Sharon Talley v. Department of Agriculture

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedApril 25, 2024
DocketDE-1221-21-0175-W-2
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sharon Talley v. Department of Agriculture (Sharon Talley v. Department of Agriculture) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharon Talley v. Department of Agriculture, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SHARON M. TALLEY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-1221-21-0175-W-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DATE: April 25, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David A. Branch , Esquire, James R. Klimaski , Esquire, and Steven J. Silverberg , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

Dora Malykin , Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

Patricia McNamee , Esquire, Riverdale, Maryland, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which denied her request for corrective action in her individual right of action (IRA) appeal because she did not prove a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following 1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to vacate the administrative judge’s finding in the alternative that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of the appellant’s protected disclosure or activities, we AFFIRM the initial decision. The administrative judge found that, although the appellant did not prove that she made protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), she proved that she engaged in protected activities under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). Talley v. Department of Agriculture, MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-21-0175-W-2, Refiled Appeal File (RAF), Tab 31, Initial Decision (ID) at 6-22. However, she found that the appellant did not prove that her protected activities were a contributing factor in the covered personnel actions at issue, and thus, the appellant did not establish a prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal. 2 RAF, ID at 37-42. On 2 In her petition for review, the appellant asserts that her burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing was substantial evidence. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 11. This is incorrect. To establish a prima facie case of reprisal for whistleblowing, an appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that she made a protected disclosure or engaged in protected activity that was a contributing factor in an agency decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. See Salazar v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 43, ¶ 23; Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 6 (2015). 3

review, the appellant presents no evidence that would support a finding that any of her alleged disclosures or activities, which occurred in 2012, were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to deny her a temporary promotion in 2019, or its failure to increase her pay or issue her a Standard Form 50 for a temporary promotion she served in 2020. 3 Thus, to the extent that the appellant disputes the administrative judge’s findings regarding her disclosures and activities, we need not reach this issue because, as the administrative judge correctly found, the appellant did not meet the contributing factor standard. Id. Because the appellant did not prove her prima facie case of whistleblower reprisal, the Board may not proceed to the clear and convincing evidence test. Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19, n.10 (2014), aff’d per curiam, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Therefore, we vacate the administrative judge’s finding in the alternative, that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of any protected disclosure or activities. RAF, ID at 42-60.

3 The administrative judge found that the appellant did not prove that the other alleged retaliatory actions were covered personnel actions under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). RAF, ID at 22-29. To the extent that the appellant challenges these findings on review, because we find them to be well-reasoned and supported by fact and law, we discern no basis to disturb them. Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (stating that the Board will not disturb an administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). Furthermore, the appellant did not object to the administrative judge’s framing of the issues as set forth in her prehearing order, despite being afforded the opportunity to do so. RAF, Tab 21 at 4-5, 10. Accordingly, we discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s characterization of the issues in this appeal. See Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 14 (2016) (declining to address on review matters excluded by the administrative judge in orders to which the appellant was afforded the opportunity to object and did not do so); Tarpley v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R. 579, 581 (1988) (stating that the appellant’s failure to timely object to rulings on witnesses precludes his doing so on petition for review). 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).

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Sharon Talley v. Department of Agriculture, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharon-talley-v-department-of-agriculture-mspb-2024.