58. seek.” Georgia v. Perry, 261 Ga. App. 886, 887 (2003) (citations omitted). Nor is there

any basis to conclude that Burton is being prosecuted using flagrantly and patently unconstitutional laws. While Burton claims that the hearing was set in retaliation for his exercising his constitutional right to petition and seek redress from the

courts, the hearing is the venue in which he may seek that redress. While the requirement that he personally appear at the hearing may be inconvenient given his circumstances, there is no indication that the requirement violates his constitutional rights—the order was served to Burton’s email (his preferred method of communication) on December 9,° giving him eight days to travel from New York to Griffin, Georgia. Indeed, the purpose of a bond is to secure a defendant's appearance in court. Ayala v. Georgia, 262 Ga. 704, 705 (1993). Thus, Burton has not shown that any of the exceptions to Younger apply. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that it must abstain under Younger and allow the state proceeding to go forward. Accordingly, Burton’s motion for TRO [ECF 1-3] is DENIED. SO ORDERED this 5th day of January, 2026.

United States District Judge

6 Id. at 37, 46.