Shandong Huarong General Group Corp. v. United States

31 Ct. Int'l Trade 42, 2007 CIT 4
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedJanuary 9, 2007
DocketCourt 01-00858
StatusPublished

This text of 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 42 (Shandong Huarong General Group Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shandong Huarong General Group Corp. v. United States, 31 Ct. Int'l Trade 42, 2007 CIT 4 (cit 2007).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

EATON, Judge:

This matter is before the court following a third remand to the United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce” or the “Department”). 1 In Shandong Huarong General Group Corporation v. United States, 29 CIT _, Slip Op. 05-129 (Sept. 27, 2005) (not published in the Federal Supplement) (“Huarong IIP’), the court remanded the Department’s second remand determination in the ninth administrative review of the antidumping duty order covering the importation of heavy forged hand tools (“HFHTs”) from the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). See HFHTs From the PRC, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,026 (ITA Sept. 17, 2001) (final determination) (“Final Results”). Plaintiffs Shandong Huarong General Group Corporation (“Huarong”) and Liaoning Machinery Import & Export Corporation (“LMC”) (collectively “plaintiffs” or the “Companies”) challenged that determination with respect to the Department’s decision to apply adverse facts available (“AFA”) and to assign the Companies a 139.31 percent 2 dumping rate to their sales of bars and wedges. 3 The court found that Commerce failed to support its selection of the 139.31 *43 percent rate with substantial evidence, that the rate was aberrational and punitive, and remanded the determination with instructions for Commerce to select another justifiable rate. On the third remand, Commerce selected a rate of 47.88 percent to apply as AFA. See Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand (ITA Mar. 3, 2006) (“Third Remand Determination”) at 1. The Companies now challenge the Department’s selection on remand of the 47.88 percent rate applicable to their sales of bars and wedges. Jurisdiction lies with 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (2000) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(iii) (2000). For the following reasons, the court sustains Commerce’s Third Remand Determination.

Background

The facts of this case have been set forth adequately in the court’s prior opinions. A brief discussion of the facts relevant to the instant action follows. In the Final Results, Commerce used AFA to set the Companies’ dumping margins and assigned the Companies the PRC-wide rate of 47.88 percent for their sales of bars and wedges. See Final Results, 66 Fed. Reg. at 48,028. The court agreed that Commerce supported with substantial evidence its application of AFA to the Companies, but because it found that the Companies had demonstrated their independence from the PRC-wide entity, it remanded the Final Results and instructed Commerce to assign the Companies separate rates. See Shandong Huarong Gen. Group Corp. v. United States, 27 CIT 1568, 1596 (2003) (not published in the Federal Supplement) (“Huarong /”); see also Third Remand Determination at 5 (“Huarong received AFA, in part, because it failed to report certain transactions as being its own sales, rather than another company’s sales, while LMC received AFA because certain transactions it reported as its own sales were, in fact, made by another company.”). On remand, Commerce found that the Companies were entitled to separate rates and assigned each of them an individual rate of 139.31 percent. That rate was the highest antidumping duty rate from any prior segment of the proceeding. Because it found that the Department failed to justify its selection of the 139.31 percent rate, the court again remanded the matter. See Shandong Huarong Gen. *44 Group Corp. v. United States, 28 CIT _, _, Slip Op. 04-117 at 17-18 (Sept. 13, 2004) (not published in the Federal Supplement) (“Huarong IF).

In accordance with the court’s remand, the Department attempted to explain its decision to apply the 139.31 percent rate to the Companies’ sales of bars and wedges, but the court found the effort insufficient. See Huarong III, 29 CIT at _, Slip Op. 05-129 at 21-22. Specifically, the court found the rate both aberrational and punitive, and further concluded that Commerce failed to support adequately the reasonableness and the relevance of that rate to the Companies’ sales. The court remanded the matter for a third time with instructions for the Department to choose from the following two rates: “(1) the Companies’ rates from a previous review, with a built-in increase as a deterrent to non-compliance; or (2) a calculated rate that accurately reflects what the Companies’ rates would have been had they cooperated, with a built-in increase as a deterrent to noncompliance.” Id. at , Slip Op. 05-129 at 22.

In the Third Remand Determination, Commerce returned to the rate of 47.88 percent, which is both the country-wide rate in this administrative review and the rate calculated for another company in the 1992-1993 administrative review. See Third Remand Determination at 1, 4. For the reasons that follow, the court sustains the selection of that rate.

Standard op Review

The court “shall hold unlawful any determination, finding, or conclusion found ... to be unsupported by substantial evidence on the record or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(l)(B)(i). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States, 322 F.3d 1369, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The existence of substantial evidence is determined “by considering the record as a whole, including evidence that supports as well as evidence that ‘fairly detracts from the sub-stantiality of the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Atl. Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).

Discussion

When selecting a rate to apply as AFA, “Commerce must do more than assume any prior calculated margin for the industry is reliable and relevant.” Ferro Union, Inc. v. United States, 23 CIT 178, 204, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1334 (1999). Indeed, “[i]n order to comply with the statute and the [Statement of Administrative Action]’s statement that corroborated information is probative information, Commerce must assure itself that the margin it applies is relevant, and not outdated, or lacking a rational relationship to [the respondent].” Id. at *45 205, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.

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Related

Ferro Union, Inc. v. United States
44 F. Supp. 2d 1310 (Court of International Trade, 1999)
Huaiyin Foreign Trade Corp. (30) v. United States
322 F.3d 1369 (Federal Circuit, 2003)

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