SHANE WEEKS & Another v. GEORGE STALCUP & Another.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: November 12, 2024
• Docket: 23-P-0997
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-997

SHANE WEEKS & another1

vs.

GEORGE STALCUP & another.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following the dismissal of a summary process action with

prejudice pursuant to a stipulation agreement, the plaintiffs,

Shane and Kaycee Weeks (landlords), filed suit against the

defendants, George and Alane Stalcup (tenants), for damage to

the rental premises in violation of the parties' prior lease

agreement. A Housing Court judge granted summary judgment to

the tenants and dismissed the suit on the basis that the

landlords' claims were waived by the stipulation. On appeal,

the landlords argue that the judge erred in granting summary

judgment because a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice is

1 Kaycee Weeks.

2 Alane Stalcup. distinguishable from a general release of all claims. They

further contend that they could not have raised a claim for

damage to the premises in the summary process action, and,

because they were not in possession at the time the stipulation

was filed, they could not have known of any physical damage to

the premises. We affirm.

Discussion. On appeal, "[w]e review a grant of summary

judgment de novo." Miller v. Cotter, 448 Mass. 671, 676 (2007).

We look to the summary judgment record to determine "whether,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and

the nonmoving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120

(1991). See Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), as amended, 436 Mass. 1404

(2002). The landlords primarily contend that the judge erred in

granting summary judgment because a stipulation of dismissal in

a summary process action is distinguishable from a general

release of all past, present, and potential future claims.

Although this principle is true so far as it goes, it does not

change the fact that the stipulation here waived all claims

between the parties.

"A settlement agreement is a contract and its

enforceability is determined by applying general contract law."

2 Dacey v. Burgess, 491 Mass. 311, 318 (2023), quoting Sparrow v.

Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 327 (2012). "Once judgment is entered

based on the parties' voluntary settlement, the judgment

'conclusively determines the rights of the parties as to all

matters within its scope.'" Dacey, supra at 315, quoting Kelton

Corp. v. County of Worcester, 426 Mass. 355, 359 (1997). "[A]

release may be prompted by the settlement of a specific dispute

or resolution of a specific issue, but broad wording in the

release operates to settle all other, unrelated matters, even if

they were not specifically in the parties' minds at the time the

release was executed." Eck v. Godbout, 444 Mass. 724, 728

(2005). When a release is clear, "unambiguous and

comprehensive," it should be enforced according to its terms.

Cormier v. Central Mass. Chapter of the Nat'l Safety Council,

416 Mass. 286, 288 (1993). Indeed, "Massachusetts law favors

the enforcement of releases." Sharon v. Newton, 437 Mass. 99,

105 (2002).

Here, the landlords voluntarily entered into the

stipulation with the tenants, under which they agreed that,

"[e]xcept as to enforce the terms of this Stipulation, all

parties waive any claims and counterclaims with prejudice."

When, as here, the parties agree to waive "any" claims and

counterclaims, without language limiting the scope of the

3 agreement to only those claims available or specifically raised

in the underlying action, the agreement cannot be construed

narrowly in the manner urged by the landlords.3 Contrast Leblanc

v. Friedman, 438 Mass. 592, 598-599 (2003) (release containing

limiting language referencing all claims related to specific

procedure constituted release of only claims arising out of that

procedure). As the judge aptly noted, the landlords "could have

reserved their rights to claim such damages" that they sought in

this action by carving out future claims for damage to the

premises beyond normal wear and tear, or by qualifying "any" to

refer only to those claims raised in the summary process

complaint, but they did not. That the landlords might have

subjectively intended for the provision to be so limited "do[es]

not furnish a basis for avoiding the release on the ground of

mistake." Cormier, 416 Mass. at 289.

The landlords further contend that because they could not

have raised a claim for physical damage to the premises in the

summary process action, they cannot now be barred from seeking

such damages. While it is true that in a summary process

3 While the landlords cite to Mass. R. Civ. P. 41, 365 Mass. 803 (1974), for the proposition that a stipulation of dismissal "refer[s] only to those allegations in the complaint and pleadings at hand," nothing in the rule limits the parties' ability to release other claims related to the tenancy, and they do not point to any other authority to support this contention.

4 action, "[r]elief available to a landlord is limited to

possession or payment for rent or use and occupation," Jinwala

v. Bizzaro, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 7 n.4 (1987), this limitation

did not preclude the parties from entering into an agreement to

release other claims related to the tenancy. See Dacey, 491

Mass. at 313, 315-316. Indeed, the parties did just that by

further stipulating that "[a]ny property remaining at or about

the premises may be disposed of by [the landlords]," a provision

accounting for matters beyond either possession or nonpayment of

rent.

As to the landlords' argument that they could not have

known of any physical damage to the rental premises while they

were not in possession, we are not persuaded. To start, the

argument is based on a factual premise that is contrary to the

language of the stipulation.4 The landlords, moreover, retained

in the lease agreement a right of entry "at all reasonable times

during the term of [the lease] . . . for the purpose of

inspecting the [p]remises," and for "making any repairs,

additions or alterations as may be deemed appropriate." See

G. L. c. 186, § 15B (1) (a). That the landlords did not

exercise this right does not render the possibility of damage

4 As of the date of the stipulation, November 15, 2021, the parties agreed that the tenants had "vacated the premises" and "ceded possession of the premises to plaintiff [Shane Weeks]."

5 undiscoverable, and, significantly, does not otherwise affect

the broad language of the stipulation.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Blake, Ditkoff & D'Angelo, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: November 12, 2024.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.