Sharyland ISD v. Oscar Alvarez and Marc Alvarez

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: April 6, 2023
• Docket: 13-22-00165-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

NUMBER 13-22-00165-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

SHARYLAND ISD, Appellant,

v.

OSCAR ALVAREZ AND MARC ALVAREZ, Appellees.

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 of Hidalgo County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Peña Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

Appellees Oscar and Marc Alvarez filed a negligence suit against appellant

Sharyland Independent School District (Sharyland) relating to a traffic accident involving

a Sharyland school bus. Sharyland filed a plea to the jurisdiction alleging that the Alvarezes failed to comply with the notice requirement of the Texas Tort Claims Act

(TTCA), which is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a suit against a governmental unit. See

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101. Sharyland appeals the trial court’s order

denying the plea, arguing that it did not receive formal or actual notice of the Alvarezes’

claims. We affirm. 1

I. BACKGROUND 2

On March 19, 2019, Sharyland employee Ignacio Perez was transporting students

and faculty by bus to a trumpet recital in McAllen, Texas. As he approached an

intersection on a two-lane road, the driver of the third vehicle in front of Perez stopped to

turn left, causing the trailing vehicles to come to a sudden stop. Perez braked but, sensing

that he would still collide with the vehicle in front of him, he drove the bus partially into the

oncoming lane of traffic. Meanwhile, Marc was driving a vehicle through the intersection

of the oncoming lane, with his father Oscar as a passenger. To avoid colliding with the

school bus, Marc swerved to the side of the road, scraping the vehicle against the

guardrail. Perez did not stop, and he continued to drive the bus to the intended

destination.

Humberto Resendez, a McAllen police officer, arrived to investigate the accident.

Officer Resendez called a Sharyland transportation dispatcher to direct the driver of the

bus to return to the scene “so that the driver would not be charged with hit and run.” 3 He

1 The Alvarezes have not filed an appellee’s brief to assist the Court.

2 The following undisputed facts are derived from the jurisdictional record.

3 It is not clear from the record whether Perez returned to the accident site. The crash report

identified the passengers of the bus, indicating that he might have. Nevertheless, this fact is not pertinent to our decision.

2 then completed his investigation and issued a Texas Peace Officer Crash Report (crash

report). In the crash report, Officer Resendez states that Perez “failed to give half of the

roadway as he attempted to pass two vehicles to the left that were stopped in front of him

to avoid a collision.” Officer Resendez then says that the vehicle driven by Marc “struck

a guardrail at [the] location after he swerved to avoid colliding with [the bus] in his lane of

travel.” Officer Resendez reported that Oscar had a possible injury but that he refused

medical treatment. He reported no other injuries. Officer Resendez noted damage to the

right side of Marc’s vehicle. Marc was able to drive the car from the scene.

On March 18, 2021, the Alvarezes sued Sharyland 4 for negligence, seeking

personal injury and property damages. Sharyland answered and later filed a plea to the

jurisdiction, arguing that the Alvarezes did not provide formal notice of their claim within

six months of the incident as required by the TTCA. See id. § 101.101(a). Sharyland

further argued that the crash report did not provide actual notice of the claim because it

reported only a “possible” injury to Oscar, who refused treatment at the scene. See id.

§ 101.101(c).

The Alvarezes filed a response to Sharyland’s plea, maintaining that Sharyland

had actual notice of personal injury, property damage, Sharyland’s alleged fault, and the

identity of the parties involved. The Alvarezes attached the following evidence to their

response: (1) the crash report; (2) Sharyland’s discovery responses; (3) Perez’s

employee incident report; (4) a statement from a Sharyland faculty member; (5) a

statement from a Sharyland transportation dispatcher; and (6) a Sharyland accident

report. In its discovery responses, Sharyland admitted that it received a copy of the crash

4 Initially, the Alvarezes also sued Perez, but their live pleading does not name him as a defendant.

3 report and that it was otherwise “made aware of the incident made the basis of this

lawsuit” within six months of its occurrence.

After a hearing, the trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction. Sharyland now

appeals. See id. § 51.014(a)(8).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law

“A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a

cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit.” Bland Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). The plea challenges the trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction over a pleaded cause of action. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife

v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of

law; therefore, when the determinative facts are undisputed, as they are here, our review

is de novo. Id.; see Reyes v. Jefferson County, 601 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2020) (per

curiam) (“Notice is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction under the TTCA, and as

such, presents a question of law we review de novo.”); Worsdale v. City of Killeen, 578

S.W.3d 57, 66 (Tex. 2019) (“Because the jurisdictional evidence is undisputed, we review

the actual-notice issue de novo.”).

Governmental immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over lawsuits in which

a political subdivision, such as Sharyland, has been sued unless immunity is waived by

the Legislature. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54, 57–58 (Tex.

2011). The TTCA provides a waiver of immunity for acts of negligence arising out of a

governmental employee’s negligent operation or use of a motor vehicle. TEX. CIV. PRAC.

& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(1). “To secure the TTCA’s limited waiver of governmental

4 immunity, claimants must timely provide notice of a claim to the governmental unit.”

Reyes, 601 S.W.3d at 797 (internal quotations omitted). “A governmental unit is entitled

to receive notice of a claim against it under [the TTCA] not later than six months after the

day that the incident giving rise to the claim occurred.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.

§ 101.101(a). This notice must reasonably describe: “(1) the damage or injury claimed;

(2) the time and place of the incident; and (3) the incident.” Id. However, formal notice is

not required by the TTCA if the governmental unit has actual notice. Id. § 101.101(c) (“The

notice requirements . . . do not apply if the governmental unit has actual notice that death

has occurred, that the claimant has received some injury, or that the claimant’s property

has been damaged.”).

A governmental unit has actual notice when it has “knowledge of (1) a death, injury,

or property damage; (2) the governmental unit’s alleged fault producing or contributing to

the death, injury, or property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved.” Reyes,

601 S.W.3d at 798 (quoting Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.3d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995)). To

establish knowledge of an injury, it is not necessary that the governmental entity be

absolutely certain of the nature and extent of the injury. City of San Antonio v. Cervantes,

521 S.W.3d 390, 396 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.). However, the

governmental entity must have actual, subjective awareness that a claimant has suffered

some injury. Id.

The second requirement is satisfied when the governmental unit has “subjective

awareness connecting alleged governmental conduct to causation of an alleged injury to

person or property in the manner ultimately asserted.” Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 65.

“Fault, as it pertains to actual notice, is not synonymous with liability; rather, it implies

5 responsibility for the injury claimed.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at Dall. v. Estate of

Arancibia, 324 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. 2010); see Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 68 (“The

critical inquiry is the governmental unit’s actual anticipation of an alleged claim rather than

subjective confirmation of its actual liability.”). “When the facts do not even imply the

governmental unit’s fault, they are legally insufficient to provide actual notice.” Worsdale,

578 S.W.3d at 64.

B. Analysis

The Alvarezes did not produce evidence that they provided formal notice to

Sharyland within six months of the accident. Rather, they contended that the evidence

showed actual notice. On appeal, Sharyland argues that it did not have actual notice of

the Alvarezes’ claims because its employee statements are silent as to fault and the crash

report is silent as to injuries and damages. We disagree. When read together, the

statements and the crash report establish each required element of actual notice.

A contemporaneous statement of a Sharyland employee on the bus described

Perez driving into the oncoming traffic lane, forcing another vehicle to veer against the

guard rail and “scrape against the entirety of the length of the railing, narrowly avoiding

contact with the bus.” Further, a Sharyland dispatcher learned that Perez had engaged in

a possible “hit and run.” The crash report corroborates the witness accounts, and contrary

to Sharyland’s assertion, includes notice as to injuries and property damage. Officer

Resendez concluded that Perez’s failure to give half the roadway was a factor causing

the accident. He identified a possible injury to Oscar and noted damage to the vehicle’s

right side. He also identified the Alvarezes as the occupants of the vehicle.

6 Thus, it is undisputed that Sharyland had notice, within six months of the accident,

of: (1) personal injury 5 and property damage; (2) its employee’s alleged fault producing

or contributing to the injury and property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties

involved. See Reyes, 601 S.W.3d at 798. We conclude that Sharyland received actual

notice pursuant to § 101.101(c), and the Alvarezes were excused from providing formal

notice. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(c); Reyes, 601 S.W.3d at 798;

see also Worsdale, 578 S.W.3d at 66–67 (holding that the City of Killeen had actual notice

under the TTCA and explaining that “[w]ell within [§] 101.101’s six-month notice deadline,

the City knew of allegations that it was responsible for maintaining a road and that the

failure to maintain the road had been identified as a contributing factor to the injuries that

provide the basis for this lawsuit”). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying

Sharyland’s plea to the jurisdiction. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. We overrule its sole

issue.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

L. ARON PEÑA Justice

Delivered and filed on the 6th day of April, 2023.

5 Sharyland does not support, with argument or authority, its conclusory statement that a peace officer’s notation of a possible personal injury is insufficient for purposes of actual notice of injury under the TTCA. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). At any rate, we find the argument unavailing. See City of San Antonio v. Cervantes, 521 S.W.3d 390, 396 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.) (explaining that a governmental entity need not be absolutely certain as to the nature and extent of a claimed injury to have actual notice under the TTCA); City of Wichita Falls v. Jenkins, 307 S.W.3d 854, 860–61 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied) (rejecting the City’s argument that it must have actual notice of the nature and extent of the claimants’ injuries under the TTCA, explaining, “all that is required is enough information for the City to investigate for the purpose of guarding against unfounded claims, settle claims, and prepare for trial”).