Sharell Horton & Andrea Norwood v. Baton Rouge Police Department, City of Baton Rouge/East Baton Rouge Parish, Saundra W. Watts, & State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 19, 2024
• Docket: 2023CA0657
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL

FIRST CIRCUIT

1111Vft NO. 2023 CA 0657

SHARELL HORTON AND ANDREA NORWOOD

VERSUS

BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF BATON ROUGE/ EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, SAUNDRA W. WATTS, AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

Judgment Rendered: JAN 19 2024

Appealed from the 19th Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Case No. 0681306

The Honorable Trudy M. White, Judge Presiding

Anderson O. " Andy" Dotson, III Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Parish Attorney City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Gregory Rome Baton Rouge Director of Litigation and Risk Management David M. Lefeve

Sr. Special Assistant Parish Attorney Michael P. Schillage

Assistant Parish Attorney Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Denis W. Barry, Jr. Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Law Offices of Spencer H. Calahan Sharell Horton Baton Rouge, Louisiana

BEFORE: THERIOT, PENZATO, AND GREENE, JJ.

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6 rrlv tears . THERIOT, J.

Defendant -Appellant, City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East Baton Rouge (" the

City/Parish") appeals the 19" Judicial District Court' s February 8, 2023 judgment

finding the City/Parish, through the actions of Saundra Watts, to be at fault in the

motor vehicle accident that is the subject of this case. Because the February 8,

2023 judgment is not a valid final judgment, we dismiss the appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the morning of April 30, 2018, Sharell Horton was traveling to work in a

2014 GMC Sierra truck owned by his fiance Andrea Norwood. Horton was

driving southbound in the left lane of Airline Highway, which has two lanes on

each side. As Horton approached the Beechwood Drive intersection, a Chevrolet

Suburban abruptly pulled in front of Horton from the right lane. Horton applied

his brakes to avoid hitting the Chevrolet Suburban and came to a stop near the

intersection.' Shortly after stopping, Horton was rear-ended by Detective Saundra

Watts, a police officer, who was also traveling to work in a 2011 Chevrolet Impala.

Horton and Norwood filed a petition for damages on March 27, 2019,

naming as defendants the Baton Rouge Police Department, the City of Baton

Rouge/ East Baton Rouge Parish (" the City/Parish"), Watts, and State Farm Mutual

Automobile Insurance Company (" State Farm"). Horton sought damages for

physical and mental pain, suffering, and anguish; physical disability and/ or

impairment of functions and activities, and loss of income and/ or loss of earning

capacity. Norwood, as the owner of the vehicle, asserted that she had sustained

property damage and sought to recover damages as a result. The Baton Rouge

Police Department and State Farm were subsequently removed as defendants.

Horton testified at trial that the light turned red after he had come to a coasting stop at the light. He further testified that he was hit while stopped at that light and that he was hit with enough force to push his vehicle into the intersection. Watts testified that the light was green and the accident happened after she ( and Horton) had passed the light.

2 A jury trial was held on October 24, 25, and 26, 2022. The jury returned a

verdict finding Watts to be 100% at fault for the crash. The jury awarded Horton a

total of $325, 000. 00 in damages, which consists of the following:

1) $ 66, 250. 00 for past medical care and expenses;

2) $ 158, 750. 00 for past physical pain and suffering;

3) $ 50, 000. 00 for future physical pain and suffering;

4) $ 25, 000. 00 for past mental anguish and distress; and

5) $ 25, 000. 00 for future mental anguish and distress.

A judgment to this effect was signed by the trial court on February 8, 2023.

Specifically, the judgment decreed that " there be judgment in favor of Plaintiff,

Sharell Horton, and against Defendant, City of Baton Rouge/East Baton Rouge

Parish in the total principal amount of $ 325, 000. 00." The judgment did not

mention the other plaintiff, Andrea Norwood.

The City/Parish appealed, arguing that the jury erred in its allocation of fault

and in returning an excessive award of damages.

DISCUSSION

Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua

sponte, even when the parties do not raise the issue. Advanced Leveling &

Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017- 1250 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

12120118), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046 ( en banc). This court' s appellate jurisdiction

only extends to " final judgments." Carter v. Carter, 2021- 1173 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

5112122), 342 So. 3d 391, 394; see also La. Code Civ. P. art. 2083( A). A final

judgment is one that determines the merits in whole or in part. In contrast, an

interlocutory judgment does not determine the merits but only preliminary matters

in the course of an action. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1841; Advanced Leveling &

Concrete Solutions, 268 So. 3d at 1046.

3 A valid judgment must be " precise, definite, and certain." Moreover, a final

appealable judgment must contain decretal language and must name the party in

favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the ruling is ordered,

and the relief that is granted or denied. These determinations should be evident

from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the

record. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions, 268 So. 3d at 1046. In the

absence of such decretal language, the ruling is not a valid final judgment, and in

the absence of a valid final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction. See Carter,

342 So. 3d at 394.

The February 8, 2023 judgment, sought to be appealed herein, rendered

judgment in favor of Sharell Horton and against the City/Parish. However, the

judgment fails to rule in favor of or against the second plaintiff, Andrea Norwood,

who asserted a claim for property damage and sought damages for property

damage and diminished value.' Since the judgment is devoid of language

resolving all of the parties' claims, it does not dispose of the entire matter, and the

judgment is a non -final, interlocutory judgment, which is non -appealable. See La.

C. C. P. arts. 1841, 1915, 2083; see also Myers v. Diaz, 2022- 0445 ( La. App. 1 Cir.

11/ 4/ 22), 354 So. 3d 78, 81. In the absence of a valid final judgment, this court

lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the appeal should be dismissed. See

Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions, 268 So. 3d at 1046- 47. Considering the

foregoing, we dismiss the instant appeal.'

On the first and second day of trial, counsel for plaintiffs identified himself as representing Sharell Horton and Andrea Norwood. On the third day of trial, two separate attorneys indicated that they represented Sharell Horton, but neither mentioned Andrea Norwood. Despite this discrepancy, the record contains no indication that Andrea Norwood' s claims were dismissed.

3 Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1951 provides that "[ o] n motion of the court or any party, a final judgment may be amended at any time to alter the phraseology of the judgment or to correct deficiencies in the decretal language or errors of calculation." However, a final judgment may not be amended under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1951 to change its substance. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1951. Because any amendment would require a substantive change, we are unable to remand this matter for the purposes of amending the February 8, 2023 judgment.

4 DECREE

For the above and foregoing reasons, the City of Baton Rouge/Parish of East

Baton Rouge' s appeal of the 19th Judicial District Court' s February 8, 2023

judgment is dismissed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Defendant -Appellant,

City of Baton Rouge/ Parish of East Baton Rouge.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

5 STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL FIRST CIRCUIT f 2023 CA 0657

BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF BATON ROUGE/ EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, SAUNDRA W. WATTS, AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

PENZATO, J., concurs.

I concur with the result reached in the opinion but write separately to address

the following language contained in the February 8, 2023 judgment:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this is a final appealable judgment pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 1911 as an express determination has been made and there is no just reason for delay.

Louisiana Code of Procedure article 1911( B) provides in pertinent part that, "[ n] o

appeal may be taken from a partial final judgment under Article 1915( B) until the

judgment has been designated a final judgment under Article 1915( B)." Article

1915( B)( 1) provides, in pertinent part, that when a court renders a partial judgment

as to one or more but less than all of the claims, demands, issues, or theories against

a party, " the judgment shall not constitute a final judgment unless it is designated as

a final judgment by the court after an express determination that there is no just

reason for delay."

The February 8, 2023 judgment rendered judgment in favor of Sharell Horton

and against City of Baton Rouge/ East Baton Rouge Parish. The judgment did not

rule in favor of or against Andrea Norwood, who asserted a claim against City of

Baton Rouge/ East Baton Rouge Parish for property damage. Thus, the February 8,

2023 judgment is a partial judgment, which was designated as final, after an express

determination that there is no just reason for delay. However, because the trial court did not provide reasons for why " there is no just reason for delay," we must make a

de novo determination of whether the designation was proper. R.J. Messinger, Inc.

v. Rosenblum, 2004- 1664 ( La. 3/ 2/ 05), 894 So. 2d 1113, 1123.

Historically, our courts have adopted and followed a policy against multiple

appeals and piecemeal litigation. Messinger, 894 So. 2d at 1122. Louisiana Code

of Civil Procedure article 1915 attempts to strike a balance between the

undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for making review available at a

time that best serves the needs of the parties. Florida Gas Transmission Company,

LLC v. Texas Brine Company, LLC, 2022- 1036 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 4/ 18/ 23), 367 So.

3d 91, 96. In considering whether a judgment is properly designated as final

pursuant to La. C. C. P. art. 1915( B)( 1), a court must take into consideration judicial

administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Florida Gas, 367 So. 3d at

96. Under Messinger, the following list ofnon- exclusive factors are to be considered

in determining whether a partial judgment should be certified as final: ( 1) the

relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; ( 2) the possibility

that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future developments in the

trial court; ( 3) the possibility that the reviewing court might be obliged to consider

the same issue a second time; and ( 4) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic

and solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing

claims, expense, and the like. However, the overriding inquiry is whether there is

no just reason for delay. Messinger, 894 So. 2d at 1122- 23.

Applying these precepts on de novo review, we conclude that the February 8,

2023 partial judgment does not meet the requirements of an appealable final

judgment under La. C. C. P. art. 1915( B). Because the resolution of Ms. Norwood' s

claim requires a determination of the liability of City of Baton Rouge/ East Baton

Rouge Parish, we would be obliged to consider this issue a second time. Therefore,

2 the designation of the February 8, 2023 judgment as final does not meet the

Messinger requirements.

Therefore, I agree with the majority that proper resolution is to dismiss the

appeal for lack ofjurisdiction.

3 STATE OF LOUISIANA

DOCKET NUMBER 2023 CA 0657

SHARELL NORTON AND ANDREA NORWOOD

BATON ROUGE POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF BATON ROUGE/ EAST BATON ROUGE PARISH, SAUNDRA W. WATTS, AND STATE FARM AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

GREENE, I., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent given that I find the February 8, 2023 judgment at issue to

be a valid judgment properly before this Court on appeal. As such, this Court should

consider the merits of the appeal.

There are four categories of appealable judgments: ( 1) a final judgment that

determines the merits in whole, ( 2) a partial final judgment that does not require a

designation as a final judgment under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915( A), ( 3) a partial judgment

that has been designated as final under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915( 6), and ( 4) an

interlocutory judgment for which the law expressly provides an appeal. Burgos v.

Evans, 2020- 0326 ( La. App. 4 Cir. 12/ 16/ 20), 312 So. 3d 1145, 1147. Louisiana Code of

Civil Procedure article 1841 defines a final judgment as one " that determines the merits

in whole or in part" and an interlocutory judgment as one " that does not determine the

merits but only preliminary matters in the course of the action."

The February 8, 2023 judgment determines the merits in whole. Specifically,

considering only the four corners of the judgment, the judgment indicates the following:

1) the referenced matter proceeded to jury trial between October 24, 2022 through

October 26, 2022; 2) counsel for plaintiff, Shareil Horton, and counsel for defendant, City

of Baton Rouge/ East Baton Rouge Parish, were present; 3) that the defendant " was one

hundred percent ( 100%) at fault in the motor vehicle accident that is the subject of this

case," and 4) that judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant in the total principal amount of $ 325, 000-00. There is no dispute that the judgment

resolves all claims between Mr. Horton and the defendant.'

It is of no moment that Andrea Norwood is listed as a plaintiff in the caption, but

is not otherwise referenced in the judgment. As this Court has long recognized, there

should be but one final judgment in a case and all issues presented by pleadings on which

evidence has been offered must be considered as disposed of thereby and when a

judgment is silent as to certain demands, they must be considered to be rejected. See

Walker v, ] ones, 230 So. 2d 851, 856 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 1969). The property damage

claim was at issue at trial and evidence of the amount of property damage was placed

before the jury. As such, the failure to include that damage award in the judgment could

be deemed a rejection of that demand. Alternatively, it is entirely possible that Ms.

Norwood' s property damage claims were settled or otherwise disposed of, even though

no evidence of same appears in the record. However, the failure to reference the

property damage claim in the judgment does not transform a final judgment rendered

following a three-day jury trial on the merits to a partial final judgment. If such is the

case, any judgment rendered following a trial on the merits would have the same fate of

the judgment at issue here if there are parties listed in the caption that are not specifically

addressed in the judgment itself. Accordingly, I find the judgment is final of its own

accord in that it determines the merits in whole, and Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure

article 1915 is not applicable herein.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if the judgment could qualify as a partial final

judgment given that the claims of Ms. Norwood are not addressed in the judgment and

remain, the judgment should nonetheless be appealable as a partial final judgment

pursuant to La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915. Article 1915 lists the exclusive instances in which

partial final judgments are permitted. Best Fishing, Inc. v. Rancatore, 96- 2254 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 12/ 29/ 97), 706 So. 2d 161, 165 citino Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc.

v. Subaru South, Inc., 616 So. 2d 1234, 1241 ( La. 1993). Article 1915 divides the

1 Moreover, the judgment contains appropriate decretal language including the name of the party in whose favor the relief is awarded, the name of the party against whom the relief is awarded, and the relief that is awarded. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 1918.

2 resolution of whether a judgment is an authorized partial final judgment into two

categories: parties and issues. In multiparty litigation, a judgment which adjudicates the

rights and liabilities of one or more, but less than all, of the parties and results in dismissal

of one or more of these parties is a partial final judgment authorized under LSA- C. C. P.

art. 1915. As such, the judgment is immediately appealable. On the other hand, a

judgment which, without dismissing a party, only adjudicates some ( but less than all)

claims, defenses or issues is a valid partial final judgment, and thus appealable, only if

expressly authorized by article 1915. Id.

Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1915( A)( 1) specifically authorizes appeals

of a partial final judgment that " dismisses the suit as to less than all the parties,

defendants, third party plaintiffs, third party defendants, and intervenors." While the

judgment at issue did not specifically dismiss any claims, it clearly adjudicated all the

issues between Mr. Horton and the defendant. Accordingly, even if the judgment could

qualify as a partial final judgment, I find that the judgment would be subject to review

under Article 1915( A)( 1), without need for any certification.

Moreover, if the underlying judgment had been rendered in favor of plaintiff on a

motion for summary judgment and resolved all the claims between Mr. Horton and the

defendant, there would be no question that the judgment would be subject to this Court' s

appellate jurisdiction under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915( A)( 3) without any requirement that

the judgment be certified under article 1915( 6). See Belhaven Trace Limited

Partnership v. Rad -Ton, L. L. C., 2017-0725 ( La. App. 1 Cir. 12/ 29/ 17), 241 So -3d 478,

482 (" While we agree with Mr. Kahoa that the summary judgment at issue does not

terminate the entire litigation, it does resolve all claims, causes of action, issues, and

defenses between Rad -Ton and Mr. Kahoa, and the summary judgment at issue is a final

judgment governed by the provisions of LSA- C. C. P. art. 1915A( 3). Consequently, the

trial court' s certification of the judgment as final [ under 1915( B)] for appeal was

unnecessary.") Had the substance of the subject judgment in favor of Mr. Horton been

rendered via summary judgment rather than via a trial on the merits, this Court would

be mandated to review the judgment under its appellate jurisdiction. Hence, a fortiori,

3 this Court' s appellate jurisdiction should attach to review such a judgment rendered

following a jury trial on the merits.

Even if the judgment is not appealable despite resolving all the claims between

Mr. Horton and the defendant nor appealable as a matter of right under the express

language of La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915( A), I find the judgment's certification appropriate

under La. Code Civ. P. art. 1915( 6) in light of the factors set forth in R.J. Messinger,

Inc. v. Rosenblum, 2004- 1664 ( La. 3/ 2/ 05), 894 So. 2d 1113.

Accordingly, finding the judgment to be properly before this Court on appeal, I

would address the merits of same rather than dismiss the appeal.