Sharkany v. Ham

CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJuly 8, 2022
Docket3:21-cv-01381
StatusUnknown

This text of Sharkany v. Ham (Sharkany v. Ham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharkany v. Ham, (D. Conn. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

GLEN ALAN SHARKANY, Plaintiff,

v. No. 3:21-cv-1381 (VAB)

TASHA HAM, Defendant.

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER Glen Alan Sharkany (“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at Osborn Correctional Institution, has filed a Complaint pro se, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Sharkany names one Defendant in the case caption, Discharge Planner Tasha Ham. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 1 (Oct. 18, 2021) (“Compl.”). Within the body of the Complaint, he also lists Lieutenant Clayton and Dr. Heather Gaw as defendants.1 Mr. Sharkany allegedly seeks damages and injunctive relief. I. BACKGROUND Mr. Sharkany alleges that defendant Ham made a false statement to Lieutenant Clayton, which resulted in Mr. Sharkany being returned to general population. Compl. at 3–4. He later had to be taken to the hospital to receive eight stitches. Id. Mr. Sharkany also alleges having been placed in handcuffs, and put in a cell without his clothing. Id. at 9. He also allegedly lost two pairs of eyeglasses. Id. at 10. For three years, Mr. Sharkany allegedly received no disciplinary tickets. Id. at 3. He allegedly had been classified as a level 2 Mental Health inmate, but questions what this mental

1 Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that all defendants be listed in the case caption. Although they technically are not defendants, the Court considers possible claims against Lieutenant Clayton and Dr. Gaw. As the Court concludes that Mr. Sharkany must amend his complaint, the Court does not order that Lieutenant Clayton and Dr. Gaw be added as defendants at this time. health treatment has accomplished. Id. Mr. Sharkany alleges that he had been prescribed only 50 mg Seraquil in the community, and that there, he committed no crimes and received no tickets. Id. at 5. But, in prison, Mr. Sharkany alleges that he has been paneled and forced to take other medication. Id. Mr. Sharkany questions why he was forcibly medicated when allegedly violent Black inmates are not. Id. Mr.

Sharkany alleges that psychiatrist I.E. Jawal and Brian Patty forcibly medicated him. Id. at 6. Mr. Sharkany argues that incidents from years ago do not support the current decision to forcibly medicate him. Id. at 7. He also alleges that staff lied at the hearing. Id. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), district courts must review prisoners’ civil complaints against governmental actors and sua sponte “dismiss . . . any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” or that “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that, under the Prisoner

Litigation Reform Act, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is mandatory); Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Section 1915A requires that a district court screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner against a governmental entity or its agents and dismiss the complaint sua sponte if, inter alia, the complaint is ‘frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A)). In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must assume the truth of the allegations, and interpret them liberally to “raise the strongest arguments [they] suggest[].” Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). This requirement applies both when the plaintiff pays the filing fee and when he proceeds in forma pauperis. See Carr v. Dvorin, 171 F.3d 115, 116 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (“The language of the statute does not distinguish between prisoners who proceed in forma pauperis and prisoners who pay the requisite filing fee.”). A plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and assert a cause of action with enough heft to show entitlement to relief and “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “‘A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Boykin v. KeyCorp., 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Notwithstanding this liberal interpretation, however, a pro se complaint will not survive dismissal unless the factual allegations meet the plausibility standard. See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387 (2d Cir. 2015) (noting that pro se complaints must allege “‘enough facts to

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). III. DISCUSSION The Complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (purpose of the complaint “is to give the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and prepare for trial”). To facilitate this, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In addition, “[i]t is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013). Although not clearly articulated in his Complaint, the Court assumes that Mr. Sharkany asserts a substantive due process claim regarding forced medication, an Eighth Amendment

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Related

Boykin v. KeyCorp
521 F.3d 202 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Olim v. Wakinekona
461 U.S. 238 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Grullon v. City of New Haven
720 F.3d 133 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Russell v. Scully
15 F.3d 219 (Second Circuit, 1993)
Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter
185 F.3d 8 (Second Circuit, 1999)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40
790 F.3d 378 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Sharkany v. Ham, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharkany-v-ham-ctd-2022.