Shanelle Anquinette Craig v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00038-CR

SHANELLE ANQUINETTE CRAIG, APPELLANT V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court 4 Tarrant County, Texas1

Trial Court No. 1782022, Honorable Andy Porter, Presiding

August 18, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before DOSS and YARBROUGH and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant, Shanelle Anquinette Craig, appeals from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating her guilty of injury to a child2 and sentencing her to nine years of confinement.

1 Originally appealed to the Second Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the

Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 73.001. Should a conflict exist between the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals and this Court on any relevant issue, we apply the precedent of the Second Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.04(f).

Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders3 brief and a motion to withdraw, concluding that no arguable ground for reversal exists. Appellant has filed a pro se response. Because our independent review of the record confirms counsel’s assessment, we modify the bill of costs and affirm the judgment as modified.

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from an adjudication of guilt following an earlier order of deferred adjudication. Appellant was indicted for the first-degree felony of injury to a child causing serious bodily injury after the death of her three-month-old daughter. She then pleaded guilty to the lesser third-degree felony of injury to a child causing bodily injury. The trial court admonished Appellant of her rights, and she signed both a waiver of rights and a judicial confession. Consistent with the plea agreement, the court deferred a finding of guilt and placed Appellant on community supervision for seven years. Among other conditions, Appellant was to commit no offense against the laws of this State, any other state, or the United States; report to the Tarrant County Community Supervision and Corrections Department at least monthly or as scheduled; submit undiluted urine samples; and complete 472 hours of community service at a rate of no fewer than eight hours per month.

About a year and a half later, the State moved to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The motion alleged that Appellant caused bodily injury to her boyfriend on two occasions, submitted a diluted urine sample, failed to report, and completed no

3 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).

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community service. Appellant pleaded not true to each allegation except the community- service allegation, to which she pleaded true with an explanation.

The State offered the testimony of the two officers who responded to the assault calls and of Appellant’s probation officer. Each officer testified that Appellant’s boyfriend described an assault and that he appeared credible. The probation officer testified that Appellant missed a scheduled reporting month and had performed no community service.

Appellant testified in her own defense. She testified that her boyfriend was the aggressor and had lied to the court, and that a new job, visitations with Child Protective Services, hearings, and required services left her with little time. She also testified that homelessness made community service difficult, and that she sprained her ankle days before her reporting date. The trial court found the two assault allegations, the failure to report, and the failure to complete community service true.4 The court found the diluted- sample allegation not true. The court adjudicated Appellant guilty and assessed punishment at nine years of confinement. This appeal followed.

ANDERS FRAMEWORK

An Anders brief must present a professional evaluation of the record and explain why the appeal presents no arguable grounds for reversal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). Counsel need not identify specific arguable points where none exist, but the brief must include record references

4 The trial court found one of the assaults to constitute a misdemeanor.

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and pertinent legal authorities. Id.; Davis v. State, 683 S.W.3d 828, 829–30 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2023, no pet.).

Counsel has met these requirements, certifying that he found no reversible error after a diligent search of the record, and he provided Appellant with the brief, the motion to withdraw, and the appellate record. Counsel also notified Appellant of her rights to file a pro se response and a pro se petition for discretionary review.

Appellant filed a response raising three complaints. She argues that she is innocent of the offense to which she pleaded guilty, that the State withheld favorable evidence,5 and that the attorneys who represented her before her guilty plea rendered ineffective assistance, resulting in an involuntary guilty plea.

We find that none of the issues Appellant presents demonstrates an arguable ground for reversal. The innocence claim challenges Appellant’s guilt of injury to a child. Appellant pleaded guilty to that offense, signed a waiver of her rights and a judicial confession, and accepted deferred adjudication under a plea agreement that waived her right to appeal. A defendant placed on deferred adjudication must raise any complaint about that original proceeding in an appeal taken when the deferred adjudication is first imposed, and she may not raise it later in an appeal from the adjudication of guilt. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Wright v. State, 506 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Appellant’s guilt is therefore not before us.

5 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 1198, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).We note that Texas prosecutors are also under an obligation, in certain circumstances, to produce evidence in the “possession, custody, or control of the state or any person under contract with the state.” See State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (discussing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 39.14, et seq.).

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The ineffective-assistance claim founders on the same rule. Appellant contends that counsel did not pursue a speedy trial, gave poor advice about the plea, and disregarded her decisions about the objectives of the representation. Each allegation concerns conduct that preceded the plea, so each belonged in an appeal from the order of deferred adjudication. Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661–62 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see Wright v. State, 506 S.W.3d 478, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

That leaves the claim that the State failed to disclose a text message in which Appellant’s sister recanted an earlier statement. Whatever the merits of that contention, a defendant must first alert the trial court to the alleged violation through a timely request for a continuance, an objection, or a motion for new trial. Keeter v. State, 175 S.W.3d 756, 759–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (holding that an appellant cannot raise a Brady complaint for the first time on appeal); Temple v. State, 342 S.W.3d 572, 591 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2010) aff’d on other grounds, 390 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (finding no preservation where the appellant did not complain of the State’s untimely disclosure as soon as the grounds for objection were apparent). Nothing in the record reflects such a request, objection, or motion.

Appellant also asks this Court to add to the clerk’s record several pleadings she filed pro se, before her guilty plea, while she was represented by counsel. A defendant has no right to hybrid representation, so the trial court therefore had no obligation to treat those filings as part of the record. See Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). The documents are also immaterial for the reason discussed above: they predate the plea, and as noted above are therefore not before us in this appeal. See Wright, 506 S.W.3d at 481. We deny the motion.

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MODIFICATION OF THE JUDGMENT

This Court has independently examined the entire record to determine whether any nonfrivolous issue exists. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Our review confirms counsel’s assessment that there is no arguable ground for reversal. Proof of a single violation of the conditions of community supervision supports an adjudication of guilt. Anderson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 805, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Appellant’s plea of true to the community-service allegation, together with her probation officer’s testimony, was enough to support the trial court’s decision to adjudicate. Further, we note that the trial court, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, was free to resolve the disputed allegations against Appellant. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

Although we find no arguable ground for reversal, our review of the record identified one item in the bill of costs that requires correction. The bill assesses a $15.00 time payment fee. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the pendency of an appeal stops the clock for purposes of that fee, and that any time payment fee assessed while an appeal is pending must be struck in its entirety, without prejudice to reassessment after the appellate mandate issues. Dulin v. State, 620 S.W.3d 129, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Here, the fee was assessed while this appeal was pending. We therefore modify the bill of costs to delete it, without prejudice to reassessment if Appellant fails to timely pay the amounts owed after the mandate issues. See id.

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CONCLUSION

We modify the bill of costs to delete the $15.00 time payment fee. The district clerk is directed to prepare and file an amended bill of costs reflecting the modification and to furnish a copy to this Court, Appellant, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. This modification extends to any order to withdraw funds from Appellant’s inmate account. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 501.014(e); Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 321 (Tex. 2009). Finding no arguable ground for appellate review, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny Appellant’s motion to send exhibits, and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.6

Lawrence M. Doss

Justice

Do not publish.

6 Counsel shall, within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the

opinion and judgment, along with notification of Appellant’s right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4. This duty is informational and ministerial in nature, does not involve legal advice, and continues after this Court grants counsel’s motion to withdraw. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 411 n.33.