Shannon, Monterek Demond, Sr. v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 20, 2003
• Docket: 08-02-00027-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Criminal Case Template

COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

MONTEREK DEMOND SHANNON SR., Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

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No. 08-02-00027-CR Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5 of Dallas County, Texas (TC# F-0054539-L)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Monterek Demond Shannon was convicted of assault on a public servant and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. For the assault, the court assessed punishment at confinement for six years and a $1,500 fine. For possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, the court assessed punishment at confinement for ten years and a $2,500 fine. The court also ordered that the sentences of confinement be served consecutively.

This appeal concerns Shannon's conviction for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. Shannon argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that he committed the offense in a drug-free zone. Accordingly, he argues that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence for that offense and by ordering that the sentences for the two offenses run consecutively. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Officers with the Dallas Police Department observed Shannon apparently selling drugs. ⁽¹⁾ When the officers detained him, Shannon had a plastic bag with thirty-five grams of crack cocaine in one hand and $39 in the other hand. He had $2,123 in his pocket.

At trial, the State presented evidence that the offense occurred within 1,000 feet of a playground. Shannon's attorney objected to this evidence as irrelevant. In particular, he argued that the drug offense for which Shannon was indicted could not be enhanced under the drug-free zones statute because it did not occur on a school bus or within 1,000 feet of a school. The judge overruled the objection.

The jury charge contained a special issue, asking the jury whether Shannon "possessed with intent to deliver a controlled substance, to-wit: Cocaine, within 1,000 feet of a playground." Shannon's attorney objected to the special issue, again arguing that enhancement was not authorized under the drug-free zones statute. The judge overruled this objection, and the jury answered the special issue in the affirmative. Based on this affirmative answer, the judge ordered that Shannon's sentences for the drug offense and the assault run consecutively.

Discussion

In his sole point of error, Shannon argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that the offense was committed in a drug-free zone. When certain offenses are committed in a drug-free zone, punishment for the offenses may be enhanced. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.134 (Vernon Supp. 2003). Accordingly, we must measure the sufficiency of the evidence by the elements of the hypothetically correct jury charge for the enhancement, as defined by statute. Young v. State, 14 S.W.3d 748, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

Shannon asserts that the hypothetically correct jury charge for the enhancement would have required the jury to determine whether the offense occurred on a school bus or within 1,000 feet of a school. Because there is no evidence that Shannon committed the offense in either of these places, he concludes that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the enhancement. Accordingly, he argues that the trial court erred by enhancing his sentence for the drug offense and by ordering that the sentences for the drug and assault offenses run consecutively.

To understand and evaluate Shannon's argument, we must examine the statutes that define the drug offense and create drug-free zones. In construing these statutes, our goal is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The literal text of a statute is generally the only definitive evidence of the Legislature's intent. Id. Therefore, we must ordinarily apply the "plain meaning rule," that is, we must give effect to the statute's plain meaning. Id.

Delivery of a Controlled Substance in Penalty Group 1

Section 481.102 of the Texas Health and Safety Code places cocaine in "Penalty Group 1." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.102(3)(D) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Section 481.112 provides that a person commits an offense if the person knowingly possesses with intent to deliver a controlled substance listed in Penalty Group 1. Id. § 481.112(a). The offense is a first-degree felony if the amount of the controlled substance is four grams or more but less than two hundred grams. Id. § 481.112(d). Because Shannon possessed thirty-five grams of cocaine, he committed a first-degree felony under section 481.112(d).

Drug-Free Zones

Section 481.134 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, entitled "Drug-Free Zones," sets out a system for increasing the punishment for certain offenses committed at or near school property, institutions of higher learning, youth centers, public swimming pools, video arcades, and playgrounds. See id. § 481.134. Subsection (a), which defines some of the terms used in the statute, is not at issue in this case. See id. § 481.134(a).

Subsection (b) provides that an "offense otherwise punishable as a state jail felony under Section 481.112 [and certain other sections] is punishable as a felony of the third degree, and an offense otherwise punishable as a felony of the second degree under any of those sections is punishable as a felony of the first degree," if the offense was committed in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a playground or institution of higher learning or in, on, or within 300 feet of a youth center, public swimming pool, or video arcade. Id.

§ 481.134(b). Under the plain meaning of this subsection, it does not apply to the section 481.112(d) offense at issue in this case, even though the offense was committed within 1,000 feet of a playground. This is so because a section 481.112(d) offense is "otherwise punishable" as a first-degree felony, rather than as a state-jail or second-degree felony.

Subsection (c) provides that the "minimum term of confinement . . . for an offense otherwise punishable under Section 481.112 (d) [and certain other sections] is increased by five years," if the offense was committed in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a school or on a school bus. Id. § 481.134(c). Under the plain meaning of this subsection, it does not apply here, even though it expressly applies to section 481.112(d) offenses. This is so because the offense was not committed in or near a school or on a school bus.

Subsections (d) through (f) provide for enhancement of certain non-first-degree offenses when they are committed in or near a school or on a school bus. Id. § 481.134(d)-(f). Subsection (g) creates an exception to subsection (f). Id. § 481.134(g). These subsections are not at issue in this case.

Finally, subsection (h) provides, "Punishment that is increased for a conviction for an offense listed under this section may not run concurrently with punishment for a conviction under any other criminal statute." Id. § 481.134(h) (emphasis added). Under the plain meaning of this subsection, it does not apply here because none of the foregoing subsections apply. Because none of the subsections of section 481.134 authorize increasing Shannon's punishment, subsection (h) does not authorize the stacking of Shannon's punishment for the drug offense and the assault.

In summary, based on the plain meaning of section 481.134, the trial court had no authority to enhance Shannon's sentence for the drug offense or to order consecutive sentences for that offense and the assault.

Absurd Results

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized an exception to the plain meaning rule. "[W]here application of a statute's plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, we should not apply the language literally." Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785. The court has noted, "When used in the proper manner, this narrow exception to the plain meaning rule does not intrude on the lawmaking powers of the legislative branch, but rather demonstrates respect for that branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way." Id. Instead, we assume that the Legislature intended a just and reasonable result. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(3) (Vernon 1998).

The State argues that enforcing the plain meaning of section 481.134 produces absurd results. This absurdity can be demonstrated by considering the result in a case with the same facts as this case, except that the defendant had less cocaine.

For example, assume a person is found guilty of assault on a public servant and possession with intent to deliver between one and four grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a playground. The drug offense is a second-degree felony. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.112(c). Applying section 481.134(b), this second-degree felony would be punishable as a first-degree felony. Id. § 481.134(b). Moreover, under section 481.134(h), the defendant would have to serve the sentences for the assault and drug offenses consecutively. Id. § 481.134(h).

Now compare that result with the result in this case. Shannon, who possessed thirty-five grams of cocaine, is guilty of a first-degree felony. The plain language of section 481.134 does not authorize enhancing his punishment for that offense, nor does it authorize consecutive sentences for the drug offense and the assault. The absurdity is apparent: the person dealing more cocaine fares better than the person dealing less cocaine.

We agree with the State that the plain language of section 481.134 produces an absurd and unjust result. We must now determine how the statute should apply in this case.

Application of the Drug-Free Zones Statute to This Case

Shannon argues that in addition to ordering that his sentences run consecutively, the trial judge increased his sentence for the drug offense by five years under section 481.134(c). The record does not support this contention. When Shannon's attorney first objected to evidence regarding the playground, the prosecutor conceded, "We can't apply subsection (b)" and "[w]e can't deal with (c)," and "[w]e only can apply (h)." The prosecutor concluded, "So we are not asking to increase the single offense by five, we are asking that the sentences for the additional sentences cannot run concurrently [sic]." During his closing argument on punishment, the prosecutor noted that the drug offense was a first-degree felony, punishable by five to ninety-nine years' confinement. He did not suggest that the minimum punishment should be enhanced under section 481.134(c). He only argued that Shannon's sentences should run consecutively under section 481.134(h).

We conclude that the judge did not increase Shannon's sentence by five years under section 481.134(c). ⁽²⁾ But he did rely on section 481.134(h) in ordering that the sentences for the two offenses run consecutively. He did not err in doing so. Because we assume the Legislature could not have intended the absurd and unjust result discussed above, the trial judge correctly ordered that Shannon's sentences run consecutively. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.021(3); Boykin, 818 S.W.2d at 785.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

SUSAN LARSEN, Justice

February 20, 2003

Before Panel No. 4

Barajas, C.J., Larsen, and McClure, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

1. Shannon ran when the officers tried to detain him. One of the officers eventually tackled him to the ground. During a struggle, Shannon bit the officer. This formed the basis for Shannon's conviction for assault on a public servant. Today we affirm that conviction in a separate opinion.

See Shannon v. State, No. 08-02-00028-CR (Tex. App.--El Paso February 20, 2003, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication).

2. Because the trial judge did not apply section 481.134(c) here, we need not decide whether it is absurd for the statute to require enhancement for first-degree drug offenses that are committed on a school bus or within 1,000 feet of a school, but not for first-degree drug offenses that are committed in other drug-free zones. We note, however, that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that the Legislature intended to treat offenses that occur at or near a school or school property differently from offenses that occur in other drug-free zones.

See Young, 14 S.W.3d at 752-53.