MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT*
I. INTRODUCTION
Star page 1*1 A divorced couple shared physical custody of their two children. After the couple's son began acting out, running away from home, and requesting to live with his father, the father asked the court to modify physical custody of the son. The superior court granted the father primary physical custody of the son and limited the mother's custodial time to weekend visitation. The mother appeals, arguing that there was no substantial change in circumstances, that the court failed to consider evidence of the father's domestic violence, and that the court should not have given weight to the son's preference. She maintains that the modification was not in the son's best interests. Observing no abuse of discretion or clear error, we affirm the superior court's order modifying custody.
II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Background
Sharyl W. and William D. divorced in 2014. They have two teenaged children, a daughter and a son. The superior court initially awarded Sharyl and William shared physical and legal custody of their children. They have spent the years since litigating many disagreements.
One of those disagreements led William to ask the court to modify legal custody in 2024. Sharyl opposed, arguing that their son, who would be 13 years old that fall, was old enough to express his views about his education and that it would be “inappropriate” for the court to make a custody determination without hearing from him. The court ordered an interview by parenting plan facilitator within the court system because the son was old enough to form a preference.1 After receiving the interview report, the court narrowly modified legal custody (regarding which school the son should attend) and awarded Sharyl final decision-making authority in the event she and William could not agree.
B. Proceedings
In March 2025 William moved to modify physical custody and asked that his son be interviewed again. Sharyl opposed, arguing that awarding William full physical custody would be detrimental to their son and that interviewing the son a second time would have little of value because of William's manipulation of the child.
The court ordered another interview with the son and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for May. During the interview, the son reported that there were positive elements about both of his parents’ homes. But he believed it would “be best to live with dad for a while,” and he still wanted to see his mother regularly, just not for overnight visits. The interviewer concluded there was no evidence of coaching, described the son as “thoughtful, direct and honest,” noted that he was “willing to own his errors,” and determined that the son's preference should carry weight.
1. Evidentiary hearing
At the evidentiary hearing, the superior court heard from several witnesses. The first witness was the principal of the son's school who testified that the son's behaviors at school and academic performance were, for the most part, positive. William's brother-in-law was the next witness. He described his nephew's behavior, both positive and problematic.
Star page 2*2 William testified next. He described his son's attitude, behavior, and performance in school, including some challenges arising out of the death of a family member. William also detailed instances of significant conflict between Sharyl and their son, including his knowledge of potentially dangerous incidents while Sharyl and their son were together. He described how, after one incident, Sharyl messaged him to tell him that after their son ran away from home, she found him walking along a highway.
William testified that he received a text from Sharyl in December 2024 stating that their son had run away following an altercation with her. William stated that he learned a few days later that their son had been charged for assaulting his mother. And he explained that he learned the charge had later been dismissed in a meeting that he had with their son's juvenile probation officer. He testified that he did not tell Sharyl about the meeting with the probation officer and that he understood her unhappiness that the charges were dropped to mean that she wanted their son criminally charged.
William also described a text message that he received from Sharyl in February 2025 stating that their son had “kicked or punched [her] windshield, which shattered” while she was inside her house. William said that in her message Sharyl had demanded that their son pay for the damage and stated that she would later decide if she would file a police report.
William acknowledged that their son had misbehaved before but said that his son had never acted violently in his care. William also testified that while it was “no secret” that he and Sharyl didn't get along, he encouraged the children to behave in her custody. Finally, William told the court that if he were awarded physical custody of their son, he wanted to revisit the issue in six months or sooner, because “it'd be important for him to have a relationship with his mother.”
Sharyl was the next witness. She accused William of trying to exert “counter-parenting, coercive control, and legal abuse.”2 She also said William “repetitively demonstrate[d] an unwillingness to communicate.” And she stated that their son's knowledge of her and William's ongoing legal proceedings was damaging their relationship.
Sharyl said that as a result of the December altercation with their son she had a corneal abrasion and injuries that required medical care. She admitted that after their son had grabbed her phone, she held him down while he bit, scratched, and injured her. She stated that after the assault charges were dismissed, she brought their son in for a second meeting with the juvenile probation officer because she was upset that the first meeting had been held without her. She testified that as the victim of an assault, she felt that she should have been notified. And she said that she brought their son back in so the probation officer could go over the information she had missed.
Sharyl next described the windshield incident. She said that the altercation began when their son refused to remove his headphones during a conversation about his grades. Later, he refused to help her carry a box upstairs. After that Sharyl discovered her windshield was broken and had to be replaced. She later learned that their son had punched it. She also testified that their son locked her out of the house, so she could not take him to school that day.
Star page 3*3 Finally, Sharyl testified that she did not think their son's custodial preference should carry weight. Sharyl admitted that his recent behavior was abnormal. She denied telling her son that she would file a police report for the broken windshield or remove him from school as punishment.
Sharyl's partner was the last witness. He described the son as fun-loving and stubborn, but noted that his behavior had changed and that he had become more withdrawn. The partner stated that the son had become defiant and rebellious, and had informed them that he would no longer comply with their household rules. The partner stated that the son broke his and Sharyl's bedroom door and ransacked their bedroom, and said he “was gathering evidence” to sue them. The partner said that he and Sharyl had been unsuccessful in their attempts to modify the son's behavior and did not talk to the son much anymore or feel safe taking him on trips for this reason. He stated that removing the son's bedroom door was a consequence for his actions, which included the son barricading himself in his room and sleeping in the bathroom.
2. Order modifying custody
The superior court issued a short order modifying physical custody of the son in May 2025. It found that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the 2023 custody order and that it was in the son's best interests to award William primary physical custody. It limited Sharyl to visitation with the son every Saturday afternoon but allowed the parents to set a holiday schedule or otherwise modify the amount of time the son spent with Sharyl.
Several months later the superior court placed its custody decision on the record. First, the court determined that the domestic violence between the son and Sharyl alone qualified as a substantial change in circumstances.3 It also found that there had been “a breakdown in the relationship between [Sharyl] and [the son] such that he [was] engaging in behaviors that [were] unsafe for him,” including running away. Even Sharyl and her partner, the court noted, had indicated it was not safe for the son to be with them.
The court next discussed the statutory best interests factors.4 It found that the son's needs were typical of a teenager his age, pointing to his overall positive academic performance and behavior, as well as his participation in mental health counseling.5 It found that William was better suited to and more capable of meeting the son's needs “in terms of providing for a safe home ... [and] physical environment.”6 The court pointed to the son's running away, the behavioral expectations at Sharyl's home that led to a high level of conflict, and the son's disengagement. The court concluded that the son's wish to live with his father should carry weight.7 It also found there was love and affection between the son and both parents, but that his relationship with Sharyl needed to heal8 and that she could not provide a stable environment for him.9 It reasoned that the son was “withdrawn,” and that “the passage of time alone [was] not improving their relationship.” William, by contrast, had “continued to provide a stable, safe environment for [the son].”
Star page 4*4 The court next found that both parents were willing to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the son.10 It found that the evidence did not support Sharyl's accusation that William was attempting to interfere in their relationship. Instead, it found that William did not believe it was in the son's best interests to live exclusively with him for the remainder of the son's minority, and that William hoped the custody modification would repair Sharyl and the son's relationship.
The court also specifically considered evidence of domestic violence in the family.11 It noted that Sharyl “testified that she was a victim of assault” and that she had set up a second meeting with the probation officer after the charges were dropped so that she could participate in the meeting as the victim.12
Finally, the court discussed other evidence it considered relevant.13 It found that Sharyl's testimony focused on blaming William for the breakdown in her relationship with the son, that she did not take responsibility for her contribution to that dynamic, and that there was no indication that Sharyl was adequately addressing the underlying reasons for the son's behavior or learning to deescalate unsafe situations. The court observed that there was no evidence that the son was exhibiting the same behaviors in William's custody, and concluded that William was better suited to meet the son's needs.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The trial court has broad discretion in child custody decisions.”15 We review the superior court's determination that there has been a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify a child custody order for abuse of discretion.16 “Abuse of discretion in child custody cases occurs when the superior court ‘considers improper factors in determining custody, fails to consider statutorily mandated factors, or assigns disproportionate weight to certain factors while ignoring others.’ ”17
“We will not reverse a custody decision unless the superior court has abused its discretion or the controlling factual findings are clearly erroneous.”18 Factual findings are “clearly erroneous if a review of the record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that the superior court has made a mistake.”19 “We afford particular deference to factual findings based primarily on oral testimony, because the trial court is better suited to judge the credibility of witnesses and weigh conflicting evidence.”20
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Determining That There Had Been A Substantial Change In Circumstances.
Star page 5*5 Sharyl argues that the court erred by determining that William had proved a substantial change in circumstances. As a result, she argues that court should not have granted William's motion to modify custody.
To modify custody the superior court must first determine whether a change in circumstances has occurred.21 We have previously held, in accord with AS 25.20.110(c), that domestic violence occurring within the family since the most recent custody order constitutes a per se change in circumstances.22
The superior court found that an act of domestic violence had occurred between Sharyl and her son since the most recent custody order. Sharyl does not contest this finding. At the evidentiary hearing Sharyl testified that she was an “assault victim” and repeatedly characterized the December altercation with the son as an “assault.” And she introduced evidence that the police considered the incident a crime of domestic violence. In her affidavit in opposition to William's motion, she described how the son hit and bit her, pulled her hair, scratched her face, and threw a full can of soda water at her. And Sharyl testified that she suffered injuries from the incident that required medical care. The record overwhelmingly establishes that domestic violence occurred between Sharyl and the son. The superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding there had been a substantial change in circumstances.
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err In Its Factual Findings.
“Once a party demonstrates a qualifying change in circumstances, the court will determine whether modification is in the best interests of the child.”23 “The best interests analysis is based on the statutory factors enumerated in AS 25.24.150(c).”24
The superior court made no findings that William had committed any acts of domestic violence. Sharyl argues that the court erred because it did not adequately weigh evidence of William's behaviors, which she argues “rise to the level of domestic abuse.”
When it determines the best interests of a child, the superior court must consider any evidence of domestic violence.25 It “must make detailed findings on alleged incidents of domestic violence,” which “are necessary on appeal to give us ‘a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court's decision, and to enable [us] to determine the ground on which the trial court reached its decision.’ ”26
Sharyl argues that the court should have found that William was abusive, characterizing his litigation strategy as “coercive control, counter-parenting, and other post-separation abus[ive] behaviors.” On appeal she again accuses William of coercive control and abusive litigation.
Star page 6*6 But “domestic violence” and “crime involving domestic violence” are terms that are defined by statute.27 In the context of custody modifications, these terms are given the same meaning as in the Alaska Statutes’ chapter on domestic violence and sexual assault.28 The defined offenses that constitute domestic violence or a crime of domestic violence under that chapter include crimes against persons; burglary; criminal trespass; arson or criminally negligent burning; criminal mischief; terroristic threatening; violating a protective order; harassment; cruelty to animals if the animal is a pet; interfering with a report of a crime of domestic violence; and unlawful contact.29 Litigation abuse and coercive control are not included, and it was not error for the court to disregard Sharyl's arguments.
Sharyl next argues that the “majority” of William's case for modifying custody was based on the son's statements, which were inadmissible hearsay. She argues that such inadmissible hearsay “was the primary basis for the court's decision,” which should be reversed. But almost all the evidence the court relied on in making its custody determination came from testimony provided at the evidentiary hearing, including Sharyl's own testimony that acknowledged that her relationship with her son had significantly deteriorated.
Moreover, much of the evidence that William presented to the court was not hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that is offered for the truth of the matter asserted,30 and it is generally inadmissible in a court proceeding.31 But a statement is not hearsay if it is the admission of a party-opponent.32 The court's determination that a custody modification was in the son's best interests was partly based on admissions that Sharyl — a party — made to William — her opponent. At the evidentiary hearing William presented messages that he had received from Sharyl describing how their son ran away and she later found him walking along a highway. William also presented messages that he received from Sharyl explaining that their son had run away again after their altercation, that the son had shattered her windshield, and that she wanted the son to pay for the damage. These admissions from Sharyl to William were not hearsay and the superior court did not err by relying on them.33
C. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Giving Weight To The Son's Preference Or In Making Its Best Interests Determination.
Finally, Sharyl argues that the superior court should not have relied upon the preference the son expressed to the interviewer. She also generally challenges the court's best interests determination. Among the best interests factors the court must consider under AS 25.24.150(c) is “the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a preference.”34 The court can obtain information about a child's preferences in various ways, “including by conducting a direct interview with the child, by ordering an interview by a court professional for the child's preference, or by appointing an independent expert to investigate custody issues.”35 “The superior court has discretion to determine whether a child is capable of forming a trustworthy preference.”36
Star page 7*7 Here, the court obtained the son's preference by ordering an interview with a court professional. The parties’ son was 13 years old at the time of the interview and expressed a clear, well-reasoned preference for wanting to live with William. The interviewer noted that the son was “thoughtful, direct and honest,” and concluded that he showed no signs of coaching. The interviewer also noted that the son expressed insight into his own needs and was “willing to own his errors.”
Sharyl's argument also overlooks the inconsistency of her current position with the position that she took in 2024 when she asked for the court to consider the son's custody preferences. At the time, Sharyl argued that the son was “clearly old enough to express his views,” and that he deserved the opportunity to share his preferences. The court granted her 2024 request, and Sharyl provides no persuasive argument as to why the son's custodial preference should be disregarded now that he is two years older.
Sharyl also argues that the court abused its discretion by determining it was in the son's best interests to award William primary custody. She suggests that there was no evidence that the son's conduct would improve in William's home and that the son's preference for living with his father should not outweigh his other needs. Her argument overlooks the superior court's specific findings that the son was acting dangerously in Sharyl's home but not exhibiting those behaviors in William's custody. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to reason that the son's dangerous conduct was less likely to occur in his father's home.
Thus, we hold that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by giving weight to the son's preference or by determining that it was in the child's best interests for his father to have primary custody.
V. CONCLUSION
The superior court's order is AFFIRMED.