Sharp v. Ajemian

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Sharp v. Ajemian

305 A.D.2d 661, 759 N.Y.S.2d 696

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 27, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 305 A.D.2d 661 (Sharp v. Ajemian) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Sharp v. Ajemian, 305 A.D.2d 661, 759 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.), dated June 20, 2002, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is tolled until after a patient’s last visit to a physician “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint” (Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151, 155 [1962]; McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 405 [1982]). Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that their course of treatment of the plaintiff ended more than 2V2 years before the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214-a; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Altman, J.P., McGinity, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, etc., the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jonas, J.), dated June 20, 2002, which denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as time-barred.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Under the continuous treatment doctrine, the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action is tolled until after a patient’s last visit to a physician “when the course of treatment which includes the wrongful acts or omissions has run continuously and is related to the same original condition or complaint” (Borgia v City of New York, 12 NY2d 151, 155 [1962]; McDermott v Torre, 56 NY2d 399, 405 [1982]). Under the circumstances of this case, the defendants failed to make a prima facie showing that their course of treatment of the plaintiff ended more than 2V2 years before the commencement of this action (see CPLR 214-a; Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Altman, J.P., McGinity, Luciano and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

305 A.D.2d 661, 759 N.Y.S.2d 696, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharp-v-ajemian-nyappdiv-2003.

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