IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY
WAEL SHARAYDEH, :
CASE NO. CA2025-10-121
Appellant, :
OPINION AND
vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 9/14/2026
LITMER PROPERTIES, LLC, et al., :
Appellees. :
:
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CV2025-07-1752
Garvey, Shearer, Nordstrom, PSC, and John J. Garvey III and Jason E. Abeln, for appellant.
Dressman Benzinger LaVelle psc, and Justin L. Knappick, for appellees.
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OPINION
BYRNE, P.J.
{¶ 1} Wael Sharaydeh appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to dismiss filed by Litmer Properties, L.L.C. and M.J.
Clips, Inc. (collectively, "the Landlords"). For the following reasons, we affirm.1 I. Factual and Procedural Background A. The Master Lease, the Sublease, and the Dispute
{¶ 2} Litmer Properties owns real property in Walton, Kentucky. The company leased a portion of that property to M.J. Clips pursuant to a lease agreement ("Master Lease"). In 2022, M.J. Clips subleased that portion of the real property to Sharaydeh pursuant to a sublease agreement ("Sublease"). The Sublease is subordinate and subject to the Master Lease and contains a forum selection clause which states that "[a]ny disputes . . . will be heard . . . in Butler County, Ohio."
{¶ 3} Sharaydeh operated a smoke shop on the property. Over time, disputes arose between the Landlords and Sharaydeh over delinquent rent, non-permitted advertising, and the condition of the property. On June 6, 2025, the Landlords delivered notice of default to Sharaydeh. In the notice, the Landlords stated that Sharaydeh materially breached the Sublease and requested that he cure those violations or vacate the property. A few weeks later, on June 30, 2025, the Landlords delivered notice of termination of the Sublease and notice to vacate the premises based on Sharaydeh's alleged failure to cure his violations of the Sublease. Eventually, on July 22, 2025, the Landlords initiated a forcible entry and detainer ("FED") action in Boone County, Kentucky against Sharaydeh.
B. Sharaydeh's Complaint and the Landlords' Motion to Dismiss
{¶ 4} Rather than simply respond to the Landlords' Kentucky FED action, on July 16, 2025, Sharaydeh filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. Sharaydeh sought declarations that he was (1) "not in default of the
1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we have sua sponte removed this appeal from the accelerated calendar. See 902 Carp Loveland L.L.C. v. Potts, 2026-Ohio-1313, ¶ 1, fn. 1 (12th Dist.).
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Sublease;" (2) that the Landlords "anticipatorily repudiated the Sublease;" and (3) that the Landlords "waived any alleged default."2
{¶ 5} Sharaydeh included excerpts of both the Master Lease and the Sublease in his complaint. However, the complaint did not ask for clarification or construction of any particular lease provisions. Instead, Sharaydeh made various assertions that he was not in default of the Sublease's provisions concerning the payment of rent and CAM charges, advertisements, the sale of marijuana and CBD products, and the condition of the property. He also argued that by changing the locks on the property, the Landlords breached the terms of the Sublease and constructively evicted him. Sharaydeh based these allegations on arguments about the facts of the matter, rather than on any particular dispute about the meaning of the language in the Sublease.
{¶ 6} On August 8, 2025, the Landlords filed a motion to dismiss Sharaydeh's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), arguing that Sharaydeh "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief c[ould] be granted" because "[Sharaydeh] . . . materially breached the Sublease and failed to cure those material defects . . ."
C. Trial Court's Decision
{¶ 7} On October 14, 2025, the trial court granted the Landlords' motion to dismiss. The court relied heavily on Miami Valley Paper Co. Div. of Millen Inst. v. Intercontinental Paper Corp., 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15917 (12th Dist. April 27, 1983), stating that Miami Valley Paper was "almost dead on point." The court found that Sharaydeh's complaint was not "justiciable in nature" because it "d[id] not seek determinations of construction of either the Master Lease or of the subsequent sublease"
2. Sharaydeh also requested the following relief in his complaint: (1) that the Landlords "be restrained in an eviction action until such time as the issues herein are decided," (2) that the court order $13,832.94 be held in escrow until the issues in the complaint were decided; (3) that there be a jury trial on any issues triable; (4) that he be awarded attorney fees; and (5) any other relief he was entitled to. We will not address these requested forms of relief because they are not at issue on appeal.
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and did not seek "determinations as to any point of validity" of the Master Lease or Sublease. The court also found that declaratory judgment was an "inappropriate mechanism" to seek relief as the complaint only raised a single issue of fact (that is, whether Sharaydeh breached the "contracts involved"). Further, the court found that there was minimal hardship in not rendering declaratory relief as another "[s]uit ha[d] already been filed in Kentucky." The court finally noted that "public policy and judicial economy" would be "ill-served" if the court considered Sharaydeh's request for declaratory judgment because, even if the court found Sharaydeh not to be in breach, a second action would need to be filed to determine and award damages. Consequently, the trial court dismissed Sharaydeh's complaint.
{¶ 8} Sharaydeh appealed, raising one assignment of error.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 9} Sharaydeh's sole assignment of error states:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 12(B).
{¶ 10} In his sole assignment of error, Sharaydeh argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting the Landlords' motion to dismiss his declaratory judgment action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) because—as he argues—he did "request[] the trial court [to] interpret the meaning of the terms of a commercial lease in relation to [the] default disputes." He also argues that the trial court erred in its application of public policy. We disagree.
A. Declaratory Judgments Overview
{¶ 11} "A declaratory judgment is a ruling that states the rights of parties or expresses the opinion of the court on a question of law without ordering anything to be done. Its distinctive characteristic is that it does not seek execution or performance from
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the opposing party." Miami Valley Paper, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15917, at *3 (12th Dist.). Rather, declaratory judgment actions provide a means by which parties can eliminate uncertainty regarding their legal rights and obligations. Calvary Industries, Inc. v. Coral Chemical Co., 2019-Ohio-1288, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.), quoting Mid-American Fire & Cas. Co v. Heasley, 2007-Ohio-1248, ¶ 8. Declaratory judgments are governed by the Declaratory Judgments Act, which is found in Chapter 2721 of the Ohio Revised Code.
{¶ 12} Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, a declaratory judgment may "construe" a contract, and may do so "either before or after there has been a breach of the contract." R.C. 2721.04. The Act further provides,
any person interested under a . . . written contract . . . or any person whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a . . . contract . . . may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . .
contract . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.
(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2721.03. The applicability of declaratory judgment actions to contracts includes the determination of parties' contractual rights and obligations under lease agreements. Concrete Recovery, L.L.C. v. Nestle Purina Petcare Co., 2026-Ohio- 692, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.), citing Calvary at ¶ 10; see generally Harder Invest., L.L.C. v. Perin- Tyler Family Found., L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-4706 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 13} In determining whether a declaratory judgment is permissible, a court examines (1) whether there is a real controversy between the parties, (2) which is justiciable in character, and (3) whether speedy relief is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties. Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm., Dept. of Liquor Control, 34 Ohio St.2d 93, 97 (1973); see also Donovan v. Lebanon, 2024-Ohio-6059, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.), quoting Ohioans for Concealed Carry Inc., v. Columbus, 2020-Ohio-6724, ¶ 30.
{¶ 14} Traditionally, with regard to the second factor (that is, whether the
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controversy is "justiciable in character"), Ohio courts have employed a two-part test. Burger Brewing at 97. The first prong considers the appropriateness of the issues for judicial resolution, and the second prong evaluates the hardship incurred if judicial relief is denied. Id., quoting Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 162 (1967).
{¶ 15} We applied these principles in Miami Valley Paper, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15917, at *4-9 (12th Dist.). In that case, this court affirmed a trial court's decision to dismiss a declaratory judgment action. First, we found that the requested declaratory judgment action was inappropriate for judicial resolution—that is, nonjusticiable— because the appellant's complaint requested a declaration of "nonliability of [appellant] under the contracts" without raising any questions of construction or validity of the contract provisions. Id. at *4-6. Instead, the request for declaratory judgment only raised "a single question of fact, i.e., if the paper provided by the appellant [was] acceptable under the terms of the contracts." Id. at *7. Second, we found that denying declaratory relief caused minimal hardship to the appellant as the parties were already litigating a similar issue with the same facts in a separate action. Id. Third, we found that speedy relief was not "necessary for the preservation of rights which may otherwise become impaired or lost" because the appellant was not confronted with any "threat of uncertainty or irreparable injury." Id. at *8.
{¶ 16} Similarly, in Therapy Partners of America v. Health Providers, Inc., 129 Ohio App.3d 572, 578 (10th Dist. 1998), the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that a requested declaratory judgment in a contract case was not appropriate where "the resolution of the controversy [was] largely dependent upon the determination of the facts in the matter" and where "a cause of action had already been filed" in a separate jurisdiction over such facts. Id. at 579. We also recognized these principles most recently in Calvary, 2019-Ohio-1288, at ¶ 13-15 (12th Dist.), holding that "the trial court did not
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abuse its discretion in granting [appellee's] motion to dismiss" when "the factual questions that [appellant] sought to have decided in its complaint for declaratory judgment [were] pending in an action between the same parties" in a separate jurisdiction. See also Keegan v. Sneed, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4807, *8 (12th Dist. Oct. 16, 2000).
B. Standard of Review
{¶ 17} In this case, the trial court dismissed Sharaydeh's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). That rule authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Marchetti v. Blankenburg, 2011-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). "In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, 'it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling relief.'" Id., quoting DeMell v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2007-Ohio-2924, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). In ruling on a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the trial court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). But unsupported legal conclusions are not accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Schulman v. Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 (1972).
{¶ 18} Typically, "[a] trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is subject to de novo review on appeal," meaning that this court must independently review the complaint to determine the appropriateness of the trial court's dismissal. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Kolenich, 2011-Ohio-3345, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.), citing Sparks v. Bowling, 2009-Ohio-5071, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.) However, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized an exception to de novo review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) dismissal that applies in a case such as the one before us. That is, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that an appellate court must review the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action on the basis of nonjusticiability under an abuse of discretion standard of review,
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rather than de novo review. Arnott v. Arnott, 2012-Ohio-3208, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion implies a ruling that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Kent v. Lee, 2026- Ohio-2969, ¶ 51 (12th Dist.), citing Nwafo v. Ugwualor, 2024-Ohio-189, ¶ 11 (12th Dist.).
C. Analysis
{¶ 19} Applying these principles to the case before us, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Sharaydeh's declaratory judgment action pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as it was not unreasonable to find that the request for declaratory judgment was nonjusticiable.3
{¶ 20} Sharaydeh's complaint asked the trial court to find that he was "not in default of the Sublease" with regard to multiple issues: the payment of rent and CAM charges, allegedly impermissible advertisements, the sale of marijuana and CBD products, and the condition of the property. The complaint also asked the trial court to find that the Landlords breached the Sublease by constructively evicting him. However, none of Sharaydeh's arguments raised any "question of construction or validity arising under the" Master Lease or Sublease. As in Miami Valley Paper, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 15917, at *4-9 (12th Dist.), Sharaydeh simply requested that the trial court issue a declaratory judgment finding him not liable and the Landlords liable based on the facts he set forth in his complaint, rather than seeking a declaration of rights or status under the Master Lease or Sublease in relation to those facts.
{¶ 21} On appeal, Sharaydeh asserts that he did request the trial court to "declare his rights and obligations in relation to Section 17.1 right to cure in relation to multiple alleged lease defaults and multiple different sections of the lease." After a review of
3. The trial court addressed the first two declaratory judgment factors (whether there is a real controversy and justiciability), but did not address the third factor (whether speedy relief is necessary). Because the court's finding of nonjusticiability was dispositive, there was no need for the court to address the third factor. Likewise, we do not need to address that factor in this opinion.
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Sharaydeh's complaint, we fail to find contractual language making such a request. In the complaint, Sharaydeh did quote certain provisions of the Master Lease and Sublease, but there is no language indicating that he was seeking an interpretation of those provisions' language or validity. Instead, to the extent Sharaydeh tied specific alleged facts to particular provisions of the Master Lease or Sublease, he simply asked the court to determine liability. Therefore, we find it was reasonable for the trial court to find that Sharaydeh's declaratory judgment action was nonjusticiable and inappropriate for judicial resolution. See Miami Valley Paper at *4-6.
{¶ 22} We also find that it was reasonable for the trial court to find that Sharaydeh would suffer minimal hardship if his requested declaratory relief was not granted as there was a pending FED action in Boone County, Kentucky that involved the same parties, facts, and legal issues. See Miami Valley Paper at *7; Therapy Partners, 129 Ohio App.3d 572, at 579 (10th Dist.); Calvary, 2019-Ohio-1288, at ¶ 15 (12th Dist.).
{¶ 23} Finally, Sharaydeh argues that the trial court erred in its application of public policy. We find that the trial court's statements about public policy "were more akin to collateral observations on the case in the nature of dicta" rather than statements pertaining to the holding of the case. State ex rel. Lee v. Village of Plain City, 2017-Ohio- 8931, ¶ 43 (12th Dist.). "Adverse dicta [is] not appealable." Id., citing Alesi v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2014-Ohio-5192, ¶ 51 (12th Dist.). Therefore, we decline to address Sharaydeh's arguments relating to the trial court's public policy statements.
{¶ 24} For these reasons, we find that the trial court did not act unreasonably in finding Sharaydeh's declaratory judgment action to be nonjusticiable.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 25} Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
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dismissing Sharaydeh's declaratory judgment action, and we overrule his assignment of error.
{¶ 26} Judgment affirmed.
HENDRICKSON and SIEBERT, JJ., concur.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
The assignment of error properly before this court having been ruled upon, it is the order of this court that the judgment or final order appealed from be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.
It is further ordered that a mandate be sent to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas for execution upon this judgment and that a certified copy of this Opinion and Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
Costs to be taxed in compliance with App.R. 24.
/s/ Matthew R. Byrne, Presiding Judge
/s/ Robert A. Hendrickson, Judge
/s/ Melena S. Siebert, Judge