COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Causey, Raphael and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Richmond, Virginia
SHAQUILL HENRY MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0771-24-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS SEPTEMBER 30, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY M. Duncan Minton, Jr. Judge
Kelsey Bulger, Deputy Appellate Counsel (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Shelly R. James, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Linda R. Scott, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Upon his conditional guilty pleas, the trial court found Shaquill Henry guilty of
possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a
controlled substance by a prisoner. On appeal, Henry argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. Finding that the search of Henry’s vehicle was not supported by
probable cause, we reverse the trial court and remand for new proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On appeal, “we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.”
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the
accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413. favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).
At 1:40 a.m. on December 20, 2022, Chesterfield County Police Officer Harrison Wells
initiated a traffic stop on Henry’s vehicle for expired tags. Henry reduced his speed and drove for
around 30 seconds until he stopped at a hotel. Henry provided his driver’s license and shook his
head “no” when Officer Wells asked if there were any weapons in the vehicle, though he
“consistently made an effort to avoid eye contact” with Officer Wells. Officer Wells observed
Henry’s eyes dart “down to his left knee” when he again asked Henry if he had a weapon. Officer
Well’s body-worn camera footage was played for the court. Officer Wells rephrased his question,
asking instead “where the weapon was,” and he observed Henry begin shaking in a manner he
described as “consistent with nervousness.” Officer Wells also observed that Henry was sweating
“profusely” despite it being below freezing that evening. Henry freely admitted that he had smoked
marijuana earlier that day.
Officer Wells noticed a torn lottery play slip, commonly used in the area as drug packaging
material, in the cupholder of the vehicle. He took Henry’s license and ran a search for active
warrants while also requesting backup and a drug dog. Officer Wells returned to Henry’s vehicle
and found that Henry had lit a cigar. Officer Wells thought that Henry may have been “trying to
mask the odor of alcohol or marijuana” with the cigar, although Wells had not smelled such odors
before. Officer Wells asked Henry to step out of the car, and Henry gave him permission to open
the door. When Officer Wells did so, he observed more torn play slips in the driver’s door
compartment.
-2- Officer Wells patted Henry down for weapons before placing him “into investigative
detention.” After being read his Miranda1 rights, Henry gave Officer Wells permission to search
his pockets, where Officer Wells found $943 in cash. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed
folded lottery slips, baggies with marijuana stems, and various other folded pieces of paper. Among
other packaging materials, Officer Wells found a blue pill with white residue that he believed to be
pressed cocaine or fentanyl, which Henry represented was “Viagra that he got from someone.”
Officer Wells arrested Henry, and when they arrived at the jail, officers found a bag of 50 more pills
in Henry’s underwear. The pills later tested positive for methamphetamine.
Henry moved to suppress evidence from the search of his vehicle, arguing that the totality of
the circumstances did not warrant extending the stop, detaining him, and searching him and his
vehicle. The Commonwealth responded that the cumulative effect of Henry’s nervousness, the time
and location of the stop, his failure to pull over immediately, and the presence of the torn lottery
play slips were enough to establish probable cause. The trial court ruled that the totality of the
circumstances gave rise to probable cause and denied the motion to suppress. Henry then entered
conditional guilty pleas to his charges, with this appeal following.
ANALYSIS
Henry argues that the circumstances of the stop were insufficient to support extending the
stop, detaining him, and searching his vehicle and person. He notes, among other things, that lottery
play slips have a legitimate purpose beyond drug packaging and that though he was nervous, he was
not evasive, and he was compliant with police orders. Upon review, we find the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Henry’s motion to suppress.
On review of a circuit court’s decision denying a motion to suppress, the appellate court
“determine[s] whether the accused has met his burden to show that the [lower] court’s ruling, when
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -3- the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was reversible error.”
Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771, 782 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65
Va. App. 53, 56 (2015)). We review “the trial court’s application of the law de novo.” Malbrough
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69 (2008). However, “[w]hile we are bound to review de novo
the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we ‘review findings of historical
fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers.’” Long v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 700, 712 (2021)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
Henry argues that Officer Wells impermissibly extended the traffic stop when he detained
and searched Henry and his vehicle. “A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police
investigation of that violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The
“tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety
concerns.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “[A]
police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates
the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Id. at 350. “A seizure justified only by
a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id. at
350-51 (alterations in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges Causey, Raphael and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Richmond, Virginia
SHAQUILL HENRY MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY v. Record No. 0771-24-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS SEPTEMBER 30, 2025 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY M. Duncan Minton, Jr. Judge
Kelsey Bulger, Deputy Appellate Counsel (Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.
Shelly R. James, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Linda R. Scott, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Upon his conditional guilty pleas, the trial court found Shaquill Henry guilty of
possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession of a
controlled substance by a prisoner. On appeal, Henry argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. Finding that the search of Henry’s vehicle was not supported by
probable cause, we reverse the trial court and remand for new proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On appeal, “we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth.”
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 564 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). That principle requires us to “discard the evidence of the
accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence
* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413. favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.” Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 254 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. App. 335, 348 (1998)).
At 1:40 a.m. on December 20, 2022, Chesterfield County Police Officer Harrison Wells
initiated a traffic stop on Henry’s vehicle for expired tags. Henry reduced his speed and drove for
around 30 seconds until he stopped at a hotel. Henry provided his driver’s license and shook his
head “no” when Officer Wells asked if there were any weapons in the vehicle, though he
“consistently made an effort to avoid eye contact” with Officer Wells. Officer Wells observed
Henry’s eyes dart “down to his left knee” when he again asked Henry if he had a weapon. Officer
Well’s body-worn camera footage was played for the court. Officer Wells rephrased his question,
asking instead “where the weapon was,” and he observed Henry begin shaking in a manner he
described as “consistent with nervousness.” Officer Wells also observed that Henry was sweating
“profusely” despite it being below freezing that evening. Henry freely admitted that he had smoked
marijuana earlier that day.
Officer Wells noticed a torn lottery play slip, commonly used in the area as drug packaging
material, in the cupholder of the vehicle. He took Henry’s license and ran a search for active
warrants while also requesting backup and a drug dog. Officer Wells returned to Henry’s vehicle
and found that Henry had lit a cigar. Officer Wells thought that Henry may have been “trying to
mask the odor of alcohol or marijuana” with the cigar, although Wells had not smelled such odors
before. Officer Wells asked Henry to step out of the car, and Henry gave him permission to open
the door. When Officer Wells did so, he observed more torn play slips in the driver’s door
compartment.
-2- Officer Wells patted Henry down for weapons before placing him “into investigative
detention.” After being read his Miranda1 rights, Henry gave Officer Wells permission to search
his pockets, where Officer Wells found $943 in cash. A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed
folded lottery slips, baggies with marijuana stems, and various other folded pieces of paper. Among
other packaging materials, Officer Wells found a blue pill with white residue that he believed to be
pressed cocaine or fentanyl, which Henry represented was “Viagra that he got from someone.”
Officer Wells arrested Henry, and when they arrived at the jail, officers found a bag of 50 more pills
in Henry’s underwear. The pills later tested positive for methamphetamine.
Henry moved to suppress evidence from the search of his vehicle, arguing that the totality of
the circumstances did not warrant extending the stop, detaining him, and searching him and his
vehicle. The Commonwealth responded that the cumulative effect of Henry’s nervousness, the time
and location of the stop, his failure to pull over immediately, and the presence of the torn lottery
play slips were enough to establish probable cause. The trial court ruled that the totality of the
circumstances gave rise to probable cause and denied the motion to suppress. Henry then entered
conditional guilty pleas to his charges, with this appeal following.
ANALYSIS
Henry argues that the circumstances of the stop were insufficient to support extending the
stop, detaining him, and searching his vehicle and person. He notes, among other things, that lottery
play slips have a legitimate purpose beyond drug packaging and that though he was nervous, he was
not evasive, and he was compliant with police orders. Upon review, we find the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Henry’s motion to suppress.
On review of a circuit court’s decision denying a motion to suppress, the appellate court
“determine[s] whether the accused has met his burden to show that the [lower] court’s ruling, when
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). -3- the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was reversible error.”
Knight v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 771, 782 (2020) (quoting Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 65
Va. App. 53, 56 (2015)). We review “the trial court’s application of the law de novo.” Malbrough
v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69 (2008). However, “[w]hile we are bound to review de novo
the ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we ‘review findings of historical
fact only for clear error and . . . give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
judges and local law enforcement officers.’” Long v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 700, 712 (2021)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)).
Henry argues that Officer Wells impermissibly extended the traffic stop when he detained
and searched Henry and his vehicle. “A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police
investigation of that violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). The
“tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s
‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety
concerns.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). “[A]
police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates
the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Id. at 350. “A seizure justified only by
a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, ‘become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Id. at
350-51 (alterations in original) (quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407). However, “[i]f an officer
develops independent reasonable suspicion or probable cause that an occupant has committed an
additional traffic offense or crime, the officer may extend the stop for a reasonable amount of time
in order to confirm or dispel that new suspicion.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462,
482 (2020).
-4- “When used as a standard of calibrating certitude, ‘[t]he very phrase “probable cause”
confirms that the Fourth Amendment does not demand all possible precision.’” Evans v.
Commonwealth, 290 Va. 277, 287 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Herring v. United States,
555 U.S. 135, 139 (2009)). “To determine whether a police officer had probable cause to conduct a
warrantless search of a vehicle . . . ‘we examine the events leading up to the [search], and then
decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to probable cause.’” Curley v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 616, 622 (2018) (second
alteration in original) (quoting District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018)). Probable
cause “is a ‘flexible, common-sense standard.’” Keene v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 547, 555
(2022) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 101, 106 (2003)). “Unlike a factfinder at
trial, ‘reasonable [police] officers need not “resolve every doubt . . . before probable cause is
established.”’” Joyce v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 646, 660 (2010) (quoting Slayton, 41
Va. App. at 107). “It ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
actual showing of such activity.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
244 n.13 (1983)).
Henry was pulled over for expired tags. In order to extend the stop beyond the time
necessary to investigate that traffic offense and issue a citation, the officer needed to establish
probable cause that another offense had occurred. As such, we must look to the totality of the
information available to Officer Wells before he searched Henry’s vehicle. So viewed, the evidence
established that Henry was driving late at night in a car with expired tags. When Officer Wells
activated his lights, Henry slowed down but continued driving a short distance until he came to a
hotel parking lot. The evidence further showed that Henry was nervous, sweaty, and that he
possessed a large amount of cash and a torn lottery slip. Henry also lit a cigar during the stop and
-5- admitted that he had smoked marijuana—a legal substance at the time of the search—earlier that
day. These circumstances were insufficient to give rise to probable cause to search Henry’s vehicle.
Turning first to the lottery play slip, we note that “[t]he Supreme Court of Virginia has
consistently held that, under the plain view doctrine, probable cause cannot be established ‘solely on
the observation of material which can be used for legitimate purposes, even though the experience
of an officer indicates that such material is often used for illegitimate purposes.’” Cauls v.
Commonwealth, 55 Va. App. 90, 100 (2009) (quoting Grandison v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 316,
320 (2007)). Though the play slip certainly could have been used as drug packaging material, more
was needed to give rise to probable cause to search the vehicle. There is no evidence that the play
slip had visible drug residue or that it was unusual in any way other than being torn. Needless to
say, a torn piece of cardstock does not by itself indicate illicit activity. Indeed, in the past we have
repeatedly declined to find probable cause where the suspect was found with similarly incriminating
materials. See Cauls, 55 Va. App. at 90 (a folded dollar bill and a plastic bag); Grandison, 274 Va.
at 316 (a dollar bill in an “apothecary fold” and a segment of a drinking straw); Snell v.
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 472, 473 (2008) (per curiam) (a tightly folded dollar bill); Brown v.
Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 419-21 (2005) (a hand-rolled cigarette); Harris v. Commonwealth,
241 Va. 146, 154 (1991) (a film canister).
Nor can it be said that Henry’s nervousness was sufficient to give Officer Wells cause to
search the vehicle. Excessive nervousness is certainly a factor that an officer may rely on in support
of a probable cause determination. See Buhrman v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 507 (2008).
However, nothing about Henry’s demeanor counselled that he might be armed or otherwise in
possession of illegal substances: rather, he displayed nervousness one might expect of a young man
being pulled over by police. While he was not particularly talkative during their encounter, Henry
-6- made no furtive movements and was compliant with Officer Wells’s commands. Henry allowed
Officer Wells to pat him down, and Officer Wells found nothing except for some cash.
Though Henry lit a cigar during the stop, which Officer Wells interpreted as Henry
attempting to conceal the odor of alcohol or marijuana, there is no evidence that Henry was driving
erratically or otherwise exhibiting signs of intoxication. Henry admitted that he had consumed
marijuana, but stated it had been earlier that day, and there is no evidence that the car smelled of
marijuana or alcohol before Henry lit the cigar. Nor did Officer Wells seek at any point to confirm
his suspicions with field sobriety tests. Simply put, nothing about Henry’s behavior itself would
lead an objective observer to anything more than a “hunch” he was engaged in illegal activity. See
McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552 (2008) (reversing a trial court’s probable cause
finding where the defendant was nervous and loitering in a high crime area but was otherwise
cooperative and made no furtive movements when approached by police (citing Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119 (2000))). Officer Wells’s hunch may have been correct, but it was unsupported by
probable cause.
CONCLUSION
Because the search of Henry’s vehicle was not supported by probable cause, the trial court
erred in denying Henry’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse Henry’s conviction and
remand for a new trial if the Commonwealth is so inclined.
Reversed and remanded.
-7-