Shannon Spencer v. Empire Today, LLC et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01661
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 SHANNON SPENCER, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01661-LK 11 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART 12 v. AND DENYING IN PART STIPULATED MOTION TO STAY 13 EMPIRE TODAY, LLC et al., 14 Defendants. 15

16 This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ stipulated motion to stay this case. Dkt. 17 No. 19. The parties request that this Court “stay this action, including all pending motions 18 deadlines, for 30 calendar days to allow the Parties an opportunity to explore a potential early 19 resolution.” Id. at 1. 20 The parties state that a “stay of this case would promote efficiency for the Parties and the 21 Court.” Id. They propose to file a joint status report “no later than February 20, 2026, apprising 22 the Court on the outcome of settlement discussions and setting briefing schedules for Plaintiff’s 23 pending motion to remand and Defendants’ pending motion to compel arbitration.” Id. 24 1 “[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to 2 control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for 3 counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). The Court “may 4 order a stay of the action pursuant to its power to control its docket and calendar and to provide

5 for a just determination of the cases pending before it.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 6 593 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1979). In considering whether to grant a stay, courts consider several 7 factors, including: 8 the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly 9 course of justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay. 10 CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962). 11 At the same time, a federal court has an independent duty to determine whether it has 12 subject matter jurisdiction over a case. Ruhgras AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) 13 (“[S]ubject-matter delineations must be policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the 14 highest level.”); Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004) (federal court is 15 obligated to determine sua sponte whether it has subject matter jurisdiction). Moreover, the Ninth 16 Circuit “strictly construe[s] the removal statute against removal jurisdiction,” and “[f]ederal 17 jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” 18 Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 19 Absent subject matter jurisdiction, “the outcome of settlement discussions” is of no import 20 to the Court. It is unable to dismiss a case with prejudice—or approve a class action settlement— 21 without jurisdiction.1 And as the parties know, this Court has repeatedly concluded that it lacks 22 subject matter jurisdiction over substantially identical cases. See, e.g., Wright v. Bluelinx Corp., 23

24 1 To the extent the parties intend to dismiss the case without prejudice, they may so inform the Court. 1 No. 2:25-CV-01645-LK, 2025 WL 3771239, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2025); Spencer v. 2 Walmart Inc., No. 23-cv-1793-BJR, 2025 WL 2910569, at *4–5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2025). 3 Therefore, it would not promote the orderly course of justice or preserve the Court’s resources to 4 grant a stay of Plaintiff Shannon Spencer’s motion to remand. However, aside from the motion to

5 remand, it does not appear that any damage, hardship, or inequity will result from staying the 6 remainder of the action or that any questions of law will arise as a result of doing so. 7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the 8 parties’ stipulated motion to stay this case. Dkt. No. 19. Other than the motion to remand, the Court 9 STAYS this case until February 20, 2026, and ORDERS the parties to submit a joint status report 10 on or before that date apprising the Court of the status of the matter and, if the matter is not 11 remanded or resolved by that date, proposing a briefing schedule for Defendants’ pending motion 12 to compel arbitration. 13 Dated this 14th day of January, 2026. 14 A

15 Lauren King United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24