Shakur v. Swalls

District Court, S.D. Illinois·Decided August 13, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-00042·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

RAHEEM SHAKUR, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) Case No. 3:20-cv-00042-GCS MATTHEW SWALLS, PENNY ) GEORGE, VIPIN SHAH, and ) KIMBERLY BIRCH, ) ) Defendants. ) ) )

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

SISON, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Raheem Shakur is an inmate currently in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) and is incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center. On January 10, 2020, Plaintiff brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights while he was housed at Vienna Correctional Center (“Vienna”). (Doc. 1). After preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on one count; the complaint alleges that Defendants Birch, Shah, Swalls, and George were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 11, p. 2). Now before the Court is Defendant Birch’s and Defendant Shah’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of remedies. (Doc. 74). For the reasons delineated below, the motion for summary judgment is DENIED. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference is predicated on Defendant Birch’s and Defendant Shah’s failure to appropriately treat a cyst in his right kidney, even after

Plaintiff complained of new pain in 2017. (Doc. 11, p. 2). In 2019, Plaintiff requested a copy of his medical records, which included an MRI report from 2017, showing a cyst in his kidney. Id. Plaintiff then spoke with Defendant Birch about the pain on November 13, 2019. Id. However, Defendant Birch told him that they could not do anything to treat the cyst and continued Plaintiff on Tramadol. Id. She also refused Plaintiff’s request to see a

specialist. Id. Defendant Shah prescribed Plaintiff Cymbalta for pain relief but took no other actions. Id. Plaintiff’s grievance records contain one grievance potentially relevant to treatment for his pain and cysts, which is dated August 2, 2019 (the “August 2nd grievance”).1 In this grievance, Plaintiff states that he was sent for an MRI on February

25, 2017. (Doc. 75, Exh. A, p. 15). After the MRI, between May and June 2018, Plaintiff met with Defendant Shah, but during the meeting, Defendant Shah was unable to locate his

1 Defendants Birch and Shah also identify a second grievance, dated October 17, 2017, as potentially relevant. (Doc. 75, p. 2). However, Plaintiff argued in his responsive filing that this grievance was not applicable. (Doc. 76). During Defendants’ cross-examination of Plaintiff on this issue, Plaintiff agreed that this grievance did not apply in this matter, and he was not asserting it as a defense to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore declines to consider that grievance now.

Plaintiff also asserted during the hearing that he filed two additional grievances in November and December 2019, which Vienna officials never addressed. The record shows some evidence of this grievance, as Plaintiff’s Cumulative Counseling Record refers to a grievance filed on November 5, 2019 reasserting the complaints made in his August 2nd grievance. (Doc. 75, Exh. A, p. 9). The Court finds Plaintiff’s testimony regarding these grievances credible. However, because Plaintiff’s August 2nd grievance fully exhausted his administrative remedies for this claim, the Court declines to consider those grievances at this time. previous MRI. Id. at p. 16. Plaintiff continued to complain to Defendant Shah about “persistent” soreness in his kidney area; during a May 11, 2018 visit, Defendant Shah

continued Plaintiff’s prescription for Tramadol, a pain reliever, and also prescribed Cymbalta. Id. Plaintiff also states that Defendant Shah, Defendant Birch, and the Health Care Administrator at Vienna failed to provide treatment or follow-up appointments for Plaintiff’s cyst as of August 2, 2019. Id. Plaintiff’s Grievance Officer received this grievance on August 22, 2019. (Doc. 75, Exh. A, p. 14). On October 1, 2019, the Grievance Officer denied the grievance based “on

a total review of all information.” Id. The Grievance Officer noted that Health Care Unit staff saw Plaintiff “numerous times,” that Plaintiff “has not complained of any kidney issues,” and that “his labs are also normal.” Id. Neither the Grievance Officer nor the Chief Administrative Officer, who completed his review of the August 2nd grievance on October 3, 2019, made any mention of procedural deficiencies in Plaintiff’s grievance. Id.

The ARB reviewed Plaintiff’s appeal of this denial on October 15, 2019. Id. at p. 17. Because Plaintiff failed to properly cite dates on which the incidents in question occurred, the ARB denied Plaintiff’s appeal. Id. LEGAL STANDARDS Summary judgment is proper when a moving party demonstrates that the record

cannot establish the presence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a). In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must provide admissible evidence from which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non- moving party. See Maclin v. SBC Ameritech, 520 F.3d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 2008). Traditionally, the Court’s role in determining a motion for summary judgment is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence, judge witness credibility, or determine the truth of the matter,

but is instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Nat’l Athletic Sportwear Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 528 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2008). However, in Pavey v. Conley, the Seventh Circuit held that a judge, rather than a jury, should determine whether factual issues relating to the defense of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies exist. 544 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2008). If the Court determines that a prisoner did not exhaust his administrative remedies, the Court will outline one of three potential

outcomes: (a) if the plaintiff still has time to do so, the plaintiff must go back and exhaust his administrative remedies; (b) if the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust was innocent, as where prison officials prevent a prisoner from exhausting his remedies, the plaintiff must be given another chance to exhaust; or (c) if the failure to exhaust was the prisoner’s fault, the case is over. Id. at 742.

The PLRA governs lawsuits filed by inmates and states that “no action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In order to satisfy the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, prisoners must strictly adhere to the

grievance process. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). Prisoners must exhaust their remedies before filing suit. See Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 398 (7th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff cannot file suit and then exhaust administrative remedies while that suit is pending. Id.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Shakur v. Swalls, (S.D. Ill. 2021).

Shakur v. Swalls (Shakur v. Swalls) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Porter v. Nussle
534 U.S. 516 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Maddox v. Love
655 F.3d 709 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Bobby Ford v. Donald Johnson
362 F.3d 395 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Anthony Riccardo v. Larry Rausch
375 F.3d 521 (Seventh Circuit, 2004)
Bahri Begolli v. Home Depot, U.S.A.
701 F.3d 1158 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
MacLin v. SBC AMERITECH
520 F.3d 781 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Pavey v. Conley
544 F.3d 739 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
Carl McDaniel v. Michael Meisner
617 F. App'x 553 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Johnson v. Johnson
385 F.3d 503 (Fifth Circuit, 2004)