Shalonda Holloman v. Department of Defense

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedNovember 27, 2023
DocketDE-315H-23-0048-I-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Shalonda Holloman v. Department of Defense (Shalonda Holloman v. Department of Defense) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Shalonda Holloman v. Department of Defense, (Miss. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

SHALONDA HOLLOMAN, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-22-0072-I-2

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DATE: November 27, 2023 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Shalonda Holloman , Mansfield, Texas, pro se.

John D. Norquist , Esquire, and Kristina Letcher , Esquire, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s removal for excessive absences. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b). ¶2 The “efficiency of the service” standard of 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) is the “ultimate criterion” for determining both whether any discipline is warranted and whether a particular penalty may be sustained. Owens v. Department of Homeland Security, 2023 MSPB 7, ¶ 15. The Board has held that “an absence for which no foreseeable end is in sight constitutes a burden which no employer can efficiently endure.” Ward v. General Services Administration, 28 M.S.P.R. 207, 209 (1985). Here, because the appellant’s testimony that she returned to work prior to the agency’s removal action was undisputed, the administrative judge found that the agency did not show that the appellant’s absences lacked a foreseeable end. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 25, Initial Decision (ID) at 7. Thus, the appellant’s removal did not promote the efficiency of the service and could not be sustained. ID at 7-8. ¶3 On petition for review, the agency argues, among other things, that the administrative judge erred by not allowing it to supplement the record with the appellant’s time and attendance records in rebuttal to the appellant’s testimony. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5 n.1; ID at 3 n.2; IAF, Tabs 19, 22. Once the record closes, additional evidence or argument will ordinarily not be accepted unless: (1) the party submitting it shows that the evidence or argument 3

was not readily available before the record closed; or (2) it is in rebuttal to new evidence or argument submitted by the other party just before the record closed. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(c). Here, the administrative judge informed the agency of its burden of establishing that the removal promoted the efficiency of the service and that whether the absence had “no foreseeable end” in sight was integral to its burden. IAF, Tab 15 at 3-4. Under the particular circumstances of this case, we do not consider the appellant’s testimony that she returned to work to be new evidence or argument submitted by the other party just before the record closed. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion by the administrative judge in denying the agency’s motion to supplement the record. ID at 3 n.2; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.59(c). ¶4 For the first time in its petition for review, the agency argues that the appellant’s return to work by teleworking was inadequate to constitute a “foreseeable end” to her absences. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 10. It argues that the appellant was required to be physically present in the office. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 10. It also argues that she did not accomplish much in the few weeks she resumed work prior to her removal. Id. The Board generally will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget , 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 34 n. 10; Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980). The agency has not made such a showing here. ¶5 In addition, the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision. See Spivey v. Department of Justice, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 15; Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980). We have reviewed the appellant’s time records and agree with the administrative judge that they support the appellant’s testimony that she returned to work and thus would not change the outcome of this appeal. ID at 3 n.2; IAF, Tab 22 at 4-5, 8. We have also considered the agency’s arguments that the 4

appellant was not permitted to telework and was unproductive, and, weighing them against the appellant’s arguments and evidence submitted in response, we are unpersuaded. IAF, Tab 23 at 5, 54, 67-68, 89; PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6, 10, Tab 3 at 7-9. Accordingly, we deny the agency’s petition for review and affirm the initial decision. ¶6 Lastly, we note that the appellant has raised challenges to the agency’s certification that it has provided interim relief. PFR File, Tab 3 at 11-12; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.116(b). However, we find that the agency’s petition does not meet the criteria for review, and the issuance of our final decision renders moot any dispute concerning the agency’s compliance with the interim relief order. Owens, 2023 MSPB 7, ¶ 10. If the appellant believes that the agency is in noncompliance with the Board’s final order, she may file a petition for enforcement in accordance with the instructions provided below. Id. For these same reasons, we will not consider the agency’s challenges to the interim relief ordered by the administrative judge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12, 15-16; see Ginocchi v. Department of the Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R. 62, n.6 (1992) (explaining that the Board does not entertain interim compliance proceedings in a petition for review).

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Shalonda Holloman v. Department of Defense, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/shalonda-holloman-v-department-of-defense-mspb-2023.