Sharp v. Learned

32 So. 2d 141, 202 Miss. 393, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 290
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 6, 1947
DocketNo. 36310.
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 32 So. 2d 141 (Sharp v. Learned) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharp v. Learned, 32 So. 2d 141, 202 Miss. 393, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 290 (Mich. 1947).

Opinion

Roberds, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

In the summer and fall of 1937 Learned cut and removed a quantity of timber from a part of the area known as, Diamond Island, or Diamond Island Towhead, located some sixteen miles south to south-west of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Sharp and Strieker contend that they were the owners of the timber and the land from which it was cut. They claim only through Louisiana title sources and that the particular land from which the timber was cut was a part of the accretions to Section 7, 8 and 9, Township 15 N, Range 14 E, Madison Parish, Louisiana. On the other hand, Learned claims that he was the owner of the timber and the land on which it was located. He claims only through Mississippi title sources, and it appears that, according to his contention, the timber was upon accretions to Sections 5 and 6, Township 14 N, Range 2 E, Warren County, Mississippi. The Chancellor, on the fourth, or last, trial, from which trial this appeal is taken, found that Learned was the owner and that the land was *398 located in Mississippi — at least, lie found that Sharp and Strieker, as against Learned, were not the owners of the timber. The primary question on this appeal is whether he was manifestly wrong in so finding. In other words, this is purely a question of fact, and, as frankly stated by learned counsel for Sharp and Strieker, they “have the laboring oar” to show that the chancellor should be reversed. However, if we should reverse the chancellor on that finding of fact, two other questions would arise, to-wit, (1) whether the suit to recover the value of the timber is barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) whether Sharp and Strieker made proof sufficiently definite and specific of the quantity and value of the timber to constitute the foundation of a personal decree for its value.

As stated, this is the fourth appearance of the case in this Court. A brief history of the proceedings may be of help in understanding the question we now pass upon and its solution.

In November, 1937, Learned filed a bill in the chancery court of Adams County, Mississippi, against Sharp and Strieker, seeking to enjoin them, for reasons stated in 'the bill, from prosecuting a contemplated suit against him in Madison Parish, Louisiana, to collect from him the value of this timber, and from attaching his land in that Parish and subjecting it to the payment of the judgement if one should be had. Sharp and Strieker answered that bill, denying fraud, and filed demurrers, general and special. The chancellor overruled the demurrers and this Court reversed and remanded the cause. Sharp et al. v. Learned, 182 Miss. 333, 181 So. 142, 182 So. 122.

On remand the bill was amended and respondents again demurred. The chancellor overruled the demurrers and this Court affirmed and remanded the case. Sharp et al. v. Learned, 185 Miss. 872, 188 So. 302.

The cause then proceeded to trial on the issue whether Sharp and Strieker should be permanently enjoined from prosecuting the Lousiana suit, which then had been filed, *399 against Learned, all tlie parties being residents of Mississippi and the land, according to complainant Learned, being in Mississippi. At this hearing a great mass of testimony, oral and documentary, including conveyances, tax records, maps, charts, plats, sketches and photographs, was introduced. The chancellor entered a decree making the injunction perpetual. No opinion of the chancellor appears in the record and, therefore, we do not know, with certainty, in which state he found the situs of the land to be. However, it would appear to be inherent in his decree under the pleadings that he found that Sharp and Strieker did not have title to the timber and that the land from which Learned cut timber was located in Mississippi. On appeal this court was of the opinion that, on the record as then made, a part of the land was in Mississippi and a part in Louisiana. However, the judgment entered here merely affirmed the chancellor in granting the injunction and remanded the cause, since, in the opinion, the Court had suggested, for reasons stated, that Sharp and Strieker, on remand, might file a cross bill to obtain a personal decree against Learned for the value of the timber if it should be found on a new trial that Sharp and Strieker were the owners thereof, it being conceded by all parties that Learned was financially able to respond to the personal decree, and that attachment was not necessary for the enforcement of such demand. Sharp and Strieker, on remand of the cause, filed such cross bill. That was the first time they had sought to recover the value of the timber in this suit. When the cause came on for hearing the chancellor announced that he considered the injunction feature at an end; that his granting of the injunction had been affirmed by this Court and that the cause was remanded only for the filing of said cross bill by Sharp and Strieker, and that the only issue remaining to be tried was whether Sharp and Strieker were the owners of the particular land from which the timber had been cut and removed, there being no claim the title to the timber had been severed from the title to *400 the land. The chancellor further announced that under the then status of the proceedings that the burden was upon Sharp and Strieker to show title to'the timber in themselves, and the quantity and value of that cut by Learned.. Sharp and Strieker assumed that burden and proceeded as cross-complainants to introduce proof. They introduced the entire record of the evidence made on the immediate prior, or third, trial. A large part of that record —in fact, the greater volume thereof, consisted of the testimony which Learned himself had offered at the third hearing, and which the chancellor had passed upon at that trial. Counsel for all parties then had an agreement to the effect that the Mississippi River had not changed its course by avulsion since 1895-6 to the time of the hearing; that all changes since that time had been by gradual processes. Sharp and Strieker then rested.

Learned, as cross-defendant, also relying upon the record which had been made on the third trial, all of which had been introduced on the fourth hearing by Sharp and Strieker, offered, in addition to that record, the testimony of Dr. H. N. Fisk, including the numerous exhibits as a part of his evidence. Learned then rested. It was upon a consideration of all of this evidence that the chancellor found that the timber Learned cut was located on land lying in Warren County, Mississippi, and that, as between, the parties hereto, the title was in Learned, or, at least, that Sharp and Strieker had shown no title in themselves. The question now again recurs. Was the chancellor manifestly wrong?

It would be impossible to reproduce in an opinion the evidence, pro and con, on that question, disclosed by the many maps, plats, charts, sketches and mosaics which are.a part of this record, and which were before the chancellor. This Court said that was true on the third appeal. It is doubly so on this one. We can only announce that after prolonged study of the record, we are unable to say, and we could not write an opinion demonstrating, that the chancellor was manifestly wrong. Indeed, we think *401 lie liad abundant evidence to support bis finding.

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Bluebook (online)
32 So. 2d 141, 202 Miss. 393, 1947 Miss. LEXIS 290, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharp-v-learned-miss-1947.