Shannon Noonan v. Troyeco, LLC, and Division of Employment Security

CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedMarch 12, 2024
DocketED111969
StatusPublished

This text of Shannon Noonan v. Troyeco, LLC, and Division of Employment Security (Shannon Noonan v. Troyeco, LLC, and Division of Employment Security) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shannon Noonan v. Troyeco, LLC, and Division of Employment Security, (Mo. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION THREE

SHANNON NOONAN, ) No. ED111969 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Labor and Industrial ) Relations Commission vs. ) ) TROYECO LLC, AND DIVISION OF ) EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, ) ) Respondents. ) Filed: March 12, 2024

Before Lisa P. Page, P.J., Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., and Angela T. Quigless, J.

OPINION

Shannon Noonan (Claimant) appeals from the decision of the Labor and Industrial

Relations Commission (Commission) denying her claim for unemployment benefits because she

voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to her employer. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Claimant began working for Troyeco, LLC (Employer) in August 2019. She was a

student in Springfield, Missouri and worked part time for Employer in a frozen yogurt shop. In

March 2020, she returned home to St. Louis for spring break, when the state enacted a COVID-

19 stay-at-home order (COVID-19 order). Claimant did not return to work until August 2020,

although she did return to Springfield, where she maintained an apartment, “a few times,”

between March and August. Claimant filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which Employer protested. A deputy

for the Division of Employment Security determined she was disqualified from receiving

benefits because she voluntarily quit her employment without good cause attributable to

Employer. Claimant appealed, and following a telephone hearing, the appeals tribunal issued a

decision finding her appeal was untimely filed without good cause. Claimant filed a timely

application for review with the Commission, which affirmed and adopted the decision of the

appeals tribunal. Claimant appealed this decision to our court. We reversed and remanded for

rehearing to consider evidence not submitted to the appeals tribunal or the Commission which

could not be properly supplemented to this court’s record on appeal. Noonan v. Troyeco, LLC,

649 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022).

Following a second telephone hearing in June 2023, and upon consideration of the

additional documents submitted, the appeals tribunal determined that while there was good cause

for Claimant’s late notice of appeal, it affirmed the decision of the deputy finding Claimant was

disqualified from receiving benefits. Claimant again appealed to the Commission which

affirmed the decision of the appeals tribunal. This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

In her sole point on appeal, Claimant argues the Commission erred in concluding she

voluntarily quit her job because she took a leave of absence due to the COVID-19 order.

Standard of Review

We review the decision of the Commission pursuant to Section 288.210 RSMo (2016). 1

Pursuant to statute, we may modify, reverse, remand, or set aside the Commission’s decision

only on the grounds that the Commission acted without or in excess of its power, the decision

1 All further statutory references are to RSMo (2016).

2 was procured by fraud, the facts found by the Commission do not support its decision, or there

was no sufficient competent evidence in the record to support the decision. Id. Thus, in the

absence of fraud, “the Commission’s factual findings are conclusive and binding if supported by

competent and substantial evidence.” McCabe v. ADP Total Source FL XVIII, Inc., 653 S.W.3d

420, 423 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022) (internal citations omitted).

Analysis

“The primary purpose of the Missouri Employment Security Law is to provide benefits to

persons ‘unemployed through no fault of their own.’” McCabe, 653 S.W.3d at 424 (citing

Section 288.020.1; Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Mo. banc

2008)). Section 288.050.1(1) disqualifies a claimant from benefits if the claimant left work

“voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work or to the claimant’s employer.” An

employee is considered to have left work voluntarily if he or she leaves of his or her own accord,

rather than being discharged, dismissed, or subjected to a layoff. McCabe, 653 S.W.3d at 424

(citing Darr v. Roberts Mktg. Grp. LLC, 428 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)). Where

the claimant is determined to have left voluntarily, we must consider whether the claimant had

good cause to do so attributable to the work or to his or her employer. Id. “Good cause” has

long been interpreted to mean circumstances which would cause an average, reasonable person

in a similar situation to leave employment rather than continue working. Id. (internal citations

omitted).

Here, there is no question Claimant left work voluntarily. She testified she was

scheduled to work following her spring break, but she chose to remain in St. Louis rather than

return to Springfield due to the COVID-19 order. Thus, this court must decide whether her

decision was the result of good cause attributable to either the work or Employer. Claimant

3 asserts the COVID-19 order was “good cause” for not returning to work, which was through no

fault of her own. However, she testified she maintained an apartment in Springfield and she

returned to Springfield “a few” times between March and August 2020 when she returned

permanently. In addition, Employer testified the shop remained open during the pandemic and

Claimant was scheduled to work following spring break; however, Claimant contacted Employer

and said she would not return.

We are sympathetic to the confusion caused by the COVID-19 order and understand her

belief that her decision to remain in St. Louis was reasonable because the pandemic was certainly

beyond her control. However, the fact remains Claimant was able to – and did – return to

Springfield during the time she sought unemployment benefits. At the same time, Employer was

open with work available to Claimant, but she chose not to return. Her decision to comply with

the COVID-19 order was not good cause attributable to the work or Employer because the

business was open and she clearly had the option to work in Springfield during the period she

claimed unemployment benefits. As a result, the Commission did not err in its determination

that she left voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or Employer. See Vaughn v.

Missouri CVS Pharmacy, LLC, 635 S.W.3d 378, 383 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021). Point one is denied.

CONCLUSION

The Commission’s decision is affirmed.

______________________________ Lisa P. Page, Presiding Judge

Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., Judge and Angela T. Quigless, Judge concur.

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Related

Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp.
271 S.W.3d 594 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2008)
Darr v. Roberts Marketing Group, LLC
428 S.W.3d 717 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 2014)

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