Sharon Prystalski v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedJuly 11, 2023
DocketSF-0752-16-0577-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Sharon Prystalski v. Department of Defense (Sharon Prystalski v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharon Prystalski v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SHARON M. PRYSTALSKI, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, SF-0752-16-0577-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: July 11, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Bradley R. Marshall, Charleston, South Carolina, for the appellant.

Douglas W. Frison, Esquire, APO/AP, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which sustained her removal for failure to follow instructions. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

BACKGROUND ¶2 Effective June 17, 2016, the agency removed the appellant from her School Psychologist position with the Daegu American School, Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA), based on a charge of failure to follow instructions (2 specifications). Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 12, 24. In support of the charge, the agency alleged that the appellant twice failed to comply with the Assistant Principal’s instructions to provide him the following information: an updated list of the students for whom she was providing services at the school; the reason each child was referred for services; the start date of services for each child; and the total number of sessions she provided for each child. IAF, Tab 6 at 12, 15-16, 21. ¶3 The appellant filed a Board appeal challenging her removal , and she requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1. She raised several affirmative defenses but withdrew them during the hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 5; Tabs 21, 25; Hearing Transcript (HT), December 5, 2016, at 5. ¶4 Following a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision that affirmed the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 32, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 14. 3

The administrative judge found that the agency proved the charge and both specifications. ID at 12. The administrative judge also found that the agency proved nexus and that the penalty of removal is reasonable. ID at 13-14. ¶5 The appellant has filed a petition for review, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3, 2 to which the agency has responded in opposition, PFR File, Tab 4. The appellant has filed a reply to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tab 6.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW The administrative judge correctly found that the agency proved the charge by preponderant evidence. ¶6 To prove a charge of failure to follow instructions, an agency must establish that the employee was given proper instructions and she failed to follow the instructions, without regard to whether the failure was intentional or unintentional. Archerda v. Department of Defense, 121 M.S.P.R. 314, ¶ 16 (2014). Even when the employee may have substantial reason to question the instructions, absent unusual circumstances, such as when obedience would cause her irreparable harm or place her in a clearly dangerous situation or when the instructions are clearly unlawful, she must first comply with the instructions and then, if she disagrees with them, register her complaint or grievance later. Pedeleose v. Department of Defense, 110 M.S.P.R. 508, ¶¶ 16, 18, aff’d, 343 F. App’x 605 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Larson v. Department of the Army, 91 M.S.P.R. 511, ¶ 21 (2002). ¶7 Applying these standards, the administrative judge found that the Assistant Principal gave the appellant proper instructions and that she failed to fully comply with them. ID at 7. The administrative judge further found that the appellant did not show that providing the requested information was clearly

2 With her petition for review, the appellant submits the hearing transcript in this appeal. PFR File, Tab 3 at 28-244. Because the transcript is already part of the record, IAF, HT, it does not constitute new evidence. See Meier v. Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980). 4

unlawful so as to excuse her noncompliance with the instructions. ID at 9. The administrative judge therefore sustained the charge. ID at 12. ¶8 On review, the appellant argues that the Assistant Principal’s instructions violated various laws, agency policies, and professional ethics standards that prohibit psychologists from disclosing confidential information. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-23. The administrative judge thoroughly addressed this argument in the initial decision and found that the appellant was not precluded by law or professional ethics from providing the Assistant Principal with the requested information. ID at 8-12. In making this finding, the administrative judge considered each item of information that the Assistant Principal asked the appellant to provide and found that none of the requested information is confidential. ID at 9-10. For example, the administrative judge found that the reason for counseling is not confidential to the school psychologist inasmuch as DODEA Manual 2946.4 contains a form for requesting services from the school psychologist which directs the individual completing the form to identify the reason for the request. ID at 9. The administrative judge further found that for school personnel to work collaboratively and manage resources, the information at issue must be shared with administrators when requested. ID at 10. ¶9 Although the appellant clearly disagrees with the administrative judge’s finding that disclosing the information would not be clearly unlawful, she has failed to show any legal error in the administrative judge’s analysis. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(b). Therefore, she has failed to provide a reason to disturb the administrative judge’s finding that the agency proved the charge. See Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate references, and made reasoned conclusions); see also 5

Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same). 3

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Related

Pedeleose v. Department of Defense
343 F. App'x 605 (Federal Circuit, 2009)
Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Arthur Fisher v. Department of the Interior
2023 MSPB 11 (Merit Systems Protection Board, 2023)

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Sharon Prystalski v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharon-prystalski-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2023.