J-A05008-26 2026 PA Super 160
WILLIAM SHANKLIN, ON BEHALF OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF HIMSELF AND THE CERTIFIED CLASS : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellant : : v. : : ESHAI CORPORATION; COURIER : DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, LLC; : ESHAI CORP. (WISCONSIN) D/B/A : COURIER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS; : NAJEEB ESHAI; UTHMAN ESHAI; : RUBINA ESHAI; AND ALI ESHAI No. 1705 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered June 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 190303034
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2026
William Shanklin, on behalf of himself and the certified class, appeals
after the entry of a consent judgment for $1,418,005.00 in his and the class’s
favor. Because a consent judgment is not appealable, we quash.
Mr. Shanklin and the class members worked for Courier Distribution
Systems (“C.D.S.”). In 2019, Mr. Shanklin sued C.D.S. and Eshai Corp. of
Wisconsin under Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”) and Wage
Payment Collection Law (“WPCL”).1 He also sued Najeeb, Rubina, Uthman,
and Ali Eshai, “as officers of Eshai Corp. and as managing members or a
member of” C.D.S., for WPCL violations. Second Amended Complaint at 1-2.
The trial court certified the class of workers. ____________________________________________
1 See 43 P.S. §§ 333.101-333.115; and see also 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-260.13. J-A05008-26
In November 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment to the
members of the Eshai family, because Mr. Shanklin produced no evidence that
they played any wage-policy roles at C.D.S. The trial court also dismissed the
WPCL claim against C.D.S. and Eshai Corp. of Wisconsin, due to lack of a wage
contract between those business entities and the class members. However,
the court refused to grant the businesses summary judgment on the PMWA
claim.
The following January, Mr. Shanklin and the class sought leave to file a
third amended complaint. They hoped to add alter-ego and corporate-veil-
piercing theories to try reaching the Eshai family’s funds. The trial court
denied the motion.
Next, the parties filed joint stipulations and motion for entry of a consent
judgment “subject to the terms and conditions set forth in a written settlement
agreement” they had entered. Stipulations of Counsel at 1. On June 3, 2025,
the parties entered into a consent judgment in favor of Mr. Shanklin and the
class for $1,418,005.00.
On June 26, 2025, Mr. Shanklin and the class filed a notice of appeal
from the “Order entered on February 5, 2024 denying [Mr. Shanklin and the
class’s] Motion to File a Third Amended Complaint . . .” Notice of Appeal at 1.
According to Mr. Shanklin and the class, the February 5, 2024 “Order was
made final and appealable by the entry of a consent judgment on June 4,
2025.” They contend the consent judgment against the business entities was
a final order under Rule of Appellate Procedure 341, because it disposed of all
-2- J-A05008-26
claims and all parties. See Shanklin & Class’s Brief at 1. Mr. Shanklin and
the class cite no precedent to support that contention, and our research
reveals that it is incorrect.
“The question of the appealability of an order goes to the jurisdiction of
the Court reviewing the order.” Prensky v. Talaat, 291 A.3d 25, 29 (Pa.
Super. 2023). See Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139, 141 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc) (indicating that this Court may raise the issue of its own
jurisdiction sua sponte). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate
standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary.” Id.
Mr. Shanklin and the class admit that the parties entered into a consent
judgment. Under Pennsylvania law, judgments, orders, and decrees by the
consent of the parties do not confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court.
“A consent decree [or judgment] is not a legal determination by the
court of the matters in controversy but is merely an agreement between the
parties — a contract binding the parties to the terms thereof.” Lower
Frederick Twp. v. Clemmer, 543 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1988). A “party who
consents to, or acquiesces in, a judgment or order cannot appeal therefrom.”
Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Health, 434
A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. 1981).
Indeed, in Sarsfield v. Sarsfield, 380 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 1977), a
wife brought an action against her husband for alleged non-compliance with
their separation agreement and sought an order of enforcement. Eventually,
the parties entered into a consent order which was entered by the court.
-3- J-A05008-26
Husband appealed, claiming the court erroneously dismissed his preliminary
objections. We held that a “decree entered by consent of the parties is so
conclusive that it will be reviewed only on a showing that an objecting party’s
consent was obtained by fraud or that it was based upon a mutual
mistake.” Id. at 901 (quoting Baran v. Baran, 72 A.2d 623 (Pa. Super.
1950) (emphasis added). In addition, “any move to modify or abrogate the
consent order must be initiated in the court below.” Id.
The non-appealable nature of a consent decree, order, or judgment
stems from the fact that a writ of error (what, today, we call an appeal) did
not lie from a special case stated, i.e., a case where the parties consented to
a general verdict. At common law, a party who wished to preserve the right
to appeal was required to try the case to verdict and “demur to the evidence,”
i.e., challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, “at least if he wishe[d] to put
the objection on record, without which no writ of error [could] be brought, nor
the decision of a court of error [be] obtained.” Henry John Stephen, O N
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS at 114 (1824) (emphasis removed).
However, if the parties wished, they could waive their rights to a writ of
error and, instead, save money and time by consenting to a final and binding
decree from the court of original jurisdiction, sitting en banc. As Stephen
explained:
if the object [of the parties] be merely to obtain the decision of the [trial] court [en banc], and it is not wished to put the legal question on record, in a view [of preserving the issue for] a writ of error, then the more common (because the cheaper and shorter course) is . . . to take a general verdict
-4- J-A05008-26
[i.e., liable or not liable], subject to a special case; that is, to a written statement of all facts of the case, drawn up . . . by the counsel and attorneys on either side under correction of the judge at the nisi prius. The party, for whom the general verdict is so given, is, of course, not entitled to judgment, till the court [en banc] has decided on the special case . . . A special case is not entered on record; and consequently, a writ of error cannot be brought on this decision.
Id. (some emphasis omitted). By “on record,” Stephen meant that there was
no record of a jury trial for an appellate court to review, because the parties
had consented to the facts. Thus, the trial court could not have made an error
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J-A05008-26 2026 PA Super 160
WILLIAM SHANKLIN, ON BEHALF OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF HIMSELF AND THE CERTIFIED CLASS : PENNSYLVANIA : Appellant : : v. : : ESHAI CORPORATION; COURIER : DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS, LLC; : ESHAI CORP. (WISCONSIN) D/B/A : COURIER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS; : NAJEEB ESHAI; UTHMAN ESHAI; : RUBINA ESHAI; AND ALI ESHAI No. 1705 EDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered June 4, 2025 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 190303034
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2026
William Shanklin, on behalf of himself and the certified class, appeals
after the entry of a consent judgment for $1,418,005.00 in his and the class’s
favor. Because a consent judgment is not appealable, we quash.
Mr. Shanklin and the class members worked for Courier Distribution
Systems (“C.D.S.”). In 2019, Mr. Shanklin sued C.D.S. and Eshai Corp. of
Wisconsin under Pennsylvania’s Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”) and Wage
Payment Collection Law (“WPCL”).1 He also sued Najeeb, Rubina, Uthman,
and Ali Eshai, “as officers of Eshai Corp. and as managing members or a
member of” C.D.S., for WPCL violations. Second Amended Complaint at 1-2.
The trial court certified the class of workers. ____________________________________________
1 See 43 P.S. §§ 333.101-333.115; and see also 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-260.13. J-A05008-26
In November 2023, the trial court granted summary judgment to the
members of the Eshai family, because Mr. Shanklin produced no evidence that
they played any wage-policy roles at C.D.S. The trial court also dismissed the
WPCL claim against C.D.S. and Eshai Corp. of Wisconsin, due to lack of a wage
contract between those business entities and the class members. However,
the court refused to grant the businesses summary judgment on the PMWA
claim.
The following January, Mr. Shanklin and the class sought leave to file a
third amended complaint. They hoped to add alter-ego and corporate-veil-
piercing theories to try reaching the Eshai family’s funds. The trial court
denied the motion.
Next, the parties filed joint stipulations and motion for entry of a consent
judgment “subject to the terms and conditions set forth in a written settlement
agreement” they had entered. Stipulations of Counsel at 1. On June 3, 2025,
the parties entered into a consent judgment in favor of Mr. Shanklin and the
class for $1,418,005.00.
On June 26, 2025, Mr. Shanklin and the class filed a notice of appeal
from the “Order entered on February 5, 2024 denying [Mr. Shanklin and the
class’s] Motion to File a Third Amended Complaint . . .” Notice of Appeal at 1.
According to Mr. Shanklin and the class, the February 5, 2024 “Order was
made final and appealable by the entry of a consent judgment on June 4,
2025.” They contend the consent judgment against the business entities was
a final order under Rule of Appellate Procedure 341, because it disposed of all
-2- J-A05008-26
claims and all parties. See Shanklin & Class’s Brief at 1. Mr. Shanklin and
the class cite no precedent to support that contention, and our research
reveals that it is incorrect.
“The question of the appealability of an order goes to the jurisdiction of
the Court reviewing the order.” Prensky v. Talaat, 291 A.3d 25, 29 (Pa.
Super. 2023). See Kapcsos v. Benshoff, 194 A.3d 139, 141 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc) (indicating that this Court may raise the issue of its own
jurisdiction sua sponte). “Jurisdiction is purely a question of law; the appellate
standard of review is de novo, and the scope of review is plenary.” Id.
Mr. Shanklin and the class admit that the parties entered into a consent
judgment. Under Pennsylvania law, judgments, orders, and decrees by the
consent of the parties do not confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court.
“A consent decree [or judgment] is not a legal determination by the
court of the matters in controversy but is merely an agreement between the
parties — a contract binding the parties to the terms thereof.” Lower
Frederick Twp. v. Clemmer, 543 A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1988). A “party who
consents to, or acquiesces in, a judgment or order cannot appeal therefrom.”
Brown v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Health, 434
A.2d 1179, 1181 (Pa. 1981).
Indeed, in Sarsfield v. Sarsfield, 380 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 1977), a
wife brought an action against her husband for alleged non-compliance with
their separation agreement and sought an order of enforcement. Eventually,
the parties entered into a consent order which was entered by the court.
-3- J-A05008-26
Husband appealed, claiming the court erroneously dismissed his preliminary
objections. We held that a “decree entered by consent of the parties is so
conclusive that it will be reviewed only on a showing that an objecting party’s
consent was obtained by fraud or that it was based upon a mutual
mistake.” Id. at 901 (quoting Baran v. Baran, 72 A.2d 623 (Pa. Super.
1950) (emphasis added). In addition, “any move to modify or abrogate the
consent order must be initiated in the court below.” Id.
The non-appealable nature of a consent decree, order, or judgment
stems from the fact that a writ of error (what, today, we call an appeal) did
not lie from a special case stated, i.e., a case where the parties consented to
a general verdict. At common law, a party who wished to preserve the right
to appeal was required to try the case to verdict and “demur to the evidence,”
i.e., challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, “at least if he wishe[d] to put
the objection on record, without which no writ of error [could] be brought, nor
the decision of a court of error [be] obtained.” Henry John Stephen, O N
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS at 114 (1824) (emphasis removed).
However, if the parties wished, they could waive their rights to a writ of
error and, instead, save money and time by consenting to a final and binding
decree from the court of original jurisdiction, sitting en banc. As Stephen
explained:
if the object [of the parties] be merely to obtain the decision of the [trial] court [en banc], and it is not wished to put the legal question on record, in a view [of preserving the issue for] a writ of error, then the more common (because the cheaper and shorter course) is . . . to take a general verdict
-4- J-A05008-26
[i.e., liable or not liable], subject to a special case; that is, to a written statement of all facts of the case, drawn up . . . by the counsel and attorneys on either side under correction of the judge at the nisi prius. The party, for whom the general verdict is so given, is, of course, not entitled to judgment, till the court [en banc] has decided on the special case . . . A special case is not entered on record; and consequently, a writ of error cannot be brought on this decision.
Id. (some emphasis omitted). By “on record,” Stephen meant that there was
no record of a jury trial for an appellate court to review, because the parties
had consented to the facts. Thus, the trial court could not have made an error
that affected the verdict.
In this Commonwealth, we relaxed the prohibition against appeals from
a special case stated, but only if the parties expressly agreed to preserve their
appellate rights after the trial court en banc entered judgment. For example,
where the parties had “referred by consent to an auditor, to report the sum
due . . . to the plaintiff, and . . . upon which the court rendered a judgment,”
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that “such judgment is not the
subject of a writ of error, unless the parties had agreed it should be.” Wilson
v. Commonwealth, 3 Pen. & W. 531, 1832 WL 3125, at *1 (Pa. 1832)
(emphasis added). In other words, parties could expressly reserve the right
to appeal from a case stated (what, today, we call a consent decree, order, or
judgment), if they wished to preserve a right to appeal from the judgment
entered upon the case stated. However, if the parties neglected to reserve
their right to appeal from the consent judgment, the subsequent appeal was
-5- J-A05008-26
“quashed, because the right thereto was not reserved in the agreement.”
Pinkney v. Erie Railroad Co., 109 A. 700 (Pa. 1920).
The ancient common-law procedure of not allowing appeals following
consent judgments remains nearly unchanged under our present Rules of
Appellate Procedure. “An appeal from a consent order [or judgment] is
permitted only if (1) the consent order explicitly permits it, or (2) the record
reveals the parties anticipated appeal.” Prensky, 291 A.3d at 30 (emphasis
added) (citing Laird v. Clearfield & Mahoning Railway Co., 916 A.2d 1091
(Pa. 2007)).
Here, Mr. Shanklin and the class make no contention that either of the
Prensky exceptions applies. Instead, Mr. Shanklin and the class rely upon
Rule 341, governing final orders. Their reliance is misplaced. A consent
judgment, decree, or order is not a “final order,” because it is not an order at
all. “A consent decree is not a legal determination by the court of the matters
in controversy but is merely an agreement between the parties . . . .” Lower
Frederick Twp., 543 A.2d at 510. Since the founding of Pennsylvania, our
courts have never permitted appeals from consent decrees, orders, or
judgments, entered upon a case stated, unless the parties expressly reserved
the right to appeal in the trial court or clearly anticipated that an appeal would
follow. See Laird, supra.
Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over Mr. Shanklin and the class’s appeal.
Appeal quashed.
Judge Sullivan joins. Judge Nichols concurs in result.
-6- J-A05008-26
Date: 7/28/2026
-7-