Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14847 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00604-JHE
SHANNON WELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(June 21, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Shannon Wells appeals the denial of her application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Wells Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 2 of 8
argues that the administrative law judge gave insufficient weight to the opinions of
her treating physician, Dr. Odeane Connor, and of a consulting psychiatrist, Dr.
Jack Bentley; failed to develop the record regarding the side effects of her pain
medication; and was biased. Wells also argues that the Appeals Council failed to
consider medical records prepared after her administrative hearing. We affirm.
Good cause supports the administrative law judge’s decision to give little
weight to Dr. Connor’s medical questionnaire. Dr. Connor completed the form on
March 18, 2014, which predated the onset date of Wells’s disability on August 11,
2014. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The doctor also noted that Wells “needs [a]
F[unctional] C[apacity] E[valuation].” See Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580,
583–84 (11th Cir. 1991) (discounting opinion when the treating physician “is
unsure of the accuracy of his findings and statements”). Dr. Connor marked boxes
stating that Wells was limited in her abilities to bend, concentrate, lift objects,
perform manual tasks, stand, walk, and work, but the doctor’s medical records
stated that the range of motion in Wells’s back fluctuated between normal and
moderately impaired, she tested negative on straight leg tests and sciatic stretch
tests, she had a normal tone, and she benefitted from medication without side
effects. See id. (discounting opinion that conflicts with treatment records). The
limitations that Dr. Connor marked also conflicted with Dr. Bentley’s medical
2 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 3 of 8
notes that Wells ambulated with little difficulty and completed tasks daily without
assistance despite her pain and Dr. Sathyan Iyer’s notes that Wells could stand
without assistance, walk on her tiptoes, squat partially, had normal muscle power
in her upper and lower extremities, and had a full range of motion in her hips,
knees, and ankles. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s
decision to discount Dr. Connor’s questionnaire.
Substantial evidence also supports the administrative law judge’s decision to
discount Dr. Bentley’s opinion that Wells was mentally disabled. The
administrative law judge was entitled to give little weight to an opinion formed
after one examination, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), based largely on Wells’s
subjective complaints, see id. § 404.1527(c)(3), which conflicted with Dr.
Bentley’s medical notes, see id. § 416.927(c)(4). Dr. Bentley’s diagnosis that
Wells had bipolar disorder was inconsistent with his findings that Wells was “at
most, mildly despondent over her chronic pain and loss of lifestyle” and lacked
symptoms of the disorder. The doctor’s diagnosis that Wells had depressive
disorder conflicted with his observations that Wells’s mood was “reasonably
cheerful and congruent with her affect,” she exhibited no obvious signs of anxiety
or restlessness, she was “reasonably stable” on her psychiatric medications, and her
prognosis was “favorable.” And Dr. Bentley’s conclusion that Wells had a
3 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 4 of 8
“marked limitation in her ability to sustain complex or repetitive work related
activities” conflicted with his records that she successfully completed the
recollection, mathematical, and spelling tests that he administered.
The administrative law judge developed a full and fair administrative record
regarding the effects of Wells’s pain medication. Wells testified that the
methadone she took for pain and the Lyrica she took for fibromyalgia made her
sleepy and, when asked by counsel whether her medicines caused dizziness, Wells
responded that she fell asleep in her car during two lunch breaks. The
administrative law judge took into account Wells’s statements to Dr. Connor and
Dr. Huma Khusro, a psychiatrist who evaluated Wells twice, that her medications
had minimal to no side effects. In Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.
1981), we held that a claimant’s hearing was procedurally deficient when she was
unrepresented and the administrative law judge failed to question her after she
testified that her seven medicines caused her to be “kind of zonked most of the
time.” Id. at 737. Unlike the claimant in Cowart, Wells had counsel to assist her in
developing her case and she never testified or argued that the side effects of her
medicines were disabling. The administrative law judge’s “failure to inquire
further into possible side effects did not deprive [Wells] of a meaningful
4 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 5 of 8
opportunity to be heard.” Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (11th Cir.
1985) (distinguishing Cowart).
Wells’s argument that the administrative law judge was biased against her
fails. The administrative law judge plays a “crucial role in the disability review
process” and his impartiality is “integral to the integrity of the system.” Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1996). Because we presume that the
administrative law judge is unbiased, “the burden of establishing a disqualifying
interest rests on [Wells].” Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1982). In
other words, Wells has to “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in . . .
[his] adjudicator[] [by presenting evidence to] convince that, under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, . . . [the] individual[]
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden
. . . .” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Wells argues that the
administrative law judge has a low rate of favorable decisions and has been
reversed by the district court, but Wells acknowledges “that statistics alone are not
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Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-14847 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00604-JHE
SHANNON WELLS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee. ________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama ________________________
(June 21, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Shannon Wells appeals the denial of her application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Wells Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 2 of 8
argues that the administrative law judge gave insufficient weight to the opinions of
her treating physician, Dr. Odeane Connor, and of a consulting psychiatrist, Dr.
Jack Bentley; failed to develop the record regarding the side effects of her pain
medication; and was biased. Wells also argues that the Appeals Council failed to
consider medical records prepared after her administrative hearing. We affirm.
Good cause supports the administrative law judge’s decision to give little
weight to Dr. Connor’s medical questionnaire. Dr. Connor completed the form on
March 18, 2014, which predated the onset date of Wells’s disability on August 11,
2014. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). The doctor also noted that Wells “needs [a]
F[unctional] C[apacity] E[valuation].” See Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580,
583–84 (11th Cir. 1991) (discounting opinion when the treating physician “is
unsure of the accuracy of his findings and statements”). Dr. Connor marked boxes
stating that Wells was limited in her abilities to bend, concentrate, lift objects,
perform manual tasks, stand, walk, and work, but the doctor’s medical records
stated that the range of motion in Wells’s back fluctuated between normal and
moderately impaired, she tested negative on straight leg tests and sciatic stretch
tests, she had a normal tone, and she benefitted from medication without side
effects. See id. (discounting opinion that conflicts with treatment records). The
limitations that Dr. Connor marked also conflicted with Dr. Bentley’s medical
2 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 3 of 8
notes that Wells ambulated with little difficulty and completed tasks daily without
assistance despite her pain and Dr. Sathyan Iyer’s notes that Wells could stand
without assistance, walk on her tiptoes, squat partially, had normal muscle power
in her upper and lower extremities, and had a full range of motion in her hips,
knees, and ankles. Substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s
decision to discount Dr. Connor’s questionnaire.
Substantial evidence also supports the administrative law judge’s decision to
discount Dr. Bentley’s opinion that Wells was mentally disabled. The
administrative law judge was entitled to give little weight to an opinion formed
after one examination, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), based largely on Wells’s
subjective complaints, see id. § 404.1527(c)(3), which conflicted with Dr.
Bentley’s medical notes, see id. § 416.927(c)(4). Dr. Bentley’s diagnosis that
Wells had bipolar disorder was inconsistent with his findings that Wells was “at
most, mildly despondent over her chronic pain and loss of lifestyle” and lacked
symptoms of the disorder. The doctor’s diagnosis that Wells had depressive
disorder conflicted with his observations that Wells’s mood was “reasonably
cheerful and congruent with her affect,” she exhibited no obvious signs of anxiety
or restlessness, she was “reasonably stable” on her psychiatric medications, and her
prognosis was “favorable.” And Dr. Bentley’s conclusion that Wells had a
3 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 4 of 8
“marked limitation in her ability to sustain complex or repetitive work related
activities” conflicted with his records that she successfully completed the
recollection, mathematical, and spelling tests that he administered.
The administrative law judge developed a full and fair administrative record
regarding the effects of Wells’s pain medication. Wells testified that the
methadone she took for pain and the Lyrica she took for fibromyalgia made her
sleepy and, when asked by counsel whether her medicines caused dizziness, Wells
responded that she fell asleep in her car during two lunch breaks. The
administrative law judge took into account Wells’s statements to Dr. Connor and
Dr. Huma Khusro, a psychiatrist who evaluated Wells twice, that her medications
had minimal to no side effects. In Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731 (11th Cir.
1981), we held that a claimant’s hearing was procedurally deficient when she was
unrepresented and the administrative law judge failed to question her after she
testified that her seven medicines caused her to be “kind of zonked most of the
time.” Id. at 737. Unlike the claimant in Cowart, Wells had counsel to assist her in
developing her case and she never testified or argued that the side effects of her
medicines were disabling. The administrative law judge’s “failure to inquire
further into possible side effects did not deprive [Wells] of a meaningful
4 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 5 of 8
opportunity to be heard.” Cherry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1191 n.7 (11th Cir.
1985) (distinguishing Cowart).
Wells’s argument that the administrative law judge was biased against her
fails. The administrative law judge plays a “crucial role in the disability review
process” and his impartiality is “integral to the integrity of the system.” Miles v.
Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 1996). Because we presume that the
administrative law judge is unbiased, “the burden of establishing a disqualifying
interest rests on [Wells].” Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1982). In
other words, Wells has to “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in . . .
[his] adjudicator[] [by presenting evidence to] convince that, under a realistic
appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, . . . [the] individual[]
poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden
. . . .” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). Wells argues that the
administrative law judge has a low rate of favorable decisions and has been
reversed by the district court, but Wells acknowledges “that statistics alone are not
evidence of bias.” Wells also argues that the administrative law judge substituted
his opinion for that of Dr. Connor and Dr. Bentley, but substantial evidence
supports the decisions to discount the doctors’ opinions. Wells identifies no ruling
or other evidence in the record establishing any partiality on the part of or a
5 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 6 of 8
specific reason to disqualify the administrative law judge. The administrative law
judge’s decision reflects no bias.
The Appeals Council committed no error when considering records of Dr.
Connor from the “Pain and Wound Care Center dated August 31, 2015 through
November 2, 2015,” “Records from Rehab Partners dated May 12, 2009 through
January 19, 2011,” and the “Statement from Fredrick Feist, M.D., dated February
20, 2016.” The Appeals Council ruled summarily that the new records did “not
provide a basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” See
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 771 F.3d 780, 784 (11th Cir. 2014). The records from Dr.
Connor and Rehab Partners contained substantially the same information and were
copies of reports that the administrative law judge reviewed. See id. Dr. Feist’s
statement was a questionnaire on which he circled yes or no and provided no
explanation to support his answers that Wells was unable to work. See Edwards,
937 F.2d at 583.
Wells’s additional evidence was not chronologically relevant. Records of
Preferred Pain Associates from April 7, 2016, to June 30, 2016, of Rapid Care
Medical Clinic from February 5, 2016, to April 11, 2016, and from Dr. Connor at
the Pain and Wound Care Center on December 1, 2015, were prepared after the
administrative law judge denied Wells’s application on November 20, 2015. See 20
6 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 7 of 8
C.F.R. § 404.970(c). Those treatment records also were not relevant to the period
preceding the administrative law judge’s decision. See Hargress v. Soc. Sec.
Admin., Comm’r, 883 F.3d 1302, 1309–10 (11th Cir. 2018). Preferred Pain
Associates reported continuing treatment for and adjustments to medicines for
Wells’s pain, and Dr. Connor reported an additional therapy session with Wells
and her dismissal as a patient. In contrast to Washington v. Social Security
Administration, 806 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2015), where a new
psychological report was chronologically relevant because its opinion that the
claimant was disabled was based on earlier treatment records of his auditory and
visual hallucinations, the additional medical records from Preferred Pain and Dr.
Connor do not contain new findings about Wells’s condition. And Wells’s medical
records from Rapid Care Clinic suffer the same fate because they reported
treatment for an injury Wells sustained after the administrative law judge’s
decision.
We AFFIRM the denial of Wells’s application for benefits.
7 Case: 18-14847 Date Filed: 06/21/2019 Page: 8 of 8
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Certain things gave me initial pause – the ALJ’s low approval rate for
claimants; the Appeals Council’s failure to address the issue of alleged bias on the
part of the ALJ; and the number of district court opinions critical of the ALJ’s
decisions. In the right case, these matters may warrant further inquiry. But in this
particular case, I conclude that the ALJ had valid reasons for discounting the
opinions of Drs. Conner and Bentley. I therefore concur in and join the court’s
opinion.