Sharifi v. Raybon

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 2, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-00267
StatusUnknown

This text of Sharifi v. Raybon (Sharifi v. Raybon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Sharifi v. Raybon, (S.D. Ala. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

MOHAMMAD SHARIFI, # Z-709, * * Plaintiff, * * vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-00267-TFM-B * TERRY RAYBON, et al., * * Defendants. *

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action is before the Court on review.1 Plaintiff Mohammad Sharifi, an Alabama death row inmate proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing a handwritten complaint. (Doc. 1). When he commenced this action, Sharifi did not pay the filing fee for a civil action, nor did he file a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee (in forma pauperis). Upon review of Sharifi’s complaint and prior litigation history, it is recommended that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), because Sharifi is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis and did not pay the filing fee when he initiated this action. I. Section 1915(g) and Sharifi’s Litigation History. Section 1915(g) provides:

1 This action has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for consideration and disposition or recommendation on all pretrial matters as may be appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). (Doc. 3). In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [in forma pauperis] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The purpose of this provision is to curb abusive prisoner litigation by requiring a prisoner who has had three or more actions or appeals dismissed as meritless to pay the full filing fee at the time he initiates suit when his next action is filed. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). “The only exception to section 1915(g) is if the frequent filer prisoner is ‘under imminent danger of serious physical injury.’” Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 723 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007). Because Sharifi is a prisoner who did not pay the fees to bring this civil action, the Court conducted a nationwide review of the civil records of the United States District and Appellate Courts to determine whether Sharifi has had three or more actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief could be

2 granted.2 From those records, the Court discovered that Sharifi has had at least three actions or appeals dismissed for one or more of the foregoing reasons, including Sharifi v. Broussard, No. 1:23-cv-00157-KD-B (S.D. Ala. July 5, 2023) (action dismissed as frivolous and malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)

and 1915A(b)(1)), aff’d sub nom. Sharifi v. Dist. Att’y of Madison Cnty., No. 23-12396 (11th Cir. May 8, 2024); Sharifi v. Hamm, No. 5:22-cv-00826-RDP-NAD (N.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2024) (action dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); and Sharifi v. Broussard, No. 5:23-cv-00661-LSC-NAD (N.D. Ala. Nov. 18, 2024) (action dismissed as frivolous and malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)). Thus, Sharifi qualifies as a “three-striker” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) who “must pay the full filing fee at the time he initiates suit.” See Dupree, 284 F.3d at 1236 (concluding that the proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss an action without

prejudice when an inmate subject to the three-strikes provision of § 1915(g) does not pay the filing fee in full at the time he

2 This Court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of other federal courts. Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1259 n.7 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Glover, 179 F.3d 1300, 1302 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999).

3 initiates the suit, and that a three-strikes plaintiff cannot pay the filing fee after filing suit as a retroactive cure). Because Sharifi did not pay the full filing fee at the time he initiated this lawsuit, the present action is due to be dismissed without prejudice unless Sharifi falls within the exception to § 1915(g).

To satisfy § 1915(g)’s imminent danger exception, Sharifi’s complaint must “plausibly allege imminent danger of serious physical injury.” Daker v. Robinson, 802 F. App’x 513, 515 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). In order to come within the exception, an inmate must be in imminent danger at the time he files suit in district court. Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999). Allegations of past harm are “insufficient to meet the imminent-danger requirement.” Daker, 802 F. App’x at 515 (citing Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193). Sharifi’s complaint does not plausibly allege that Sharifi was in imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his complaint, or at any other time. Most of the complaint

consists of vulgar, obscene, and irrelevant rantings that the Court will not repeat. However, it appears that Sharifi is complaining about his lack of access to a law library computer and seeking to have the Court order correctional officials to provide a certain level of law library access to him and other prisoners. (See Doc.

4 1 at 1-2, 6). These allegations clearly do not fall within § 1915(g)’s imminent danger exception. See Daker v. Jackson, 942 F.3d 1252, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2019) (rejecting challenge to § 1915(g) based on access-to-the-courts concerns and finding that access to the courts claim did not meet the imminent danger of

serious physical injury exception to § 1915(g)); Young v. United States, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271265, at *2, 2021 WL 12224769, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2021) (finding plaintiff’s “arguments that his access to the courts has been blocked . . . clearly insufficient to fall within the exception to § 1915(g) for ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’”), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 271273, 2021 WL 12224768 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 22, 2021).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rivera v. Allin
144 F.3d 719 (Eleventh Circuit, 1998)
United States v. Glover
179 F.3d 1300 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
Medberry v. Butler
185 F.3d 1189 (Eleventh Circuit, 1999)
William A. Dupree v. R. W. Palmer
284 F.3d 1234 (Eleventh Circuit, 2002)
Nguyen v. United States
556 F.3d 1244 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Jones v. Bock
549 U.S. 199 (Supreme Court, 2007)
United States v. William Rey
811 F.2d 1453 (Eleventh Circuit, 1987)
Waseem Daker v. Theodore Jackson
942 F.3d 1252 (Eleventh Circuit, 2019)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Sharifi v. Raybon, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/sharifi-v-raybon-alsd-2025.