Shamrock Oil & Gas Corporation v. Coffee

140 F.2d 409, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4384
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 3, 1944
Docket10700
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 140 F.2d 409 (Shamrock Oil & Gas Corporation v. Coffee) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corporation v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4384 (5th Cir. 1944).

Opinion

*410 WALLER, Circuit Judge.

Appellee, as lessor under two oil and gas leases covering lands in the sour gas area of Moore County, Texas, brought suit to recover the difference between the sum that had been paid plaintiff and a sum alleged to be due plaintiff, as royalty, from July 1, 1937, to December 31, 1942. The leases, contain the following applicable royalty provisions: “B. On gas produced from said land and sold or used off the land, or in the manufacture of gasoline, including casinghead gas, the market price at the well of Ys of the gas so sold or used, provided that if and when lessee shall sell gas at the wells, lessor’s royalty thereon shall be % of the amount realized from such sale.”

The contentions are: (1) That the defendant during the period in question did not pay the plaintiff the market price at the well of the gas taken. (2) That if there was no established market price at the well, then the defendant had not paid the plaintiff the actual value of the gas at the well where taken.

Under the contract the defendant took the gas from wells which it had drilled on the plaintiff’s land and transported same through the pipes of its gathering system to its plant. In the process of gathering and transporting gas from well to plant it be-becomes commingled with large volumes of similar gas from other wells. At the plant of the defendant the gas was used for manufacturing gasoline, butane, and propane. The residue was sold by the lessee principally to carbon black plants for utilization in the manufacture of carbon black. Defendant made monthly settlements with the plaintiff for the gas so produced in sums which it says represented the market price at the well of the gas produced. The correctness of the volume of gas produced is not involved. An interesting discussion of the Panhandle Gas Field, distinguishing the uses and properties of sweet and sour gas, is found in Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp. v. Thompson, D.C., 14 F.Supp. 318, and also, Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 57 S.Ct. 364, 81 L.Ed. 510, to which reference is hereby made for a discussion of conditions and circumstances affecting the market of sour gas in the area of production at the time of making the contract here in question. Since making the contract here involved, plants have been erected for processing the raw sour gas into butane and propane in addition to gasoline and carbon black. The manufacture of carbon black has been made lawful and facilities have in. recent years been established for such purpose in the. area in question. Because of these added uses and facilities plaintiff insists that there is an added market value.

The lower court, in its oral opinion, after reviewing the situation at some length, concludes: “Laying aside the fact to a degree that there has been some transactions made that warranted a higher price, we think that for the greater period covered by this suit that that gas was reasonably worth and had a value, under the circumstances, of one cent per thousand cubic feet, and we think that during the past twelve months for the calendar year 1942, that recognition should be taken of the upsurge and uses of the products of natural gas, and that for the year 1942 a fair price would be something like $.014 per thousand cubic feet, and if the parties will figure out a judgment on that basis it will be the judgment of the Court.” (Italics added.)

The court below, in its oral as well as its written findings, used the phrases “market price”, “market value”, and “reasonably worth” more or less interchangeably, and came to the conclusion that the gas was “reasonably worth and had a value” under the circumstances of $.01 per m. c. f. for a part of the period, and that “a fair price” would be something like $.014 per m. c. f. for the past twelve months.

The contract is that if Shamrock sold the gas at the mouth of the well the royalty owners would take their part of what it sold for. In the event the gas were used by Shamrock to make gasoline or otherwise, or was sold after being removed -from the lease, the royalty owners were to have the “market price” at the mouth of the well. A little was sold to drillers and the like away from the lease, but it is negligible, and would fall under the market price provision. The great bulk of the gas was used to extract gasoline and butane, with the residue sold for carbon black. The “market price” at the well is, therefore, the only applicable contract provision.

Market price is the price that is actually paid by buyers for the same commodity in the same market. It is not necessarily the same as “market value” or “fair market value” or “reasonable worth”* Price can only be proved by actual transactions. Value or worth, which is often resorted to when there is no market price *411 provable, may be a matter of opinion. There may be wide difference between them. 1 The first inquiry here must be whether there was a market price. All the witnesses say that gas like this was bought at the mouth of the well continually in this field. A market price therefore existed and was admittedly proven by actual sales. Opinions and estimates, and particularly ■consideration of what the buyers could have paid or should have paid, are entirely irrelevant.

The sixth paragraph of the written findings of fact of the court below is as follows : “6. That the market relied upon by defendant to sustain market value from July 1, 1937 to date of trial was not a free, open and competitive market but was a suppressed market, and such distress price reflected by the use of the schedules adopted by the Natural Gasoline Association of America and the payment for the gasoline portion on the field or charcoal test rather than of actual recovery was not the regular or fair market value at the wells where produced. That the fair market value of said gas at the wells where produced in Moore County, Texas including the wells involved herein was 10 per m. c. f. during the period of time from July 1, 1937 to December 31, 1941, and was 1.40 per m. c. f. from January 1, 1942 to December 31, 1942.” (Italics added.)

We are not clear as to exactly what the lower court meant in its references to “suppressed market” and “distress price”. The history of the sour gas in the Panhandle Field is that the sour gas was for many years undesirable, that the supply greatly exceeded the demand, that millions of cubic feet were pumped into the air, but on the other hand the demand for sweet gas, also produced in great quantities in other sections of the Panhandle area, was much greater. If the court below in the use of the term “suppressed market” or “distress price” had reference to the above conditions and that it was a buyers’ market, such findings are justified, by the experience of the area, but there is no evidence in the record to show that there was any combination, agreement, conspiracy, or confederation whatsoever among the buyers to suppress the market for sour gas. On the contrary, it appears that there was competition. The fact that the seller had to take what the buyer offered is not the question before the court, but the first question is were there sales at the well of sour gas in this area during the period? If sales were made, a market price is established.

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Bluebook (online)
140 F.2d 409, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4384, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shamrock-oil-gas-corporation-v-coffee-ca5-1944.