Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedJanuary 6, 2026
Docket1:23-cv-00425
StatusUnknown

This text of Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association (Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, (E.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 SHANNON RAY, KHALA TAYLOR, PETER No. 1:23-cv-00425 ROBINSON, KATHERINE SEBBANE, and 13 RUDY BARAJAS, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly 14 Situated, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 15 Plaintiffs, PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 16 v. 17 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated 18 association, 19 Defendant. 20 21 ----oo0oo---- 22 Plaintiffs Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, 23 Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas brought this putative class 24 action against defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association 25 (“NCAA”), alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman 26 Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. (Second Am. Compl. (Docket No. 27 84).) Plaintiffs have filed an unopposed motion for preliminary 28 approval of class action settlement. (Docket No. 159.) 1 I. Background and Proposed Settlement 2 This is one of two related cases assigned to this court 3 involving antitrust challenges to a since-repealed NCAA bylaw 4 barring “volunteer coaches” from receiving pay. The related 5 case, Smart v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 2-22-cv-02125 6 WBS CSL, 2025 WL 2651800 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025), recently 7 ended in settlement. 8 The court previously granted plaintiffs’ motion to 9 certify a class in this action, which consists of “[a]ll persons 10 who from March 17, 2019, to June 30, 2023, worked for an NCAA 11 Division I sports program other than baseball in the position of 12 ‘volunteer coach,’ as designated by NCAA bylaws.” (Docket No. 13 128 at 27.) Plaintiffs now estimate the class has approximately 14 7,718 members. (Docket No. 159 at 8.) 15 The parties propose a gross settlement amount of 16 $303,000,000, to be paid in three separate installments of 17 $101,000,000 into a common fund over the course of two calendar 18 years. (See Plan of Allocation (Docket No. 159-1 ¶ 2).) Amounts 19 paid to class members “will be determined by the school, sport, 20 and year in which he or she worked.” (Docket No. 159 at 15.) 21 More specifically, plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Ashenfelter “will 22 calculate a Recognized Loss for each six-month period coached by 23 a Class Member . . . based on the wages paid to the team’s 24 lowest-paid coach during that period who was not designated as a 25 ‘Volunteer Coach,’” and then incorporate a “stepdown” to account 26 for the fact that class member coaching positions were “lower in 27 the hierarchy than [their] reference coach.” (Id. at 16; Plan of 28 Allocation ¶ 12.) The resulting payment for each claimant will 1 be divided into three amounts corresponding with settlement 2 distributions. (Id. at 12-13.) 3 Plaintiffs’ counsel anticipates that attorneys’ fees 4 will comprise up to 30% of the settlement fund. (Docket No. 159 5 at 27.) Plaintiffs further request service awards for the class 6 representatives in the amount of $25,000 each. (Id. at 29.) 7 II. Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlements 8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that 9 “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be 10 settled . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 23(e). This Order is the first step in that process and analyzes 12 only whether the proposed class action settlement deserves 13 preliminary approval. See Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266 14 F.R.D. 468, 473 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Shubb, J.). Preliminary 15 approval authorizes the parties to give notice to putative class 16 members of the settlement agreement and lays the groundwork for a 17 future fairness hearing, at which the court will hear objections 18 to (1) the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) 19 the terms of the settlement. See id.; Diaz v. Tr. Territory of 20 Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989). The court 21 will reach a final determination as to whether the parties should 22 be allowed to settle the class action on their proposed terms 23 after that hearing. 24 A. Class Certification and Notice 25 Having already certified a class under Rule 23, the 26 court must now “direct to class members the best notice that is 27 practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice 28 to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” 1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form 2 and content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 3 F.R.D. 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & 4 Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice 5 must be “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the 6 plaintiff class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. 7 Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). 8 Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided the court with a 9 proposed notice to be sent class members via email, First-Class 10 Mail, and paid and earned media. (See Docket No. 159-3 at 4.) A 11 dedicated website and toll-free telephone number will serve as 12 additional resources. (Id.) The proposed notices explain the 13 proceedings, define the scope of the class, and explain what the 14 settlement provides and the minimum amount each class member can 15 expect to receive in compensation. (See id. at 20-25.) The 16 notices further explain the opt-out procedure, the procedure for 17 objecting to the settlement, and the date and location of the 18 final approval hearing. (See id.) The content of the notices 19 therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 23(c)(2)(B); Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 21 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally 22 describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to 23 alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come 24 forward and be heard.’”) (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. 25 No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)). 26 The parties have selected A.B. Data, Ltd.’s Class 27 Action Administration Company (“A.B. Data”) to serve as the 28 Settlement Administrator. (Declaration of Elaine Pang (“Pang 1 Decl.” (Docket No. 159-3) ¶ 4.) Pursuant to the notice plan, the 2 Settlement Administrator will effectuate direct notice to each 3 class member using a provided list of available names, schools, 4 sports, email addresses, and/or mailing addresses for known class 5 members. (See id. ¶ 10.) Further, the Settlement Administrator 6 will establish a website and toll-free phone number, which will 7 be referred to in the mail and email notices, to supplement 8 direct notice and provide further information about the 9 settlement to class members. (See id. ¶¶ 11-14.) The proposed 10 notice procedures appear “reasonably calculated, under all the 11 circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the proposed 12 settlement. See Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 13 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019). 14 B. Terms of the Settlement 15 The court must next determine whether the terms of the 16 parties’ settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. See 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

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Bluebook (online)
Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly Situated v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shannon-ray-khala-taylor-peter-robinson-katherine-sebbane-and-rudy-caed-2026.