Shapiro v. Department of Justice
This text of Shapiro v. Department of Justice (Shapiro v. Department of Justice) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________ ) RYAN SHAPIRO, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 13-0555 (PLF) ) DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ) ) Defendant. ) ___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The claims presented in this case initially were brought in Shapiro v. Department
of Justice, Civil Action No. 12-1883 (BAH), within a thirteen-count complaint challenging the
denials of numerous Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests as well as three discrete
FOIA-related practices by the Department of Justice. On April 17, 2013, Judge Beryl A. Howell
issued a decision concluding that severance of the claims in that case, “which deal with twenty
unrelated FOIA/PA requests that are at varying stages of administrative processing,” was
“appropriate ‘to promote the efficient administration of justice.’” Shapiro v. Department of
Justice, Civil Action No. 12-1883, at 6-7 (Apr. 17, 2013) (citing 4 JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET
AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 21.05 (3d ed. 2013)). Judge Howell severed twelve of the
thirteen counts and ordered that they be dismissed unless the plaintiffs “refiled [them] in
appropriate separate actions.” Id. at 7.
On April 24, 2013, plaintiffs refiled five of these claims in a new complaint,
thereby initiating this case. In their new complaint, four plaintiffs seek an order directing the
FBI to provide the documents requested by each of them in their separate FOIA requests (Counts One through Four). Plaintiffs allege that each request was denied in whole or in part, or is
expected to be denied, pursuant to the FBI’s blanket policy of considering requests for search
slips less than 25 years old to be exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption (b)(7)(E).
Compl. ¶¶ 15-16; id. ¶¶ 26, 29, 31, 37, 48 (alleging application of blanket policy). Plaintiffs also
bring a facial challenge to this alleged policy (Count Five). Id. ¶¶ 59-65.
On June 12, 2013, the Court issued an Order directing plaintiffs to show cause
why Counts One through Four of their complaint should not be severed from Count Five under
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or dismissed. 1 Plaintiffs filed a response on
June 24, 2013, Dkt. No. 9, and a supplemental response on July 8, 2013. Dkt. No. 10. The
government responded on August 9, 2013, by filing a memorandum expressing its views as to
why these claims should be severed. Dkt. No. 15. The Court heard argument on the matter on
September 16, 2013.
Upon consideration of the arguments presented at oral argument and in the
parties’ papers, Judge Howell’s decision, and the applicable rules, the Court concludes that
Counts One through Five are permissibly joined and that the interest of judicial economy weighs
against severance at this time. Counsel for the government does not contest that the FBI’s search
slip policy is implicated in each of Counts One through Four, and it appears that legal questions
relating to that alleged policy are likely to predominate over other issues in the case. Under such
circumstances, the denials or reasonably anticipated denials of plaintiffs’ FOIA requests on the
basis of the same blanket policy are fairly construed as a “series of transactions or occurrences”
under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a); see 7 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1653, at 415 (3d ed. 2001) (noting
1 The Order to Show Cause was issued by Chief Judge Richard W. Roberts. This case was reassigned to the undersigned on August 29, 2013. 2 that Rule 20’s transaction requirement is not a “rigid test,” but rather a “flexible concept[] used
by the courts to implement the purpose of Rule 20 and therefore [is] to be read as broadly as
possible whenever doing so is likely to promote judicial economy”); Disparte v. Corporate Exec.
Bd., 223 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2004) (“the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible
scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties”) (internal quotation omitted). The Court
retains discretion to sever the claims at a later stage if it appears that the claims may be tried
more conveniently in separate actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21; 7 WRIGHT ET AL. §1653, at 416.
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that [Dkt. No. 8] the Order to Show Cause issued by Chief Judge
Roberts is hereby DISCHARGED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall meet and confer, and shall file a joint
report containing a proposed briefing schedule or, if the parties cannot agree, each side’s
proposed briefing schedule on or before October 3, 2013.
SO ORDERED.
/s/___________________________ PAUL L. FRIEDMAN DATE: September 19, 2013 United States District Judge
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Shapiro v. Department of Justice, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shapiro-v-department-of-justice-dcd-2013.