Sharman v. Nagle

11 Pa. D. & C.4th 134, 1991 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 188
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Berks County
DecidedJuly 2, 1991
Docketno. 74
StatusPublished

This text of 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 134 (Sharman v. Nagle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Berks County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharman v. Nagle, 11 Pa. D. & C.4th 134, 1991 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).

Opinion

GRIM, J.,

This is an action for. a declaratory judgment whereby plaintiff seeks a determination by the court that a valid marriage does not exist between the parties. The following is the procedural history.

On November 10, 1987, defendant Barbara S. Sharman filed a complaint in divorce. On January 7, 1988, plaintiff Henry R. Sharman filed an answer to the divorce complaint and a complaint for declaratory judgment under section 206 of Divorce Code. In his complaint Henry avers that he was married to another woman from March 6, 1943, until March 3, 1969, at which time he was divorced by a Pennsylvania decree. Although Barbara avers in'her divorce complaint that the parties were married in July 1967, in Juarez, Mexico, after Henry had obtained a Mexican divorce from his former wife a few days earlier, Henry contends that the Mexican divorce was invalid and that the parties’ cohabitation was meretricious.

Barbara filed an answer to Henry’s complaint for declaratory judgment stating that she believed that the Mexican divorce and their subsequent marriage in Mexico were lawful arid that Henry had told her that the divorce decree was valid. Additionally, she [136]*136argued that the impediment to the parties’ marriage, Henry’s prior existing marriage, had been removed when he was divorced by the Pennsylvania decree on March 3, 1969.

Both parties filed a motion for summary judgment. They agreed to submit the issues on memoranda and Henry’s deposition. The court granted summary judgment for Barbara. Henry, appealed. The Superior Court reversed and remanded the matter for further proceedings. This court then presided over a trial which produced a voluminous record comprised of lengthy testimony and 47 exhibits. The following are the relevant facts.

Barbara met Henry on a skiing trip in early 1964. Barbara testified that she knew that Henry was married to the former Miriam D. at that time, but that he told her that the marriage was strained due to Miriam’s mental problems. A sexual relationship between the parties ensued. Miriam was subsequently committed to a state mental institution, Wernersville State Hospital. In late summer or early fall of 1965 Henry asked Barbara to live with him at his residence.to help care for his and Miriam’s two adopted sons. Both sons never saw Miriam again after 1965.

Barbara testified that Henry informed her that he did not expect Miriam to improve psychologically. It is undisputed that Henry wanted a divorce from Miriam and that the parties realized that a Pennsylvania divorce would be hard to obtain due to Miriam’s condition. Barbara contends that Henry wanted a divorce so that he could marry her. Henry denies that this was his reason.

Barbara became pregnant in January 1967, and eventually gave birth to the parties’ daughter, Wendy Sharman, on October 2, 1967. After Barbara became 'pregnant, Henry contacted a local attorney [137]*137to make the necessary arrangements for him to obtain a divorce from Miriam in Mexico. A Mexican attorney, Eugenio Calzada, Esq., proceeded with the divorce proceedings in Mexico. Henry travelled to Mexico twice. The first timé he went without Barbara. The second time Barbara accompanied Henry. She claims that she did so in order to marry Henry after the divorce was granted and to go on a honeymoon in Acapulco, Mexico.

Henry denies that Barbara accompanied him in order to marry him. Instead, he claims she went along for a vacation.

Henry’s sons were teenagers when the parties went to Mexico. They testified that they did not know why the parties travelled to Mexico but they had assumed it was for a vacation.

The parties arrived in Ciudad Juarez on or about July 1, 1967. Henry met with Mr. Calzada concerning his divorce, and the divorce was entered on July 1, 1967. The divorce decree was in Spanish and later translated into English.

On July 6, 1967, the parties underwent a marriage ceremony which was primarily conducted in Spanish. Mr. Calzada was one of the witnesses, but none of the witnesses' knew the parties for the required length of time. The parties later received translations.

Barbara testified that both parties entered into the ceremony with the specific intent of marrying each other, believing that they were free to do so. Although the wedding ceremony was partially in Spanish, Barbara claims that both parties fully understood that they were married to each other.

Henry denies the purposes of these proceedings. He submits that the parties went to Ciudad Juarez to force Miriam to give him a divorce and to forestall criminal actions which were being threatened by [138]*138Miriam against them. He claims that they went through a marriage ceremony in order to appease Barbara’s sensibilities regarding the pending birth of their daughter.

Henry argues that the marriage ceremony was invalid because the witnesses did not know the parties. Barbara testified that she had no knowledge of Mexican law so she relied on their attorney’s advice and believed that everything was legal.

Approximately one month prior to the parties’ trip to Mexico, Barbara claims that Henry bought her a wedding ring which she began wearing immediately following the ceremony. Henry denies that he bought Barbara a wedding ring. He maintains that she selected a ring without his participation and that he just paid the bill when it arrived. Barbara, however, presented a receipt for a wedding ring from a jeweler made out to Henry and indicating that it was a cash transaction. (Exh. 44.) The court viewed the ring and it definitely looked like a wedding ring.

Ever since the wedding on July 6, 1967, Barbara has used the , surname Sharman, Henry acknowledges this. Henry asserts that he did not care what she called herself so he allowed her to use the surname Sharman.

Henry’s son, John Scott Sharman, is presently 40 years old. He testified that neither of the parties had told him that they were inarried and that he had never looked at Barbara’s hand to note if she wore a wedding ring. He and his brother admit that they knew Barbara introduced herself as Mrs. Henry Sharman, but they claim that Henry introduced Barbara only as Barbara. Wendy, the daughter of the parties, however, recalled several instances where Henry introduced Barbara as hi's wife in her presence. Henry rebutted this testimony by saying [139]*139that if he did so it was only to avoid embarrassing Barbara and Wendy by stating their true relationships to him.

On August 29, 1967, after the parties had returned to Pennsylvania, Miriam filed criminal charges against both parties, accusing husband of adultery and bastardy and Barbara of fornication. Henry contacted an attorney to represent the parties in those proceedings. Barbara testified that she did not recall all of the facts surrounding the charges. She knew that Henry did not attach too much importance to the actions so she did not either.

On September 11, 1968, Miriam, acting through her attorney and her parents, executed a comprehensive property settlement agreement with Henry. In November 1968, as part of the resolution of the criminal actions, Miriam instituted an action in divorce against Henry in Berks County, Pennsylvania, which resulted in the entry of a Pennsylvania divorce decree between herself and Henry on March 3, 1969 (“Pennsylvania divorce”).

On February 4, 1969, a hearing was held before a master in divorce.

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Bluebook (online)
11 Pa. D. & C.4th 134, 1991 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 188, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharman-v-nagle-pactcomplberks-1991.