Shannon, Gee Yue Wang v. Tien-Sheui, Wang

Opinion

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2025-1444

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KAREN W. SHANNON, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Gee Yue Wang, a/k/a George Wang,

Appellant,

v.

MI TIEN-SHEUI, a/k/a GRACE WANG,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County. Donna M. Keim, Judge.

September 9, 2026

BILBREY, J.

Karen W. Shannon, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of her late father George Wang, appeals the amended final judgment and final judgment granting supplemental relief entered against the Estate and in favor of her mother Grace Wang. We affirm without further discussion the trial court’s ruling that it had subject matter jurisdiction to consider the declaratory judgment brought by Grace as a separate action outside of the probate of the Estate. See Swenszkowski v. Compton, 662 So. 2d 722, 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“Because

[plaintiff] is not making a claim or demand against the decedent's estate that arose before her death, and because the action cannot be deemed a liability of the decedent. . . the claim is not subject to the probate code’s statutes of nonclaim.”).

However, we reverse the trial court’s ruling in the declaratory judgment action that granted summary judgment for Grace and its final judgment thereafter granting supplemental relief. In the summary judgment, the trial court determined that upon George’s death Grace inherited the right to collect rent from a ground lease because it was held as tenants by the entireties with George. Disputed issues of fact as to whether a tenancy by the entireties was created require us to remand this issue for fact-finding.

Background

George and Grace were immigrants from China during the 1960s. They married in the United States and remained married until George died in 2020. Through hard work they created an American success story. As the trial court stated,

Starting in the mid-1970s, the Wangs’ primary business was owning and operating hotels for approximately 45 years and they owned no less than ten franchise hotels in Florida and Georgia at one time or another during this period. They also owned and operated restaurants at various times (e.g. Dairy Queen, Country Kitchen, and Rocky’s Ribs). Grace Wang operated the hotels and restaurants on a day-to-day basis and George Wang dealt with the taxes, legal transactions, legal contracts, and professional service providers such as lawyers and accountants. Grace Wang was not paid as a typical employee but was compensated jointly with George Wang through the success of the businesses. Neither Grace nor George Wang had any independent source of wealth, and the profits from their businesses were the only money they had to invest in their ongoing business and real estate investments. They acquired their business and real estate assets in both of their names on occasion and in George Wang’s name only on occasion.

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In 1981, George acquired the four-acre plot of land in Gainesville that is now subject to the ground lease at issue. He was the only grantee listed on the warranty deed to the land and remained sole owner until his death. 1 In 2000, George and Grace entered into a sixty-year ground lease on the land with a third- party. The “Landlord” named in the ground lease was “George Wang and Grace Wang, Husband and Wife.” The ground lease directed that rent was to be paid to “George and Grace Wang” but mailed to George’s attention. George and Grace both signed the lease as landlord. The lease was eventually assigned to Walgreens as the tenant. The monthly rent received from Walgreens was deposited into a bank account in George and Grace’s name.

After George died, Grace filed a declaratory judgment action against the Estate. In the only count at issue on appeal, Grace claimed that she was a party to the ground lease and that she and George held the right to receive rents from the lease as tenants by the entireties. Grace further claimed that upon George’s death sole ownership of the rents due under the lease passed to her by operation of law. She claimed that the Estate had no right to any rent under the ground lease.

After litigation, Grace and the Estate filed competing motions for summary judgment on the issue of ownership of the ground lease. Grace filed an affidavit in support of her claim that a tenancy by the entireties existed in the right to receive rents under the ground lease. She noted that marital assets were used to purchase the land subject to the lease at issue. She further stated in the affidavit that she and George believed that she was beneficial owner of the land and that she and George believed that she was co-owner of the ground lease.

The Estate argued that Grace did not own the land at issue, so she was unable to be a landlord of that land and lease it. The Estate noted that in the ground lease, the landlord “covenants, represents and warrants” that it has fee simple title to the land.

1 In pleadings before the trial court, Grace claimed that the

land was also now hers as entireties property. The trial court dismissed that count of the declaratory action, and Grace did not cross appeal that dismissal.

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But Grace was never made a fee simple owner of the land. The Estate argued that the right to receive rent belonged to the owner of the land in fee, which in this case was solely George.

In opposition to Grace’s motion for summary judgment, the Estate also pointed out that George made a will in 2015. In that will George provided that if Grace did not survive him all “right title, income and interest” to the land subject to the ground lease was specifically devised to Karen. If Grace did survive George, then the will established a trust with Grace as the beneficiary of the income from the residuary property, which included the leased property. In that event, upon Grace’s death then all “right, title, income and interest” to the leased property was specifically devised to Karen.

The Estate argued that the six unities needed to create a tenancy by the entireties were lacking. Especially important, according to the Estate, there was no showing that George intended to grant a right of survivorship to Grace in signing the lease.

After hearing argument, the trial court granted Grace’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Estate’s motion. The trial court found that no disputed issues of fact existed and that as a matter of law Grace had the right to receive rent from the ground lease as the surviving tenant by the entireties. After various motions, the trial court then entered an amended final judgment and final judgment granting supplemental relief that awarded Grace a monetary judgment for rent that Estate had collected from Walgreens. This appeal followed.

Analysis

This court applies de novo review to an order granting summary judgment. Depriest v. Greeson, 213 So. 3d 1022, 1025 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). A trial court should grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as determined by applying the federal standard. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a). In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we must view the evidence and any inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,

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Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Whether a tenancy by the entireties was created is a question of fact. Kowalski v. Rosenbaum, 255 So. 3d 963, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018).

Under a tenancy by the entireties, “[u]pon the death of one spouse, the surviving spouse continues to be seized of the whole. Thus . . . after death of one spouse the surviving spouse continues to hold the entire estate. . . .” Berlin v. Pecora, 968 So. 2d 47, 50 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Cacciatore v. Fisherman’s Wharf Realty Ltd. P’ship, 821 So. 2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). To create a tenancy by the entireties, there must be six unities. Beal Bank, SSB v. Almand & Associates, 780 So. 2d 45, 52–54 (Fla. 2001).

As the Florida Supreme Court explained in Beal Bank:

Property held as a tenancy by the entireties possesses six characteristics: (1) unity of possession (joint ownership and control); (2) unity of interest (the interests in the account must be identical); (3) unity of title (the interests must have originated in the same instrument); (4) unity of time (the interests must have commenced simultaneously); (5) survivorship; and (6) unity of marriage (the parties must be married at the time the property became titled in their joint names).

Id.

The Beal Bank Court then continued:

Although only a married couple is legally entitled to hold property as a tenancy by the entireties, a married couple may also hold property jointly as tenants in common or as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Tenancies in common, joint tenancies, and tenancies by the entireties all share the characteristic of unity of possession; however, tenancies in common do not share the other characteristics or unities. . . . Joint tenancies and tenancies by the entireties share the characteristic of survivorship and three additional unities of interest, title, and time. . . . In other words, for both joint tenancies and tenancies by the entireties, the owners’

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interests in the property must be identical, the interests must have originated in the identical conveyance, and the interests must have commenced simultaneously.

Beal Bank, 780 So. 2d at 52–53. 2

A lease or the right to receive proceeds from a lease can be held as tenants by the entireties. See Rutenberg v. Rutenberg, 334 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). Grace argues that in entering into the lease with Walgreen’s predecessor, George at the same time conveyed a tenancy by the entireties in the lease to Grace. If so, this would be an unusual arrangement. See Cantor v. Palmer, 163 So. 2d 508, 509 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (compiling cases where a wife was granted an interest in a property by the husband by a separate instrument other than the lease with a third-party). But we have been provided no authority to hold that in entering into a lease with a third-party, a spouse could not in that same document convey an interest in the leased property to the other spouse.

Here, however, the Estate provided sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute which could not be resolved on summary judgment. Grace did not own the property, so she could only be entitled to the proceeds from the entire lease if George made her a tenant to the lease with right of survivorship. But nowhere in the lease is a right of survivorship specified. And although there is evidence that George intended to create a right of survivorship by the lease naming “George Wang and Grace Wang, Husband and Wife” as Landlord, “Husband and Wife” are omitted in directing

2 Beal Bank has been superseded by statute relating to bank

accounts. See Loumpos v. Bank One, 423 So. 3d 856 (Fla. 2025) (holding the statute addressing bank deposits and accounts in two or more names, providing that “[a]ny deposit or account made in the name of two persons who are husband and wife shall be considered a tenancy by the entirety unless otherwise specified in writing,” authorizes a joint spousal bank account to be held as a tenancy by the entireties even if the account was originally established by one spouse citing § 655.79(1) Fla. Stat.). That statute is irrelevant to the property at interest here.

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that rent was to be paid to “George and Grace Wang,” making his intent uncertain.

That George made bequests involving both the land and the lease, which would be unnecessary if Grace had a right of survivorship in the lease, is further evidence that he did not intend to convey a right of survivorship to Grace in making the lease. Disputed issues of fact exist that could not be resolved on a motion for summary judgment. See Norman v. Bank of Hawthorne, 321 So. 2d 112, 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (holding that disputed issues of material fact meant that it was error to grant summary judgment determining whether a tenancy by the entireties was created); see also Hurlbert v. Shackleton, 560 So. 2d 1276, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“[U]nless a tenancy by the entireties is clearly expressed in the instrument, the parties must prove they intended to create a tenancy by the entireties.”).

Conclusion

We therefore reverse the trial court’s final judgment declaring Grace to be owner of any rents due under the ground lease. We further reverse the trial court’s grant of supplemental relief to Grace in the form of rents received by the Estate. We remand for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.

M.K. THOMAS and LONG, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

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John S. Mills and Jonathan A. Martin of The Mills Firm, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Charles H. Hardage and Seldon J. Childers of Childers Law, LLC, Gainesville, for Appellee.