FIFTH DIVISION BROWN, C. J., BARNES, P. J., and MERCIER, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
May 4, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0303. CARSON et al. v. CHATHAM COUNTY et al.
MERCIER, Judge.
Sharon Carson, as executrix of the Estate of Bernitha Vaughn, and Vaughn’s
daughter Terry Heyward (“plaintiffs”) appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing
Chatham County (“the County”) from this wrongful death and personal injury action
on sovereign immunity grounds. Finding no error, we affirm.
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity,
protects all levels of governments from legal action unless they have waived their
immunity from suit.” City of Albany v. Dougherty County, 352 Ga. App. 664, 667(1)
(835 SE2d 681) (2019) (quotation marks omitted). A motion to dismiss grounded in
sovereign immunity challenges a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, rather than the merits of a plaintiff’s complaint. See Alred v. Ga. Pub. Def. Council, 362 Ga. App.
465, 466 (869 SE2d 99) (2022) (“Sovereign immunity is not an affirmative defense,
going to the merits of the case, but raises the issue of the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction to try the case.” (quotation marks omitted)). To survive a motion to
dismiss on this basis, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that sovereign
immunity has been waived. See id.
When a defendant raises a sovereign immunity challenge, “the trial court may
receive evidence if necessary to develop the record and make relevant factual findings
to decide the threshold issue of whether [the] defendant’s entitlement to sovereign
immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 24 (806 SE2d 195) (2017) (punctuation omitted). Although
we review a trial court’s ruling in this regard de novo, we will uphold the factual
findings underlying that ruling if they are supported by any evidence. See Alred, 362
Ga. App. at 466.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the record in this case. Plaintiffs sued
the County, the City of Savannah (“the City”), and others in 2018, alleging that, on
March 9, 2016, a car being pursued at high speeds by unmarked police vehicles in
2 Savannah collided with a car driven by Vaughn, killing her.1 The complaint asserted,
among other things, that County and City officers jointly engaged in the high-speed
pursuit as part of an undercover drug investigation, violating police policy and
negligently causing Vaughn’s death. The County moved to dismiss the claims against
it, arguing that it was protected from suit by sovereign immunity, and the trial court
granted the motion.2
The case subsequently proceeded to trial against the City and Kareem Felder,
the individual driving the car that collided with Vaughn, resulting in a jury verdict for
plaintiffs exceeding $3,500,000. The jury apportioned fault between the two
defendants, assessing the City’s fault at 37.5 percent and Felder’s fault at 62.5
percent. In entering judgment, the trial court reduced the total damages awarded
against the City to $500,000, the amount of the City’s limited waiver of sovereign
immunity under OCGA § 36-92-2. This appeal followed.
1 The lawsuit originally named additional family members as plaintiffs, but only Carson and Heyward are listed as plaintiffs in this appeal. 2 After the County filed its motion, plaintiffs dismissed their complaint without prejudice, and, within six months of that dismissal, renewed the complaint. The County refiled its motion to dismiss with respect to the renewed complaint. 3 Plaintiffs do not challenge the jury’s verdict on appeal. Rather, they argue that
the trial court erred in dismissing the County from the lawsuit; that, like the City, the
County waived its sovereign immunity up to $500,000 in damages stemming from the
County’s actions during the police chase; and that this $500,000 should be stacked
on top of the City’s $500,000 judgment.
Pursuant to OCGA § 36-92-2(a)(3):
The sovereign immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived up to ... $500,000.00 because of bodily injury or death of any one person in any one occurrence, an aggregate amount of $700,000.00 because of bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one occurrence, and $50,000.00 because of injury to or destruction of property in any one occurrence, for incidents occurring on or after January 1, 2008.
As used in this provision, a “claim” is “any demand against a local government
entity for money for a loss caused by negligence of a local government entity officer
or employee using a covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her official duties
or employment.” OCGA § 36-92-1(1). The term “local government entity” includes
counties, as well as municipal corporations. See OCGA § 36-92-1(3). And a “covered
4 motor vehicle” is any vehicle owned, leased, or rented by the local government entity
at issue. See OCGA § 36-92-1(2).
On appeal, plaintiffs point to no specific evidence that the County owned,
leased, or rented any of the police vehicles involved in the incident leading to
Vaughn’s death. Instead, they contend that, pursuant to an intergovernmental
agreement executed in February 2016, the City and County operated and shared
responsibility for a joint police force, necessarily waiving sovereign immunity with
respect to the police activity. We disagree.
Under the 2016 agreement, the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police
Department (“SCMPD”) acted as a joint instrument of the City and County
governments, providing “the full range of police services in the unincorporated area
of the County and in the jurisdictional area of the City[.]” All SCMPD police officers
were to be sworn in by the City and the County, but were classified as City employees.
The agreement provided that capital assets and equipment would “be generally owned
by the entity that directly purchased the item[.]” Vehicles purchased by the County
constituted County property, while vehicles purchased by the City belonged to the
5 City. The agreement specified: “[N]othing in this agreement shall be construed as a
rental agreement between the parties for use of [SCMPD] cars nor is there any waiver
of sovereign immunity based upon renting of [SCMPD] cars.” It also made clear that
the agreement did not “waiv[e] any immunity or defense available to either party
under law.”
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that unmarked cars used by officers
assigned to the SCMPD, the County-run Counter Narcotics Team (“CNT”), and the
Savannah-Chatham Undercover Narcotics Investigative Team (“UNIT”)
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FIFTH DIVISION BROWN, C. J., BARNES, P. J., and MERCIER, J.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.us/rules
May 4, 2026
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A0303. CARSON et al. v. CHATHAM COUNTY et al.
MERCIER, Judge.
Sharon Carson, as executrix of the Estate of Bernitha Vaughn, and Vaughn’s
daughter Terry Heyward (“plaintiffs”) appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing
Chatham County (“the County”) from this wrongful death and personal injury action
on sovereign immunity grounds. Finding no error, we affirm.
“The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity,
protects all levels of governments from legal action unless they have waived their
immunity from suit.” City of Albany v. Dougherty County, 352 Ga. App. 664, 667(1)
(835 SE2d 681) (2019) (quotation marks omitted). A motion to dismiss grounded in
sovereign immunity challenges a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, rather than the merits of a plaintiff’s complaint. See Alred v. Ga. Pub. Def. Council, 362 Ga. App.
465, 466 (869 SE2d 99) (2022) (“Sovereign immunity is not an affirmative defense,
going to the merits of the case, but raises the issue of the trial court’s subject matter
jurisdiction to try the case.” (quotation marks omitted)). To survive a motion to
dismiss on this basis, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that sovereign
immunity has been waived. See id.
When a defendant raises a sovereign immunity challenge, “the trial court may
receive evidence if necessary to develop the record and make relevant factual findings
to decide the threshold issue of whether [the] defendant’s entitlement to sovereign
immunity deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.” Dep’t of Pub. Safety v.
Johnson, 343 Ga. App. 22, 24 (806 SE2d 195) (2017) (punctuation omitted). Although
we review a trial court’s ruling in this regard de novo, we will uphold the factual
findings underlying that ruling if they are supported by any evidence. See Alred, 362
Ga. App. at 466.
With these principles in mind, we turn to the record in this case. Plaintiffs sued
the County, the City of Savannah (“the City”), and others in 2018, alleging that, on
March 9, 2016, a car being pursued at high speeds by unmarked police vehicles in
2 Savannah collided with a car driven by Vaughn, killing her.1 The complaint asserted,
among other things, that County and City officers jointly engaged in the high-speed
pursuit as part of an undercover drug investigation, violating police policy and
negligently causing Vaughn’s death. The County moved to dismiss the claims against
it, arguing that it was protected from suit by sovereign immunity, and the trial court
granted the motion.2
The case subsequently proceeded to trial against the City and Kareem Felder,
the individual driving the car that collided with Vaughn, resulting in a jury verdict for
plaintiffs exceeding $3,500,000. The jury apportioned fault between the two
defendants, assessing the City’s fault at 37.5 percent and Felder’s fault at 62.5
percent. In entering judgment, the trial court reduced the total damages awarded
against the City to $500,000, the amount of the City’s limited waiver of sovereign
immunity under OCGA § 36-92-2. This appeal followed.
1 The lawsuit originally named additional family members as plaintiffs, but only Carson and Heyward are listed as plaintiffs in this appeal. 2 After the County filed its motion, plaintiffs dismissed their complaint without prejudice, and, within six months of that dismissal, renewed the complaint. The County refiled its motion to dismiss with respect to the renewed complaint. 3 Plaintiffs do not challenge the jury’s verdict on appeal. Rather, they argue that
the trial court erred in dismissing the County from the lawsuit; that, like the City, the
County waived its sovereign immunity up to $500,000 in damages stemming from the
County’s actions during the police chase; and that this $500,000 should be stacked
on top of the City’s $500,000 judgment.
Pursuant to OCGA § 36-92-2(a)(3):
The sovereign immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived up to ... $500,000.00 because of bodily injury or death of any one person in any one occurrence, an aggregate amount of $700,000.00 because of bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one occurrence, and $50,000.00 because of injury to or destruction of property in any one occurrence, for incidents occurring on or after January 1, 2008.
As used in this provision, a “claim” is “any demand against a local government
entity for money for a loss caused by negligence of a local government entity officer
or employee using a covered motor vehicle while carrying out his or her official duties
or employment.” OCGA § 36-92-1(1). The term “local government entity” includes
counties, as well as municipal corporations. See OCGA § 36-92-1(3). And a “covered
4 motor vehicle” is any vehicle owned, leased, or rented by the local government entity
at issue. See OCGA § 36-92-1(2).
On appeal, plaintiffs point to no specific evidence that the County owned,
leased, or rented any of the police vehicles involved in the incident leading to
Vaughn’s death. Instead, they contend that, pursuant to an intergovernmental
agreement executed in February 2016, the City and County operated and shared
responsibility for a joint police force, necessarily waiving sovereign immunity with
respect to the police activity. We disagree.
Under the 2016 agreement, the Savannah-Chatham Metropolitan Police
Department (“SCMPD”) acted as a joint instrument of the City and County
governments, providing “the full range of police services in the unincorporated area
of the County and in the jurisdictional area of the City[.]” All SCMPD police officers
were to be sworn in by the City and the County, but were classified as City employees.
The agreement provided that capital assets and equipment would “be generally owned
by the entity that directly purchased the item[.]” Vehicles purchased by the County
constituted County property, while vehicles purchased by the City belonged to the
5 City. The agreement specified: “[N]othing in this agreement shall be construed as a
rental agreement between the parties for use of [SCMPD] cars nor is there any waiver
of sovereign immunity based upon renting of [SCMPD] cars.” It also made clear that
the agreement did not “waiv[e] any immunity or defense available to either party
under law.”
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that unmarked cars used by officers
assigned to the SCMPD, the County-run Counter Narcotics Team (“CNT”), and the
Savannah-Chatham Undercover Narcotics Investigative Team (“UNIT”)
participated in the undercover surveillance and pursuit of Felder on March 9, 2016.
Asserting that the trial court was required to take this allegation — and a claimed
connection between the County and the unmarked cars — as true, plaintiffs argue that
dismissal was improper. But a trial court addressing a motion to dismiss on sovereign
immunity grounds is not bound by the allegations in the complaint. See Bonner v.
Peterson, 301 Ga. App. 443, 443 (687 SE2d 676) (2009) (contrasting a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) with a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1)). On the
contrary, the court may consider evidence and make factual findings relating to
6 sovereign immunity. See Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 343 Ga. App. at 23-24; Bonner, 301 Ga.
App. at 443.
That is exactly what the trial court did here. In resolving the motion to dismiss,
the court found that all police vehicles involved in the incident giving rise to plaintiffs’
claims were owned by the City, not the County, rendering the sovereign immunity
waiver in OCGA § 36-92-2(a)(3) inapplicable to the County. See OCGA § 36-92-1(2)
(for purposes of the waiver, a “covered motor vehicle” is one owned, leased, or
rented by the local government entity at issue). At least some evidence supports this
conclusion. A captain with the SCMPD testified by affidavit that “no officers, agents,
employees or vehicles representing . . . Chatham County[] were involved in the March
9, 2016 Felder incident.” The director of the County’s Risk Management
Department, which maintained an inventory of all County-owned vehicles assigned
to the SCMPD, similarly averred that “[n]one of the vehicles involved in the incident
alleged in [plaintiffs’] complaint were owned or operated by Chatham County.” The
record further shows that SCMPD officers, including those assigned to UNIT, were
employed by the City. And although the County operated its own drug task force
7 (CNT), the County presented evidence that CNT officers and vehicles did not take
part in the March 9, 2016 undercover operation or the pursuit of Felder.
This evidence supports the trial court’s determination that County-owned
vehicles were not involved in Vaughn’s death. Plaintiffs’ reliance on the 2016
intergovernmental agreement — which they insist establishes a joint venture as to all
police activities — is unavailing. Rather than demonstrating County ownership of the
vehicles, the agreement makes clear that SCMPD police vehicles were not jointly
owned; they were owned by the government entity (the City or the County) that
purchased them, and nothing in the agreement establishes a rental relationship
between the parties.3
Simply put, the trial court was authorized to find that the County did not own,
lease, or rent any of the police vehicles at issue here. Under the plain terms of OCGA
3 Plaintiffs cite Ayers v. Ass’n of County Comm’rs of Ga.-Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency, 332 Ga. App. 230 (771 SE2d 743) (2015), to support their claim that the County’s decision to enter the intergovernmental agreement necessarily establishes a sovereign immunity waiver with respect to SCMPD vehicles. The Ayers decision, however, does not address sovereign immunity or the waiver in OCGA § 36-92-2. And we recently found sovereign immunity applicable in another case involving an intergovernmental agreement. See Montgomery County v. Rountree, 374 Ga. App. 551 (913 SE2d 415) (2025). Without more, the mere fact that the County executed the agreement with the City does not establish an immunity waiver. See id. at 553-554 (1). 8 §§ 36-92-1 and 36-92-2(a)(3), therefore, these vehicles were not “covered motor
vehicles” with respect to the County. See Montgomery County v. Rountree, 374 Ga.
App. 551, 553-54(1) (913 SE2d 415) (2025) (ambulance not a “covered motor vehicle”
with respect to the county where plaintiff failed to show that the county owned or
leased the ambulance). Accordingly, because plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the
County waived sovereign immunity as to their claims, the trial court properly granted
the County’s motion to dismiss. See id. at 554 (1) (trial court erred in denying
county’s motion to dismiss where plaintiff failed to establish that “ambulance
involved in the collision is a ‘covered’ motor vehicle” under OCGA § 36-92-2(a)(3)).
Judgment affirmed. Brown, C. J., and Barnes, P. J., concur.