Shankar v. Microsoft Corporation

W.D. Washington

Shankar v. Microsoft Corporation

DecidedApril 3, 2024

Docket2:24-cv-00308

StatusUnknown

This text of Shankar v. Microsoft Corporation (Shankar v. Microsoft Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Shankar v. Microsoft Corporation, (W.D. Wash. 2024).

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Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 RAGHAVENDRAN SHANKAR, CASE NO. C24-0308-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 MICROSOFT CORPORATION, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel and motion 16 to seal (Dkt. Nos. 8, 11). Having duly considered the relevant record, the Court hereby DENIES 17 the motion to appoint counsel and GRANTS the motion to seal for the reasons described below. 18 The appointment of counsel for a pro se litigant in a civil case “is a privilege and not a 19 right.” United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965). A court may 20 appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)1 but should do so 21 “only in exceptional circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). 22 When determining whether exceptional circumstances justify the appointment of counsel, the

23 1 Although courts often refer to motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) as motions to appoint 24 counsel, the statute does not actually authorize the Court to force a lawyer to take a case. Nor does the Court have staff attorneys standing by to represent pro se litigants. Instead, the Court 25 may only “request” that an attorney represent an indigent litigant. Id. § 1915(e); see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307 (1989) (holding that § 1915(e) authorizes 26 “courts to ask but not compel lawyers to represent indigent litigants”). 1 Court considers “the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to 2 articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. 3 Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 4 (9th Cir. 1983)). Moreover, it is within the Court’s discretion “to deny the motion when [a party 5 is] unable, or unwilling, to verify their poverty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 6 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960)). 7 Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence verifying his indigence. Indeed, the 8 Honorable S. Kate Vaughan, United States Magistrate Judge, previously recommended denying 9 Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis for this very reason. (See Dkt. No. 3.) And in 10 doing so, she noted that “[i]n the past twelve months, Plaintiff indicates he has received 11 $100,000 in business or professional income, $5,000 in public assistance, [] $70,000 in income 12 from other sources,” and “between $50,000 and $70,000 in savings.” (Id. at 1.) Accordingly, 13 because Plaintiff appears to have the financial resources to retain counsel, his motion to appoint 14 counsel (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED. 15 Separately, Plaintiff moves to seal several documents, including three complaints and his 16 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5, 9, 10). While the public has a common law 17 right to inspect and copy public records, including those from judicial proceedings, these rights 18 are not absolute. They must yield when (1) sealing a document serves a compelling interest, (2) 19 that is substantially likely to be harmed if the document is not sealed, and (3) there are no less 20 restrictive alternatives for protecting the interest. See United States v. Doe, 870 F.3d 991, 998 21 (9th Cir. 2017). Given the nature of the information contained in the materials at issue, these 22 criteria are met here. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED. The motion 24 to seal (Dkt. No. 11) is GRANTED and the Clerk is DIRECTED to maintain Docket Numbers 1, 25 5, 9, and 10 under seal. 26 // 1 DATED this 3rd day of April 2024. A 2 3 4 John C. Coughenour 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 RAGHAVENDRAN SHANKAR, CASE NO. C24-0308-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 MICROSOFT CORPORATION, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel and motion 16 to seal (Dkt. Nos. 8, 11). Having duly considered the relevant record, the Court hereby DENIES 17 the motion to appoint counsel and GRANTS the motion to seal for the reasons described below. 18 The appointment of counsel for a pro se litigant in a civil case “is a privilege and not a 19 right.” United States ex rel. Gardner v. Madden, 352 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1965). A court may 20 appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)1 but should do so 21 “only in exceptional circumstances.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984). 22 When determining whether exceptional circumstances justify the appointment of counsel, the

23 1 Although courts often refer to motions under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) as motions to appoint 24 counsel, the statute does not actually authorize the Court to force a lawyer to take a case. Nor does the Court have staff attorneys standing by to represent pro se litigants. Instead, the Court 25 may only “request” that an attorney represent an indigent litigant. Id. § 1915(e); see also Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307 (1989) (holding that § 1915(e) authorizes 26 “courts to ask but not compel lawyers to represent indigent litigants”). 1 Court considers “the likelihood of success on the merits and the ability of the petitioner to 2 articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. 3 Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 4 (9th Cir. 1983)). Moreover, it is within the Court’s discretion “to deny the motion when [a party 5 is] unable, or unwilling, to verify their poverty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 6 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960)). 7 Here, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence verifying his indigence. Indeed, the 8 Honorable S. Kate Vaughan, United States Magistrate Judge, previously recommended denying 9 Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis for this very reason. (See Dkt. No. 3.) And in 10 doing so, she noted that “[i]n the past twelve months, Plaintiff indicates he has received 11 $100,000 in business or professional income, $5,000 in public assistance, [] $70,000 in income 12 from other sources,” and “between $50,000 and $70,000 in savings.” (Id. at 1.) Accordingly, 13 because Plaintiff appears to have the financial resources to retain counsel, his motion to appoint 14 counsel (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED. 15 Separately, Plaintiff moves to seal several documents, including three complaints and his 16 motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. Nos. 1, 5, 9, 10). While the public has a common law 17 right to inspect and copy public records, including those from judicial proceedings, these rights 18 are not absolute. They must yield when (1) sealing a document serves a compelling interest, (2) 19 that is substantially likely to be harmed if the document is not sealed, and (3) there are no less 20 restrictive alternatives for protecting the interest. See United States v. Doe, 870 F.3d 991, 998 21 (9th Cir. 2017). Given the nature of the information contained in the materials at issue, these 22 criteria are met here. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel (Dkt. No. 8) is DENIED. The motion 24 to seal (Dkt. No. 11) is GRANTED and the Clerk is DIRECTED to maintain Docket Numbers 1, 25 5, 9, and 10 under seal. 26 // 1 DATED this 3rd day of April 2024. A 2 3 4 John C. Coughenour 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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