Shangraw v. Shangraw

61 A.D.3d 1302, 878 N.Y.S.2d 804
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedApril 30, 2009
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 61 A.D.3d 1302 (Shangraw v. Shangraw) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shangraw v. Shangraw, 61 A.D.3d 1302, 878 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

Peters, J.P.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Chemung County (Hayden, J.), entered August 14, 2008, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 6, to modify a prior order of custody.

In 2006, petitioner (hereinafter the father) and respondent (hereinafter the mother) stipulated to joint legal and shared physical custody of their son (born in 2002). A few months later, the mother started a relationship with a married man, moved into his home and began having a sexual relationship with both her paramour and his wife. The father thereafter commenced this proceeding seeking sole legal and physical custody of the child, alleging that the child had been exposed to the mother’s adult activities and inappropriately disciplined by the paramour, and obtained an order to show cause temporarily granting him this relief. Between the commencement of this proceeding and the hearing on the petition, the mother relocated twice, first to South Dakota and then to Texas. At trial, the mother did not contest the father’s request for sole physical custody, but instead sought to continue the joint legal custody arrangement and enjoy periodic visitation with the child in Texas. After a hearing, Family Court awarded the father sole legal and physical custody of the child and ordered that, in light of the mother’s present circumstances, all visitation with the child take place in New York. The mother appeals, and we affirm.

Family Court properly awarded sole legal custody to the father. The parties do not dispute that a change of circumstances has occurred since the stipulated order of custody; the mother relocated, she agreed that the father have physical custody of the child, and both parties acknowledged during the hearing that they could not and did not effectively communicate or cooperate with each other. Moreover, the mother admitted to willfully deceiving the father regarding her whereabouts during the pendency of the petition, both in failing to advise the father of her move to Texas and sending postcards to the child with a South Dakota return address, but with a Texas postmark. Evidence was also presented that, following the mother’s relocation to South Dakota, the father was left to make all of the child’s medical and school decisions. According substantial deference to Family Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations (see Matter of Gast v Gast, 50 AD3d 1189, 1189-1190 [2008]; Matter of Eck v Eck, 33 AD3d 1082, 1083 [2006]), we find adequate support for its determination that joint legal custody was [1304]*1304no longer feasible and that an award of sole legal custody to the father would promote the child’s best interests (see Matter of Clupper v Clupper, 56 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2008]; Matter of Ferguson v Whible, 55 AD3d 988, 990 [2008]; Matter of Grant v Grant, 47 AD3d 1027, 1028-1029 [2008]).

Nor did Family Court err in denying the mother visitation with the child in Texas. Like custody determinations, the primary consideration in deciding issues of visitation is the best interests of the child (see Matter of Frierson v Goldston, 9 AD3d 612, 614 [2004]; Matter of Rogowski v Rogowski, 251 AD2d 827, 827 [1998]). Here, Family Court was concerned not with visitation itself, but with visitation between this young boy and his mother in a distant state. Indeed, the mother was awarded visitation with the child as often as she is willing to travel to New York, so long as she provides due notice to the father. Family Court’s decision to restrict visitation to New York was grounded upon the mother’s itinerant lifestyle, the child’s young age and the mother’s lack of insight into her behaviors that proved detrimental to her son. Significantly, the only person the mother knows in Texas is a “friend” with whom she lives and shares a bed, but who is a stranger to her son. Visitation under these circumstances could perpetuate the child’s behavioral issues which, according to the child’s counselor,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
61 A.D.3d 1302, 878 N.Y.S.2d 804, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shangraw-v-shangraw-nyappdiv-2009.