Shannon Zimmerly v. Pierce County Council, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedDecember 16, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-06004
StatusUnknown

This text of Shannon Zimmerly v. Pierce County Council, et al. (Shannon Zimmerly v. Pierce County Council, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shannon Zimmerly v. Pierce County Council, et al., (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 SHANNON ZIMMERLY, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-06004-BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER 9 v. 10 PIERCE COUNTY COUNCIL, et al., 11 Defendant. 12

13 This matter is before the Court following Magistrate Judge David Christel’s Order 14 granting pro se plaintiff Shannon Zimmerly leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. 2, 15 based on her indigency. This Court must now decide whether Zimmerly’s proposed 16 complaint, Dkt. 3, states a plausible claim. 17 A court should “deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears 18 from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.” 19 Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted); 20 see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if “it 21 ha[s] no arguable substance in law or fact.” Id. at 1370 (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 22 1 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 2 1984). 3 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but like any other

4 complaint it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially 5 plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic 6 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible 7 when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 8 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. “[A]

9 plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 10 than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 11 action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 12 speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnotes omitted). This 13 requires a plaintiff to plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

14 me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly at 555). 15 In order to state a plausible claim, a plaintiff must allege facts that allow the court 16 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 17 Id. 18 Zimmerly claims she has been “subjected to ongoing harassment, retaliatory

19 prosecution, and selective enforcement” after “neighbors obtained anti-harassment orders 20 against” her and pressured the Pierce County Prosecutor’s Office to “initiate baseless 21 actions” against her. Dkt. 3 at 6. She alleges she was provoked to display a yard sign with 22 crude text, after which Pierce County charged her with violating the anti-harassment 1 orders. Id. She asserts First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection claims, and 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for these alleged civil rights violations. Id. at 4. She also brings a 3 Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) claim against defendant Bonneville Power

4 Administration because a “neighbor illegally constructed structures encroaching on 5 county-owned property.” Id. at 4, 6. 6 Zimmerly has not articulated sufficient facts to state a plausible claim. She insists 7 defendants falsely and vindictively sued her, but she does not provide any detail on the 8 “who, what, when, where, and why” of the factual story. It is not enough to simply assert

9 the anti-harassment orders and lawsuits filed against her caused her “actual harm,” 10 “emotional distress,” and “liberty restrictions.” Id. at 7. She similarly does not explain 11 how neighbors’ “illegally constructed structures” actually harmed her. Id. at 6. As with 12 all Article III plaintiffs, Zimmerly must have standing to pursue her claims and 13 demonstrate she suffered (1) an injury in fact that is (2) traceable to the defendants’

14 conduct, and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Lujan v. 15 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Zimmerly’s current proposed 16 complaint, Dkt. 3, is wholly conclusory and does not meet this standard. 17 Ordinarily, the Court will permit pro se litigants an opportunity to amend their 18 complaint to state a plausible claim. However, where the complaint cannot be saved by

19 any amendment, dismissal without leave to amend may be appropriate. United States v. 20 Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011). 21 Zimmerly appears to ask this Court to alter or reverse Orders issued by a state 22 court. This Court cannot and will not review or reverse decisions made in state court. The 1 Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 2 injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and 3 rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.

4 280, 284 (2005). “[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district 5 court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court and 6 seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a forbidden de 7 facto appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmona v. Carmona, 8 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). Zimmerly’s proper remedy is to fight the entry of

9 allegedly malicious and unlawful state court anti-harassment against her in state court, or 10 to appeal those orders in state court. This Court has no jurisdiction over such claims, and 11 there is nothing Zimmerly could plead to change that conclusion. Similarly, for the FTCA 12 claim, Zimmerly cannot assert any facts that could plausibly allege she suffered an injury 13 from encroachment on county-owned property.

14 The case is DISMISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk 15 shall close the case. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 Dated this 16th day of December, 2025. A 18 19 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 20 United States District Judge

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Related

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555 (Supreme Court, 1992)
Carmona v. Carmona
603 F.3d 1041 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
United States v. Corinthian Colleges
655 F.3d 984 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Anant Kumar Tripati v. First National Bank & Trust
821 F.2d 1368 (First Circuit, 1987)

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Shannon Zimmerly v. Pierce County Council, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shannon-zimmerly-v-pierce-county-council-et-al-wawd-2025.