Sharpe v. Sharpe

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sharpe v. Sharpe

147 A.D.2d 944, 538 N.Y.S.2d 739, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1259

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 3, 1989

StatusPublished

This text of 147 A.D.2d 944 (Sharpe v. Sharpe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sharpe v. Sharpe, 147 A.D.2d 944, 538 N.Y.S.2d 739, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1259 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1989).

Pincite

Opinion

— Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and defendant’s motion granted. Memorandum: Special Term erred in denying defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment in an action to rescind a separation agreement incorporated but not merged in a preequitable distribution divorce decree. Defendant’s failure to appear for trial was excusable. Moreover, it is apparent from the motion papers that there is merit to defendant’s defense to plaintiff’s request for alimony in the rescission action (see, Math v Math, 39 AD2d 583, affd 31 NY2d 693; Moran v Moran, 81 AD2d 740, 741; Matter of Mammon v Mammon, 54 AD2d 762). Upon defendant’s return to the United States in April 1989, the matter should be scheduled for trial and proceed forthwith. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Lynch, J. — set aside default judgment.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Green and Lawton, JJ.

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— Order unanimously reversed on the law without costs and defendant’s motion granted. Memorandum: Special Term erred in denying defendant’s motion to vacate a default judgment in an action to rescind a separation agreement incorporated but not merged in a preequitable distribution divorce decree. Defendant’s failure to appear for trial was excusable. Moreover, it is apparent from the motion papers that there is merit to defendant’s defense to plaintiff’s request for alimony in the rescission action (see, Math v Math, 39 AD2d 583, affd 31 NY2d 693; Moran v Moran, 81 AD2d 740, 741; Matter of Mammon v Mammon, 54 AD2d 762). Upon defendant’s return to the United States in April 1989, the matter should be scheduled for trial and proceed forthwith. (Appeal from order of Supreme Court, Oneida County, Lynch, J. — set aside default judgment.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Callahan, Denman, Green and Lawton, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

147 A.D.2d 944, 538 N.Y.S.2d 739, 1989 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1259, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharpe-v-sharpe-nyappdiv-1989.

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