Sharon Dresser v. Hal J. Webb

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: November 5, 2025
• Docket: 3D2024-0056
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed November 5, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D24-0056 Lower Tribunal No. 18-596-CA-01 ________________

Sharon Dresser, Appellant,

vs.

Hal J. Webb, et al., Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Lisa S. Walsh, Judge.

Kula & Associates, P.A., Elliot B. Kula, W. Aaron Daniel, and Elaine D. Walter, for appellant.

Richard and Richard, P.A., and Dennis A. Richard, Robert J. Alwine and Kevin Shohat, for appellees Hal J. Webb and Hal J. Webb, P.A.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Nagymihaly v. Zipes, 353 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 3d DCA

1978) (“The court may find as a matter of law that where a party accepts the

benefits of a settlement or compromise of his case and he knows or in the

exercise of due diligence should have known all the facts concerning that

settlement (as in the case at bar), he ratifies that settlement by the

acceptance of those benefits whether the settlement in the first instance was

unauthorized by him or not and he is thereafter estopped to attack the

settlement and the judgment entered thereon.”); Moriber v. Dreiling, 194 So.

3d 369, 373 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[A]s a matter of law, a plaintiff may not rely

on statements made by litigation adversaries to establish fraud claims.”);

Chevy Chase Sav. and Loan Inc. v. Berkowitz, 601 So. 2d 289, 291 (Fla. 4th

DCA 1992) (“Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(d) provides that

uncontroverted facts specified in a summary judgment will be deemed

established for the balance of the case.”); Rigmaiden v. NBCUniversal

Media, LLC, 307 So. 3d 918, 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (“The news media has

been given a qualified privilege to accurately report on the information they

receive from government officials. This privilege includes the broadcast ‘of

the contents of an official document, so long as their account is reasonably

accurate and fair’, even if the official documents contain erroneous

information.” (emphasis added)) (quoting Woodard v. Sunbeam Television

2 Corp., 616 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)); Ortega Trujillo v. Banco

Cent. Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (“Florida

courts have refused to define parties making defamatory statements later

reported by news outlets as media in and of themselves.”); Vachet v. Cent.

Newspapers, Inc., 816 F.2d 313, 316 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of

the alleged defamation means the heart of the matter in question—the

hurtfulness of the utterance.”); Smith v. Taylor County Publ’g Co., Inc., 443

So. 2d 1042, 1044–45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (“Whether alleged libelous

statements are pure expressions of opinion or not is for the court to decide

as a matter of law.”); Lipsig v. Ramlawi, 760 So. 2d 170, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA

2000) (“[A] speaker cannot invoke a ‘pure opinion’ defense, if the facts

underlying the opinion are false or inaccurately presented.”); § 90.403, Fla.

Stat. (2020) (“[E]vidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues,

misleading the jury . . . .”); Reid v. Est. of Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 10 (Fla. 3d

DCA 2011) (“In civil cases prosecuted under [the clear and convincing

evidence] standard, ‘an appellate court may not overturn a trial court's finding

regarding the sufficiency of the evidence unless the finding is unsupported

by record evidence, or as a matter of law, no one could reasonably find such

evidence to be clear and convincing.’” (citation omitted)); Wolfson v. Kirk,

3 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (“[S]ome statements are so

obviously defamatory, that is damaging to reputation, that the mere

publication of them gives rise to an absolute presumption both of malice and

damage.”); § 768.73(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (“Where the fact finder determines that

at the time of injury the defendant had a specific intent to harm the claimant

and determines that the defendant's conduct did in fact harm the claimant,

there shall be no cap on punitive damages.”).