USCA4 Appeal: 25-1526 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/07/2026 Pg: 1 of 16
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1526
SHANNON MULLEN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF SUNSET BEACH, NORTH CAROLINA,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
ISAAC KRAMMES, in his individual capacity,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (7:23-cv-00117-FL-KS)
Argued: January 28, 2026 Decided: May 7, 2026
Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Keenan wrote the opinion, in which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Wynn concur. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1526 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/07/2026 Pg: 2 of 16
ARGUED: Raymond Curtis Tarlton, TARLTON LAW PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Norwood Pitt Blanchard, III, CROSSLEY MCINTOSH COLLIER HANLEY & EDES PLLC, Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Catherine E. Edwards, EDWARDS BEIGHTOL, LLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. G. Grady Richardson, Jr., Susan Groves Renton, LAW OFFICES OF G. GRADY RICHARDSON, JR., P.C., Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellee.
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BARBARA MILANO KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
Shannon Mullen filed this action against the Town of Sunset Beach, North Carolina
(Sunset Beach), asserting claims of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on allegations of sexual
assault committed by a Sunset Beach police officer. The district court awarded summary
judgment to Sunset Beach concluding that, as a matter of law, Mullen’s injuries did not
result from the Sunset Beach police department’s failure to adopt policies prohibiting the
officer’s conduct or from the department’s failure to train and supervise its officers. The
district court also awarded summary judgment to Sunset Beach on Mullen’s claims for
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention under North Carolina law.
Based on our review, we agree with the district court’s judgment. After construing
the evidence in Mullen’s favor, we hold that the district court correctly concluded that
Mullen failed to show that Sunset Beach was deliberately indifferent to her constitutional
rights and, so, failed to establish a claim for municipal liability under Section 1983. On
the record before us, no jury could reasonably conclude that Sunset Beach knew that there
was a substantial risk that one of its officers would commit a sexual assault. Therefore,
any omission in the department’s policies or its training and supervision could not have
caused Mullen’s asserted injuries. Additionally, we agree with the district court that
Mullen’s state law claims fail for lack of supporting evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the
court’s award of summary judgment to Sunset Beach.
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I.
Kenneth Klamar (Chief Klamar) began serving as Chief of Police for the Sunset
Beach police department (the department) in 2017. In 2019, Isaac Krammes applied for a
position as an officer with the department after completing the “North Carolina Basic Law
Enforcement Training” (BLET) program.
Sunset Beach’s police department conducted a pre-employment investigation of
Krammes. As part of this investigation, personnel contacted Krammes’ former employers
and military supervisors. The only negative response in the record included one prior
employer’s statement that Krammes’ “temperament needs to be closely monitored.” J.A.
773. When asked to clarify this remark, the employer did not provide any specific
information.
Police department personnel also conducted a “social media check” and required
Krammes to submit to medical and drug screenings and a psychological examination. The
psychological exam, which included both an interview and personality testing, identified
Krammes as “suitable” for employment, but noted that he had a “high risk” for “integrity
problems” and had been unfaithful to his first wife.
Krammes also was subjected to a “computerized voice stress analysis” (CVSA)
examination. The CVSA report indicated “no deception,” and the examiner noted that
Krammes was a “good hire.” J.A. 752. However, the report also noted: (1) Krammes
initially had failed a few sections of the BLET final exam; (2) another law enforcement
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jurisdiction had declined to hire Krammes after a polygraph examination; 1 and (3)
Krammes’ ex-wife had filed a domestic violence complaint against him in 2017, which
complaint was later dismissed. After Krammes obtained a final certification from the state
training standards commission, Chief Klamar hired Krammes as a patrol officer beginning
in October 2019.
Krammes first encountered plaintiff Shannon Mullen in early 2020, when he
executed a traffic stop on the car Mullen was driving. During that stop, Krammes learned
Mullen was driving without a valid license. Mullen alleged that after the stop, between
March and June 2020, Krammes visited and entered her home about four times while on
duty. Mullen reported that during these visits, Krammes exposed himself and pressured
her to engage in sex acts. According to Mullen, she had sexual intercourse with Krammes
at least once in exchange for leniency regarding her driving violations.
In October 2020, department officers executed a drug-related search at Mullen’s
residence. During the search, Assistant Chief Joe Smith observed that Mullen was visibly
upset by Krammes’ presence. Mullen stated to Krammes, “Oh, I got stuff on you.” J.A.
350. Krammes later asked Assistant Chief Smith whether Mullen had told him anything.
When Smith said that she had, Krammes responded that “none of it was true.” J.A. 351.
1 The polygraph examination report is not in the record, nor is there any record evidence that Krammes had “failed” the examination.
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Less than two months later, in December 2020, Krammes resigned from his position with
the department.
During Krammes’ employment, the department did not receive any complaints or
allegations against him. However, his employment record showed that Krammes was
disciplined for speeding, for failing to complete reports, and for making inappropriate jokes
and slurs, including harassing a female employee about her weight. More than a year after
Krammes’ resignation, in February 2022, Mullen first reported to department officials that
she and Krammes had engaged in sex acts in 2020 while Krammes was on duty, and that
such conduct was coerced and not consensual. After receiving this report, Chief Klamar
and another officer investigated the matter and interviewed Mullen about her allegations.
Mullen later filed the present complaint against Sunset Beach, alleging two claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
arising from Krammes’ conduct. 2 In particular, Mullen alleged that Sunset Beach was
subject to municipal liability for (1) unconstitutional policies and customs, and (2) failure
to train and supervise its officers. Mullen also asserted state law claims against Sunset
Beach for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
The parties proceeded to engage in discovery. In Krammes’ deposition, he
acknowledged that “it’s against policy” to engage in sexual activity while on duty, and he
2 In her complaint, Mullen also alleged claims against Krammes individually, but the parties entered into a settlement agreement and the district court dismissed the case against Krammes. 6 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1526 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/07/2026 Pg: 7 of 16
admitted to violating this policy. Krammes additionally stated that he had not received any
training on sexual misconduct while employed with the department.
The parties agree that the department did not have a particular written policy
regarding sexual misconduct. Nevertheless, the department had a general rule requiring
officers to be attentive and alert while on duty and to not act in a manner that “brings the
department into disrepute or reflects discredit upon the employee.” J.A. 666.
According to evidence in the record, Chief Klamar was aware that three other Sunset
Beach police officers had engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct while on duty in 2017
before Officer Krammes began working for the department in 2019. The first officer
admitted to having consensual sexual relations with his wife while he was on duty. Chief
Klamar recommended that the officer be terminated based on this conduct, but the officer
later was permitted to resign.
A second officer resigned his position after department officials learned that he had
engaged in a consensual sexual encounter while on duty. There are no other details in the
record about this incident.
Finally, a third officer engaged in sexual relations with a citizen while the officer
was on duty. The officer had been talking with a woman alongside her car and, after she
drove away, later stopped her for failing to use her car’s headlights. After the traffic stop,
the officer sent the woman a text message asking to meet her in a remote area. She
complied, and she later reported to Chief Klamar that she had engaged in consensual sexual
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relations with the officer. Although Chief Klamar recommended that the officer be
terminated, the officer was permitted to resign. 3
After completing discovery, Sunset Beach moved for summary judgment, which
motion the district court granted. On appeal, Mullen asserts that the district court erred in
awarding judgment to Sunset Beach on her claims of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and on her North Carolina state law claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention. We address these issues in turn.
II.
A party is entitled to summary judgment when there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). In reviewing an award of summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard and
construe “all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Tekmen v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 55 F.4th 951, 958 (4th Cir.
2022) (citation omitted).
A.
3 There was a fourth officer who was terminated from the department in 2013 for reasons other than sexual misconduct. Because he was later accused of sexual assault for conduct that occurred after his employment had ended, this incident is not relevant to the present case. 8 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1526 Doc: 49 Filed: 05/07/2026 Pg: 9 of 16
We first address Mullen’s argument that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Sunset Beach on her claims of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Mullen contends that Sunset Beach is liable for injuries she sustained as a result of
Krammes’ sexual assault. She asserts that despite the department’s awareness of prior
incidents of sexual misconduct by officers while on duty, Sunset Beach (1) failed to adopt
any policies prohibiting sexual misconduct by an officer on duty, and (2) failed to
adequately train and supervise its officers to prevent such misconduct. According to
Mullen, Chief Klamar must have been aware of a pattern of sexual misconduct by officers
and nonetheless failed to take action to prevent such misconduct, including Krammes’
assault of Mullen.
Mullen further contends that Chief Klamar should have been aware of the ongoing
nature of Krammes’ misconduct toward Mullen. She maintains that because Officer
Krammes frequently parked his patrol car near Mullen’s residence, which was located near
the police station, Krammes’ misconduct was sufficiently “open and flagrant” to place
Chief Klamar on notice that Mullen’s constitutional rights were likely to be violated. So,
Mullen maintains that a jury reasonably could conclude that Sunset Beach had notice of
Krammes’ and other officers’ misconduct, did “nothing” to address the problem, and that
its failure to revise its policies or to implement adequate training or supervision caused
Mullen’s injuries. We disagree with Mullen’s arguments.
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Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is limited. As explained below, a
municipality is responsible under Section 1983 only for constitutional violations caused by
its own policies or practices, not for the isolated misconduct of individual employees.
Section 1983 provides that any “person” who under color of state law causes the
deprivation of another’s federal constitutional rights is liable to the injured party. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities qualify as “persons” under Section
1983. But municipalities may only be held liable for their own unlawful acts; they are not
vicariously liable for constitutional violations caused by their employees. Owens v. Balt.
City State’s Attys. Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691
and Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011)). A plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct
causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Thus, municipal
liability arises only when the alleged constitutional injury results from an official policy,
custom, or practice attributable to the municipality itself. Id. at 403-04.
Relevant here, municipal liability may arise through an “omission,” such as the
failure to adopt policies preventing unconstitutional conduct, or the failure to adequately
train or supervise employees regarding the impropriety of such conduct. Lytle v. Doyle,
326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003). To succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must show that
the omission “manifests deliberate indifference” on the part of the municipality “to the
rights of citizens.” Id.
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Deliberate indifference is a demanding standard. Owens, 767 F.3d at 402; see also
Est. of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961 F.3d 661, 672 (4th Cir. 2020). It requires proof
that municipal policymakers (1) knew or should have known that their failure to act was
likely to result in constitutional injury, and (2) disregarded that risk. Shaw v. Stroud, 13
F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994); see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89 (1989).
Isolated instances of unconstitutional conduct by municipal employees are insufficient to
establish municipal liability. See Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 230 (4th
Cir. 1984); see Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other
grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam) (rejecting municipal liability
based on “isolated incidents”). Instead, a plaintiff generally must demonstrate a pattern of
“persistent and widespread” similar constitutional violations sufficient to place
policymakers on notice that their failure to adopt appropriate policies or training would
likely result in constitutional injury. Owens, 767 F.3d at 402-03 (citing Spell v. McDaniel,
824 F.2d 1380, 1386-91 (4th Cir. 1987)). However, a plaintiff also can show that training
was inadequate when a situation occurred “with sufficient frequency,” Lytle, 326 F.3d at
474, and the deficient training made “the specific violation almost bound to happen, sooner
or later,” Spell, 824 F.2d at 1390 (quotation omitted); see also Canton, 489 U.S. at 390
n.10 (positing that in certain situations, the need for training can be “so obvious” and its
absence “so likely” to produce a constitutional violation that a failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference).
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The district court held, and we agree, that no facts in the record show that Chief
Klamar or any other individual with policymaking authority knew of a substantial risk that
sexual assaults likely would be committed by Sunset Beach officers while on duty. The
only prior incidents identified by Mullen involved officers engaged in consensual sexual
relations while on duty. 4 Although this conduct violated the department’s rule requiring
officers to be attentive while on duty and plainly was not appropriate, as evidenced by
Chief Klamar’s recommendation that these officers be fired, the prior incidents do not
resemble the allegations of sexual assault and coercion in this case. Because those prior
incidents did not involve coercion or abuse of authority to compel sexual activity, they did
not place department policymakers on notice of a repeated problem of sexual assault that
would require a response by those policymakers. Without evidence of a pattern of prior
similar constitutional violations, Sunset Beach lacked the notice necessary to establish its
deliberate indifference to the protection of citizens’ constitutional rights. See Connick, 563
U.S. at 62.
4 Mullen urges us to conclude that one officer necessarily engaged in coercive sexual conduct because he encountered the woman in a traffic stop while he was on duty and, thus, was in a “position of power” over her. However, even if we assume, without deciding, that Mullen is correct on this point, this one incident of coercive conduct was insufficient to place policymakers on notice of a pattern of constitutionally violative conduct that needed to be addressed, nor would it make the need for sexual misconduct training so obvious that a failure to train demonstrates deliberate indifference. See Connick, 563 U.S. at 61-64.
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We also observe that nothing in the record suggests that Chief Klamar knew or
should have known about Krammes’ misconduct toward Mullen and could have acted to
prevent it. Mullen stated that Krammes visited her home about four times between March
and June 2020. Although Krammes’ patrol car may have been parked near Mullen’s home,
Chief Klamar explained that officers routinely parked in the area near Mullen’s home to
monitor traffic. Further, there was no evidence to suggest that Krammes was engaged in
anything other than police work on those occasions. Both Mullen and Krammes stated in
their deposition testimony that no one in the department knew about Krammes’ sexual
assault and harassment of Mullen.
The record shows that the first time that department officials could have been aware
of Krammes’ unlawful conduct toward Mullen arose several months after that conduct had
ended, during the search of Mullen’s home in October 2020. Krammes resigned two
months later. Accordingly, no facts demonstrate that Chief Klamar or other department
policymakers knew or should have known about Krammes’ unlawful conduct, failed in
their supervision of Krammes, or could have acted to prevent his actions. And because
Sunset Beach lacked notice that any other officer was committing similar sexual assaults,
no reasonable jury could conclude that the department’s policies or its training and
supervision reflected a deliberate indifference to Mullen’s constitutional rights. Therefore,
the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Sunset Beach on Mullen’s
municipal liability claim.
B.
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Mullen next contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of Sunset Beach on her claims of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention under
North Carolina law. Focusing mainly on her negligent hiring claim, Mullen asserts that
she presented evidence that Sunset Beach failed to review or recognize severe “red flags”
appearing in Officer Krammes’ background check, including concerns such as his poor
performance on a prior polygraph examination and an allegation of domestic violence.
Based on this evidence, Mullen argues that a jury reasonably could conclude that Sunset
Beach was negligent in hiring Krammes. We disagree with Mullen’s contentions.
Initially, we observe that although Mullen focuses her state law claims on her
allegation of negligent hiring, she also alleges claims of negligent supervision and
retention. As explained above, however, there were no indications about Krammes’ or
other officers’ conduct that should have caused Chief Klamar or other department officials
to take additional supervisory actions regarding the prevention of sexual assault committed
by officers while on duty. And because Krammes resigned soon after department officials
first had evidence indicating that he may have engaged in misconduct toward Mullen, a
jury could not reasonably conclude that Sunset Beach negligently retained Krammes as an
officer. We therefore turn to consider Mullen’s claim of negligent hiring.
To establish a claim of negligent hiring under North Carolina law, a plaintiff must
show that the employee was incompetent or unfit for the position, that the employer knew
or should have known of that incompetence or unfitness through the exercise of reasonable
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care, and that the employee’s incompetence or unfitness caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 462 (N.C. 1990); see also Keith v. Health-Pro Home Care
Servs., Inc., 873 S.E.2d 567, 576 (N.C. 2022). Critically, the employer must be on notice
of prior conduct or characteristics suggesting a propensity for the same or similar
misconduct that injured the plaintiff. See Medlin, 398 S.E.2d at 462-63. Without such
notice, the employer cannot be held liable for negligence in hiring that employee. Id. So,
generalized concerns about an employee’s character or performance typically are
insufficient to establish liability.
As the district court concluded, nothing in Krammes’ application or background
suggested that he had a prior history of sexual assault before Sunset Beach hired him. At
most, Krammes’ application materials suggested a general concern about his
“temperament,” his past infidelity toward his spouse, and a past allegation of domestic
abuse. 5 With regard to Krammes’ poor performance on a prior polygraph examination, the
record does not include any further information about that exam. Thus, the evidence is
insufficient to show Krammes’ propensity to commit sexual assault. See id. at 463
(explaining that the record lacked evidence that defendants knew or could have known of
the principal’s alleged pedophilic tendencies). Accordingly, the district court correctly
5 We observe that Chief Klamar expressed concern about this domestic abuse charge. However, upon inquiry, he learned that because the charge was dismissed, it did not impact Krammes’ certification under the state training standards.
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determined that department officials could not be held liable for negligent hiring under
North Carolina law.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment in
favor of Sunset Beach on Mullen’s claims of municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
and of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention under North Carolina law. 6
AFFIRMED
6 Because Mullen failed to establish any negligent conduct on the part of Sunset Beach, her additional claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law necessarily also fails. Glenn v. Johnson, 787 S.E.2d 65, 70-72 (N.C. App. 2016) (setting out elements for such a claim and requiring negligent conduct). So, we affirm the district court’s award of summary judgment to Sunset Beach on this claim as well. 16