Sharkey v. Sisson

310 Ill. 98
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 20, 1923
DocketNo. 15457
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 310 Ill. 98 (Sharkey v. Sisson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharkey v. Sisson, 310 Ill. 98 (Ill. 1923).

Opinion

Mr. Chief Justice Farmer

delivered the opinion of the court:

William Sharkey, as conservator of George W. Morris, filed his bills in the circuit court of Edgar county to set aside two deeds made by Morris on January 2, 1922, in one of which Jennie Sisson was grantee and in the other Hatch Henson was the grantee. The deeds expressed consideration of one dollar each, and both reserved a life estate to the grantor in the property conveyed. The deed to Jennie Sisson conveyed 140 acres of land, which was the home place of the grantor, and the deed to Henson conveyed to the grantee 96 acres. Both bills alleged that the grantor at the time of executing the deeds was in his dotage and his mind and memory were so impaired as to render him incapable of knowing what he was doing and the effect of his acts or the nature of the business engaged in. Both bills alleged that the grantees and others, by means of undue influence, fraud and falsehood, induced the grantor to execute the deeds. The bills were answered by the respective defendants, denying all the material allegations as to unsoundness of mind and undue influence. The cause was heard before the court. It was stipulated by the parties that the two cases be tried at the same time and heard on the same testimony, but as there might be evidence which would be competent in one case and not competent in the other, it was further stipulated that after the hearing the court should enter a decree in each case upon evidence applicable to the case and render separate decrees, so that if the case were reviewed by the Supreme Court only one certificate of evidence, one record and one set of briefs and abstracts would be required. After hearing the evidence the court set aside the deeds in both cases on the ground of mental incapacity of the grantor to execute them, and also on the ground that there was a fiduciary relation existing between the grantor and Henson. The defendants to both bills appealed from the decree to this court, and the causes are submitted here as one case, upon one record, one set of briefs and abstract. The parties will be referred to as complainant and defendants.

George W. Morris was seventy-five years old at the time he executed the deeds, January 2, 1922. He owned 350 acres of land in Edgar county, worth about $200 an acre, and about $20,000 worth of personal property. He had been married in 1890 to a sister of defendant Jennie Sisson. No children were born of the marriage and his wife died several years ago. Mrs. Sisson lived with Morris and his wife from 1890 to 1894 and was married to her present husband while living at their house. She had a daughter born of the marriage, and when the child was two or three years old she went to live with Morris and wife, and lived there until Mrs. Morris died, in 1907. Morris was married a second time but was divorced from his second wife, and no children were born of that marriage. He had three sisters: Amanda, now dead, who married Peter Voorhees; Sarah, now living, who is the second wife of Peter Voorhees; and Martha Perisho. Amanda left a number of children surviving her, among them John W. Voorhees and Lizzie Henry, who took an active part in the litigation. Hatch Henson began working for Morris when he was twelve or fourteen years of age and has worked for him ever since. When he was about seventeen years old he prepared to leave Morris to work for another man, and Morris persuaded him not to do it, promising that he was going to take care of him, and Henson continued to work for Morris. Henson appears to have worked the farm as tenant from 1911 to March 1, 1918, when Morris rented the farm for three years to complainant, who lived on the place until March 1, 1921. In the fall of 1921 Morris asked John Voorhees, his nephew, a son of his deceased sister, Amanda, to find him a tenant. Voorhees secured Roy Hillery, and in September, 1921, Morris made a written lease to Hillery, by the terms of which Hillery was to take possession the spring of 1922. After the lease was made Morris rented part of the farm as pasture to other persons until the term of the Hillery lease began, and Hillery was in possession under the lease at the time of the trial. In March, 1921, Sarah Voorhees, a sister of Morris and aunt and stepmother of John Voorhees, filed a petition to have a conservator appointed for Morris. Summons was served but Morris did not appear, and John Voorhees was appointed conservator. Shortly afterwards Morris consulted attorneys about having the appointment of a conservator set aside, and it was set aside March 26, 1921, as we understand, without any proceeding for that purpose having been filed. The conservator, Voorhees, testified he voluntarily re-instated Morris because he was dissatisfied. Since 1915 Morris has lived with his sister Mrs. Voorhees, in Paris, and with Hatch Henson, — the greater part of the time with Mrs. Voorhees. The deeds sought to be set aside were, as we have stated, executed January 2, 1922. At that time Morris was staying at the home of his sister Mrs. Perisho. In January, 1922, the two sisters of Morris, Mrs. Voorhees and Mrs. Perisho, filed another petition to have a conservator appointed for Morris. A hearing was had on the petition in the spring of 1922 but the jury disagreed. By agreement the cause was certified to the circuit court, but that court decided it had no jurisdiction of the case and certified it back to the county court, where a conservator was appointed December 27, 1922, and that conservator, Sharkey, filed the bills to set aside the deeds.

The issues made by the pleadings were, whether Morris had sufficient mental capacity to make valid deeds at the time the deeds were executed, and whether they were procured by the undue influence of the grantees. No issue of fiduciary relation between the grantor and grantees was made by the pleadings and no relief was asked in the bill on that ground. A complainant must recover on the case made by his bill. He cannot state one case in the bill and make a different one by the proof. Allegations and proof must correspond. If the case made by the proof is variant from that stated in the bill, relief cannot be granted. Relief will be denied on the facts proved by the evidence where there are no averments in the bill to which the evidence applies. (McKay v. Bissett, 5 Gilm. 499; Howard v. Burns, 279 Ill. 256; Kosturska v. Bartkiewicz, 241 id. 604.) In Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence (vol. 2, sec. 955,) the author discusses the distinction between a case where the proof establishes actual undue influence designedly exerted upon a party susceptible to such influences on account of mental weakness, old age and the like, and a case where the evidence establishes the charge of a fiduciary relation existing between parties to a transaction. The author says when undue influence is established as a fact, any contract or other transaction accomplished by its means is voidable and is set aside without the necessary aid of any presumption; that where the charge is of a fiduciary relation between the parties to a transaction, mental weakness, old age and the like are not assumed as an element in the transaction; that such facts may be present but are immaterial and not essential. The author says: “Nothing can tend more to produce confusion and inaccuracy in the discussion of the subject than the treatment of actual undue influence and fiduciary relations as though they constituted one and the same doctrine.” That text was quoted with approval in Thomas v. Whitney, 186 Ill. 225, and Beach v. Wilton, 244 id. 413.

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Bluebook (online)
310 Ill. 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharkey-v-sisson-ill-1923.