Shannon Driver v. Paradise Valley Unified School District, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: July 6, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02412
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Shannon Driver, No. CV-25-02412-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Paradise Valley Unified School District, et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 On September 3, 2025, Paradise Valley United School District Defendants (“School 16 District Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss attacking the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s 17 federal claims and seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 (Doc. 10). 18 The Motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 12 & 13). Two other Motions pending on the docket 19 are also fully briefed. The first is a “Motion to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint 20 and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction” filed by Individual Defendants 21 Corey Newland (“Newland”) and Jane Doe Newland, Dana Zupke (“Zupke”) and Jane Doe 22 Zupke, David Abrams (“Abrams”) and Jane Doe Abrams, Dr. Chad Smith (“Smith”) and 23 Jane Doe Smith, Matthew Hanshaw (“Handshaw”) and Jane Doe Hanshaw, and Patrick 24 1 Defendants do not clarify in their Motion to Dismiss which Defendants constitute the 25 moving “School District Defendants.” The counsel of record that filed the Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the School District Defendants represents Paradise Valley United 26 School District, David Franklin, Kerwin Franklin, Chad Smith, Unknown Smith, Hurley, Unknown Hurley, Corri Lacombe, Unknown Lacombe, David Abrams, Unknown Abrams, 27 Dana Zupke, Matthew Hanshaw, Unknown Hanshaw, Corey Newland, and Unknown Newland. The Court will thus construe these Defendants to be the School District 28 Defendants. Defendant Erin Maloney has her own representation and will not be considered a part of the School District Defendants for purposes of this Motion. 1 Hurley (“Hurley”) and Jane Doe Hurley (collectively, “Individual School District 2 Defendants”). (Doc. 41). Defendant Erin Maloney (“Maloney”) has also filed a Motion 3 to Quash Service of Summons and Complaint and to Dismiss for Lack of Personal 4 Jurisdiction. (Doc. 43). 5 I. Background 6 Driver alleges that her son, ED, still a minor, was assaulted in a locker room before 7 football practice. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 27–28). She says that one boy pinned her son to the wall, 8 and another punched him in the head. (Id. at ¶ 28). According to Driver, the blame does 9 not end with her son’s alleged assailants. After the assault, she says her son sought help 10 from a revolving door of adults—all of whom failed him. First, he spoke to his coach, 11 Hanshaw, about what happened . (Id. at ¶ 29). Then, he spoke to the athletic trainer, 12 Maloney, who examined him for a concussion. (Id. at ¶ 30). Maloney called Driver to 13 take ED home and provided an information packet about concussions. (Id.) While ED 14 waited for Driver, he also told Zupke, another coach and physical education teacher, about 15 the incident. (Id. at ¶ 31). Driver says she then emailed Lacombe and Dr. Chad Smith, the 16 Dean of Students and Principal respectively, about what happened to ED. (Id. at ¶ 33). 17 About five days later, after no response to her original email, Driver sent another email 18 about the incident, this time to Athletic Directors Abrams and Newland. (Id. at ¶ 36). She 19 also says that she reported the incident to the Phoenix Police Department. (Id. at ¶ 38). 20 Unhappy with the lack of investigation by the school into the incident, on July 10, 21 2025, Driver brought a ten-count Complaint against Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 51–113). 22 Plaintiff avers that all Individual Defendants were served on July 31, 2025. (See Docs. 16– 23 28). On September 10, 2025, School District Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s 24 entire Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff fails to 25 sufficiently allege any federal claims against them. Individual School District Defendants 26 subsequently filed a second Motion to Dismiss for insufficient service on November 6, 27 2025. (Doc. 41). Maloney’s Motion to Dismiss for insufficient service was filed on 28 November 12, 2025. (Doc. 43). 1 The Court’s rulings on these Motions and the reasoning follows. 2 II. Motions to Dismiss for Insufficient Service 3 The Court denies the School District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for insufficient 4 service as untimely and waived. The Court will grant Maloney’s request to quash service 5 as to her but allow Plaintiff a short extension of time to effectuate proper service upon her. 6 Courts generally cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has not 7 been properly served with (or waived process of) service. Under Federal Rules of Civil 8 Procedure 12(b)(4) and (5), a court may dismiss a suit or claim for insufficient process and 9 insufficient service of process, respectively. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(4), (5). “Once service is 10 challenged, [Plaintiff] bear[s] the burden of establishing that service was valid.” 11 Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2004). Rule 12(b)(4) was designed to 12 “challenge irregularities in the contents of the summons.” Chilicky v. Schweiker, 796 F.2d 13 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds by 487 U.S. 412 (1988). A Rule 14 12(b)(5) motion is used to challenge the mode of delivery or lack of delivery of the 15 summons and complaint. See, e.g., Crane v. Battelle, 127 F.R.D. 174,177 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 16 4, 1989). Notably, 17 Rule 12 promotes the early presentation of preliminary defenses. Rule 12(g) requires that a party who raises a defense through a pre-answer motion raise 18 all such possible defenses in a single motion; omitted defenses cannot be 19 raised in a second, pre-answer motion. Rule 12(h) imposes an even higher burden with respect to the failure to raise certain specific defenses, including 20 insufficiency of process, and insufficiency of service of process. If a party 21 files a pre-answer motion, but does not raise one of the defenses listed in Rule 12(h), that party waives the omitted defense and cannot subsequently 22 raise it in his answer or otherwise. 23 Sunnergren v. Ahern, 2010 WL 4366189, n.1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) citing Chilicky v. 24 Schweiker, 796 F.2d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 1986), reversed on other grounds, 487 U.S. 412 25 (1988). 26 Although neither party specifies which subsection of Rule 4 they are moving under, 27 both Individual School District Defendants and Malony object to the manner in which they 28 were served. They claim that Plaintiff’s certificates of service all state that service of the 1 Complaint and Summons was “receive by Corri Lacombe,” who represented “she was 2 authorized to accept service. . . as she is the dean of students.” (Docs. 16–28). Defendants 3 attach a declaration from Lacombe contesting this representation and clarifying that she 4 did not and has never had authority to accept service for the individual Defendants. 5 (Doc. 42 at 2). Plaintiff responds by pointing to the process server’s affidavit of service, 6 which indicates that Lacombe stated she was authorized to accept service on behalf of the 7 Individual Defendants. (Docs. 44 & 45). Plaintiff says if Ms. Lacombe was mistaken, that 8 is not the process server’s fault and good cause exists under these circumstances to extend 9 the time to serve these Defendants. 10 The Court will deny the Individual School District Defendants’ Motion to Quash. 11 (Doc. 41). These Defendants raised a defective service defense for the first time in their 12 November 6, 2025, Motion to Quash, which was filed two months after School District 13 Defendants (a group of which they were included), had already filed a Motion to Dismiss. 14 Nowhere in the Motion to Dismiss is there a protest to the way Driver served these 15 Individual Defendants. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) requires that all defenses be 16 raised in a single pre-answer motion and any defense not raised is considered waived. Id. 17 Having failed to timely raise this defense, and presumedly on fair notice of the lawsuit 18 when they filed their Motion to Dismiss, School District Defendants, including Individual 19 School District Defendants, have waived their opportunity to contest service. Individual 20 School District Defendants’ Motion to Quash service is properly denied. 21 A different result ensues, however, for Maloney. Maloney’s challenge to defective 22 service in her Motion to Dismiss is the first time Maloney has filed a pre-answer motion in 23 this lawsuit. Plaintiff states that the process server was under the mistaken impression that 24 he properly served Maloney when Lacombe represented that she was authorized to accept 25 service on Maloney’s behalf. (Doc. 45-1 at 1–3; Doc. 44-1). But if Lacombe was not 26 authorized to accept service on Maloney’s behalf, then service was not proper and shall be 27 quashed. See Iknadosian v. Mahon, 2014 WL 2548975, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (“A 28 person may act as an authorized agent to accept service of process only if they are actually 1 appointed by another person to do so.”) (internal quotations omitted). The Court will credit 2 Lacombe’s affidavit that she was not authorized to accept service and quash the certificate 3 as to Maloney. 4 When service of process is insufficient, the Court is faced with two choices. 5 O’Haire v. Napa State Hosp., 2010 WL 1223197, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2010). The 6 Court can either dismiss the action or quash service and retain the case. Id. Quashing 7 service is appropriate in cases where there is a reasonable prospect that plaintiff will be 8 able to execute service properly. Id. Because there appears to be a reasonable prospect 9 that Plaintiff will serve Maloney properly, the Court will quash service of process on 10 Maloney and allow Plaintiff a short extension of time to execute service upon her. Plaintiff 11 shall provide the Court with proof of service of the Summons and Complaint on Maloney 12 within 30 days of this Order or show cause why Maloney should not be dismissed from 13 this lawsuit. 14 III. School District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 15 To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the 16 plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain 18 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 19 face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). 20 “[A]ll well-pleaded allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in a light 21 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Wyler Summit Partnership v. Turner Broad. Sys. 22 Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir.1998). “[T]he court [is not] required to accept as true 23 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 24 inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 25 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 26 statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. “[A] formulaic recitation of the 27 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 28 However, “[a] dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only where it 1 appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle it to 2 relief.” Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1999). Also, in evaluating a motion 3 to dismiss, a district court need not limit itself to the allegations in the complaint; but may 4 take into account any “facts that are [ ] alleged on the face of the complaint [and] contained 5 in documents attached to the complaint.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 6 2005). 7 School District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted on all counts because 8 the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted on 9 all four claims. 10 A. Section 1983: Fourteenth Amendment 11 School District Defendants argue that Driver attempts to disguise a simple tort 12 action as a constitutional claim. (Doc. 10 at 3). By repeating the circumstances of an 13 assault between teenagers, School District Defendants say Driver is trying to mold a 14 negligence claim into a constitutionally rooted action. (Id.) Driver disagrees and says the 15 School District Defendants’ failure to “investigate,” take “corrective action,” and protect 16 ED “from future harm” sufficiently states constitutional violations. (Doc. 12 at 12). As 17 pled, School District Defendants’ alleged failures are not enough for either a substantive 18 or procedural due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The 19 Fourteenth Amendment prevents state actors from depriving individuals of life, liberty or 20 property without due process of law. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 21 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The rule restrains state

22 2 As correctly noted by the School District Defendants, Driver does not specify whether she is bringing a substantive or a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth 23 Amendment on behalf of ED. Even assuming that Driver is bringing a Section 1983 procedural due process claim, Driver has failed to state a claim for which relief can be 24 granted. A Section 1983 procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment requires the following: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) 25 a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process. Buckingham v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep’t of Agr., 603 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2010). The lack of process 26 requirement enshrines a person’s protected right to be given an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” for any infringement on their liberty or 27 property interest. Id. Because Driver has made no meaningful distinction between a substantive or a procedural due process claim and has not adequately or otherwise plead a 28 procedural due process violation, the Court will not consider if Driver’s Section 1983 procedural due process claim is viable. 1 actors from abusing their power or using it as an “instrument of oppression.” Id. What the 2 rule does not do is require state actors to affirmatively keep people safe from the conduct 3 of private parties. Id. at 197. As with most rules, however, there is a significant carveout. 4 The Ninth Circuit has held that state actors can be held liable under the Fourteenth 5 Amendment’s Due Process clause when an individual is in state custody and the state 6 creates the danger, otherwise known as the state-created danger doctrine. To prevail, a 7 plaintiff needs to show the following: (1) a state actor affirmatively created or placed the 8 plaintiff in danger he otherwise would not have faced; (2) the danger was “known or 9 obvious;” and (3) the state actor acted with “deliberate indifference” in the face of the 10 known danger. Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006). For a 11 plaintiff to place their claims firmly within the sanctuary of this rule, the challenged 12 conduct must be affirmative. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 203. A mere failure to act does not 13 trigger the state-created danger theory. Id. 14 Driver has not stated a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. 15 In the Complaint, Driver states that School District Defendants failed to protect ED from 16 the harm that resulted from the attack in the locker room. Driver describes a lack of 17 initiative to investigate the incident and to prevent the incident from happening again in 18 the future. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 43–45). Missing from the Complaint, however, are factual 19 allegations describing how School District Defendants affirmatively placed ED in harm’s 20 way such that the state-created danger doctrine applies. The Ninth Circuit has not 21 recognized a state-created danger theory based only on a “public official’s failure to detect 22 and prevent student-on-student harassment.” Wormuth v. Lammersville Union Sch. Dist., 23 305 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1122 (E.D. Cal. 2018). Nor is there precedent for the doctrine to 24 attach when a school fails to punish students who act as assailants. Id. Therefore, the 25 Court finds that Driver’s Section 1983 substantive due process claim rooted in the 26 Fourteenth Amendment, fails to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 27 B. Monell Liability for Failure to Train 28 School District Defendants state that Driver has failed to allege that a certain policy 1 or custom was instituted by School District Defendants such that Monell liability can attach 2 for a failure to train claim. (Doc. 10 at 8). Driver argues that failure to supervise the locker 3 room during the time of the attack is sufficient to provide a basis for Monell liability. (Doc. 4 12 at 13). At this juncture, the Court finds that Driver’s allegations insufficiently allege a 5 Monell claim against School District Defendants. 6 Failure to train can constitute a basis for Monell liability only where the failure 7 amounts to a deliberate indifference of constitutional rights. Benavidez v. County of San 8 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021). To make out a case for failure to train, a 9 plaintiff must include enough facts to support a reasonable inference of each of the 10 following: (1) a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that amounts to 11 a deliberate indifference of a constitutional right; and (3) that the constitutional injury 12 would not have occurred if the municipality had properly trained its employees.” Id. at 13 1153–54. 14 Driver’s Monell claim fails to allege sufficient facts that can allow the Court to 15 reasonably infer that there was a constitutional violation of a municipal training policy. 16 The Court is hard-pressed to uncover any facts in Driver’s Complaint that identify the 17 training policy at issue or that the non-identified policy amounted to a deliberate 18 indifference of a constitutional right. The sparse facts and allegations that are provided are 19 leveled against individuals. To succeed on a claim premised on failure to train under 20 Monell, Driver needed to assert both that School District Defendants chose a training 21 program inadequate to prevent constitutional violations and was deliberately indifferent to 22 the violations. Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2022). The 23 Complaint offers no facts that, strung together, can amount to a reasonable inference that 24 there was failure to train under Monell by School District Defendants. Notably, a sole 25 incident cannot form the basis of a failure to train claim. Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875. For such 26 a claim to survive, a deficient policy needs to be identified; “an inadequate training policy. 27 . . cannot be inferred from a single incident.”3 Smith v. City of Marina, 709 F. Supp. 3d

28 3 Driver does state that there have been “a series of documented incidents in Maricopa County, some resulting in criminal charges against football players who assaulted other 1 926, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2024) quoting Hyde, 23 F.4th at 875. Because Driver has failed to 2 identify a specific policy that falls within the confines of a failure to train violation, Driver’s 3 failure to train claim under Monell will be dismissed. 4 C. Title IX 5 In few words, Driver also argues that School District Defendants violated Title IX. 6 (Doc. 1 at 24). School District Defendants points out that Title IX is applicable only in 7 instances where sex-based discrimination has occurred. (Doc. 10 at 10). The Court agrees 8 with School District Defendants that, as stated, Driver has not set forth a legally cognizable 9 Title IX claim. 10 At its heart, a Title IX claim can only be based on discrimination due to a person’s 11 sex. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The plain language of the statute requires this result. Id.; see 12 also Parents for Priv. v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1228 (9th Cir. 2020). In other words, a 13 viable claim under Title IX must be sex-based for it to survive. A school that receives 14 federal funding can be liable for student-on-student harassment but only if the following is 15 true: “(1) the school had substantial control over the harasser and the context of the 16 harassment, (2) the plaintiff suffered harassment so severe that it deprived the plaintiff of 17 access to educational opportunities or benefits; (3) a school official who had authority to 18 address the issue and institute corrective measures for the school had actual knowledge of 19 the harassment; and (4) the school acted with deliberate indifference to the harassment such 20 that the indifference subjected the plaintiff to harassment.” Grabowski v. Arizona Bd. of 21 Regents, 69 F.4th 1110, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). 22 Driver’s Title IX claim, as plead, cannot survive a motion to dismiss. For support 23 that School District Defendants committed Title IX violations, Driver alleges that ED was 24 “physically and assaulted by minor Defendants . . . .” (Doc. 1 at 24). What the Complaint 25 lacks is an allegation that the incident between ED and his classmates was motivated by 26 sex. O’Yates v. Pluid, 2025 WL 1616488, at *4 (D. Mont. Feb. 11, 2025), report and 27 football players.” (Doc. 12 at 13) (emphasis added). But Driver makes no mention of 28 incidents specific to School District Defendants, either as to Paradise Valley School District specifically, or the individually named Defendants in this case. 1 recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1305242 (D. Mont. May 6, 2025). Without that 2 allegation, a Title IX claim, something that can only be tied to a sex discrimination charge, 3 fails to state a claim. Therefore, Driver’s Count Three for violation of Title IX will be 4 dismissed. 5 D. Conspiracy under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment 6 On its own, conspiracy is not an independent tort under Section 1983. Lacey v. 7 Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012). In fact, when a claim is found 8 insufficient under Section 1983, a plaintiff is then precluded from using Section 1983 to 9 frame a conspiracy claim. See Dooley v. Reiss, 736 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) 10 (holding that the “absence of an actual deprivation implies that plaintiffs also failed to state 11 a section 1983 claim based on the alleged conspiracy”). Put differently, for there to be a 12 valid Section 1983 conspiracy claim, there must be a valid Section 1983 claim to begin 13 with. 14 Because the Court previously found that Driver had not sufficiently pleaded a 15 Section 1983 claim, the Court also finds that Driver’s conspiracy claim cannot survive. 16 There being no standalone basis for a Section 1983 conspiracy claim, this claim is also 17 dismissed. 18 IV. Leave to Amend 19 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide leave 20 to amend unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. See 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 22 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to 23 ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on [the] part of the movant, repeated failure to 24 cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed undue prejudice to the opposing party 25 . . . [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 26 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962)). Leave to 27 amend may be denied when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts 28 consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber 1 Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). In sum, 2 leave to amend “is properly denied [where] amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City 3 and Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 4 Here, the Court will allow Plaintiff to amend her Complaint because it is not 5 absolutely clear that the dismissed claims cannot be saved by any amendment. See Fed. R. 6 Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 7 2008). Without these federal claims, the Court is not inclined to exercise supplemental 8 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Williamson v. Las Vegas Police 9 Dep’t, 2022 WL 1747940, at *5 (D. Nev. May 27, 2022). But the Court finds Defendants’ 10 request to dismiss the entire matter prejudice at this juncture. Plaintiff’s federal claims will 11 be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. If Plaintiff declines to amend her 12 Complaint, the Court will dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 13 Accordingly, 14 IT IS ORDERED that School District Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 10) is 15 granted. Count One for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation under the Fourteenth Amendment; 16 Count Two for a Monell violation also under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Count Three for a Title IX 17 violation; and lastly Count Four for Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth 18 Amendment are all dismissed. Plaintiff may file an amended pleading within 20 days of 19 this Order. If Plaintiff does not file an amended pleading within 20 days of this Order, 20 the Clerk shall dismiss this matter for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that School District Defendants’ Motion to Quash 22 Summons and Complaint and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 41) is 23 denied. 24 IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Maloney’s Motion to Quash Service of 25 Summons and Complaint and Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 43) is 26 granted in part. The Certificate of Service (Doc. 23) shall be quashed. If Plaintiff files 27 an amended complaint, Driver must serve the Amended Complaint and Summons on 28 Maloney within 21 days of the filing of the Amended Complaint, or show cause to the 1 || Court why Maloney should not be dismissed from this lawsuit. 2 Dated this 6th day of July, 2026. 3

5 norable'Diang4. Hunfetewa 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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